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I. DEATHWATCHES
The other night I saw a documentary on television about
some elephants in Botswana.1 The herd was in trouble. Water
was scarce, and the elephants were on the move. They trav-
elled north to the Linyanti River, following the ancient paths
of their ancestors. An elderly cow staggered behind the others,
weakened from starvation, dehydration, and advanced age.
Suddenly she slipped in the sand. The wind blew so fiercely
across the hot, dry land that when she fell only a muffled cry
could be heard over the white howl of air in motion. It was like
* Associate Professor of Law, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro
College. I would like to thank the following students for their excellent re-
search assistance: Irwin J. Berkowitz, Nancy Ellis, Margie Forbes, and Leslie
Ann Rosenstein. I would also like to express my gratitude to Charles B.
Wheeler for his editorial assistance and to Marsha L. Freeman, Susan J. Goss,
Beth Mobley and Geraldene Roselle of the Touro Law Center Library for
their dogged and cheerful pursuit of arcane materials.
This piece is dedicated to my father, John E. Harmon, Jr.-to his soul and
to the trillium in the ravine.
1. Journey to the Forgotten River (PBS television broadcast, Mar. 14,
1990). In Botswana, the animals had relied on the Linyanti River and the
Savuti Channel for water. In 1982, seismic shifts and a severe drought oc-
curred. The rainwater pans dried out and drained the Savuti, forcing the ani-
mals to retreat 70 miles north to the Linyanti. Thousands of buffalo, zebra,
elephants and other animals trudged through the dust in the searing heat. Id-
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watching a silent movie. Her legs sprawled and dangled; her
parched body almost rolled over, propelled by her weight and
the speed of her fall. Her head arched back; her trunk curled;
her mouth opened wide in a protest of pain. But the sound of
her body as it hit the ground could not be heard over the unre-
lenting wind. At least I could not hear it as I drank a cup of
coffee and watched her die from my cozy kitchen on Long
Island.
As she lay there panting on the ground, the narrator com-
mented in his neutral male voice, the voice of science and rea-
son, "They wait, clearly reluctant to leave her. In the blazing
sun, she became dehydrated. Because the survival of the herd
is more important than the life of an individual, the old cow is
left to die-alone."2
Then, because the medium of film forces us to see the
world through the eyes of another, I too, like the elephants,
had to move on, following the herd as it crossed the wheat-
colored land in search of food and water. And I too, like the
elephants, wanted to stay with her. I did not want her to die
alone.
Elephants attend the births and deaths of members of their
species. When an elephant calf is born, some of the herd will
encircle the mother, acting as midwives and sentries. When the
calf is delivered, the attendants will trumpet loudly, swaying
their bodies and flapping their ears. Then they will fondle and
caress the dark, damp baby and help it to stand. After the cele-
bration is over, a hush will descend upon the herd.3 Perhaps
the elephants fall silent out of respect for the new family; per-
haps out of fatigue; perhaps out of wonder, if there is such a
thing as elephant wonder. I see no reason why there should
not be.
At the end of life, an elephant rarely dies alone. The same
research team that filmed the fallen cow in Botswana also doc-
umented the death of an old bull. After the elephant had
fallen, the other members of the herd huddled around him.
Four hours later, when he died, they approached his body in
twos and threes,
sweeping their trunks slowly over him, not touching him for the most
part but maintaining an inch of distance between his skin and the
moist tips of their trunks. The ritual was more impressive for its si-
lence. Not a rumble was uttered, and no scraping of skin or sand
2. Id.
3. RAMEsH BEDI, ELEPHANT: LORD OF THE JUNGLE 19 (1969).
Vol. 77:1
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broke the afternoon stillness.4
There is beauty in their gestures, in their shared silence, in
the very fact that they attend.
When I first learned about the complex social behavior of
whales and dolphins, it occurred to me that, in many ways,
these cetaceans were just like wet elephants.5 Like elephants,6
whales and dolphins exhibit what animal behaviorists call
"epimeletic" behavior, the succorant behavior of the adult
members of a group toward another adult that is in distress or
dying.7
There are different kinds of epimeletic behavior. One kind
4. Dereck Joubert, Eyewitness to an Elephant Wake, 179 NAT'L GEO-
GRAPHIC, May 1991, at 39, 40.
Elephants are particularly vigilant when their young die, for they are
loath to let go. One African cow carried about her calf that had been dead for
two days. She would put it down to eat or drink, but then would pick it up
again when she moved on. BEDI, supra note 3, at 62.
Elephants also mourn their dead. Lakshmi, an elderly circus cow, died of
grief after the death of her longtime mate. 'Lakshmi continued to walk
around the empty post of her departed companion and would not be consoled."
Id at 64. She stopped eating when he died and, within two weeks, was dead as
well. Id
5. '"The order Cetacea is divided into three suborders: the Archaeoceti,
all of which are extinct and known only from fossil remains; the Odontoceti or
toothed whales, containing the majority of the living species forming the or-
der, and the Mysticeti, the whalebone or baleen whales." L. HARRISON MAT-
THEWS, THE NATURAL HIsTORY OF THE WHALE 25 (1978).
"Most of the members of the Odontoceti are comparatively small
porpoises and dolphins, though some, such as the Beaked whales and the
Killer whale, reach a length of 30 feet and one, the Sperm whale, reaches 60
feet or more." Id at 28. While the number of species of whalebone whales,
the Mysticeti, is small, each animal is enormous individually. The Mysticeti
include such mammoths as the Humpback whale, the Blue whale and the Fin
whale. The Blue whale can measure one hundred feet or more. Id. at 43-46.
6. There are many documented instances of elephants helping a member
of the herd in distress or appearing unwilling to desert an injured member. In
one account, a bull, wounded by a gunshot, fell to the ground. His three adult
male companions "closed in on him, one on either side and one behind, and
they just boosted him on to his feet and, in that formation, supporting him on
either side, set off, wheeling gradually round to the left and back to the for-
est." RICHARD CARRINGTON, ELEPHANTS 83 (1958) (quoting DAvID E. BLUNT,
ELEPHANT 97-98 (1933)).
Another elephant watcher reported that most accounts described the ef-
forts of cows to assist a stricken bull. While bulls have on occasion helped an-
other bull, there are few reported instances of other elephants trying to help a
stricken cow. Id
7. See generally Melba C. Caldwell & David K. Caldwell, Epimeletic
(Care-giving) Behavior in Cetacea, in WHALES, DOLPHINS, AND PORPOISES 755
(Kenneth S. Norris ed., 1966) (discussing research involving odontocetes).
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is called "standing by," although the old whalers used more
nautical terms such as "heaving to" or "bringing to." When a
cetacean companion is distressed or wounded, the entire school
remains close, or "stands by," even at the risk of danger." In a
second kind of epimeletic behavior, called "excitement," the
succorants approach the distressed animal and make a display
of extreme agitation, sometimes even attempting a rescue.9 A
third kind of epimeletic behavior is called "supporting behav-
ior." Cetaceans exhibit supporting behavior when an animal is
rendered unable to break surface; members of the group will
push him towards the light and air so that he can breathe.10
There have even been reported instances of dolphins pushing a
drowning human swimmer to the surface." The urge to render
aid may even extend to other species. 2
What motivates cetaceans to care for one another? Animal
behaviorists do not agree. Some argue that epimeletic behavior
is nothing more than an instinctive reaction-it is all a matter
of ancient chemistry. 3 Others believe that whales and dol-
phins are capable of altruism,14 but differ on the conditions for
8. MA~nHEWS, supra note 5, at 172.
9. Sperm whales, for example, have been known to attack whale boats
that have harpooned a member of their school, or to push an injured animal
away from a source of danger. Id at 173.
10. While land mammals, particularly other gregarious species like the el-
ephant, may exhibit the other two kinds of epimeletic behavior, only cetaceans
can exhibit "supporting behavior" because they alone live in an aquatic envi-
ronment and must surface at short intervals to breathe. The supporting of a
distressed adult odontocete by its companions is probably an extension of ma-
ternal behavior toward a newborn calf. W. NIGEL BONNER, WHALES 174 (1980).
As soon as the calf is born, the mother pushes it to the surface to draw its first
breath. Frequently, her adult companions assist her. IMi at 173. Much like the
elephants, the group seems to take an active interest in the fate of a newborn.
Bonner refers to other whales, typically other females, who attend a birth
as "aunts." Not only will the "aunts" help the mother push the newborn to-
ward the surface, but they will also help keep other whales in the group away
from the new mother and baby. I& "In Bottlenosed Dolphins, the 'aunt' is
often the only other dolphin that the mother will allow near her calf." I
Naturalists have also observed female odontocetes assisting with the delivery
of the calf. IMi
11. MArHEWS, supra note 5, at 173.
12. C. BONNER, supra note 10, at 173-74 (describing account of whales in
captivity assisting a dolphin in giving birth).
13. The stimulus of seeing an object behave abnormally (for a dolphin or
whale) may cause the instinctive reaction of pushing the object toward the
surface. See MATTHEWS, sup'ra note 5, at 173. "There are no grounds, how-
ever, for imputing any use of intelligence in such acts, nor even for supposing
that the animals know what they are doing." IM.
14. Altruism is generally thought to be the promotion of the good of
others. PETER A. ANGELES, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 7 (1981). "Reciprocal
[Vol. 77:1
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its occurrence.15 All theorists, regardless of their point of view,
warn of the dangers of anthropomorphism. 16
I am not certain that I understand the sin of anthropomor-
phism. Am I supposed not to argue that whales and dolphins
are like human beings, or am I supposed not to argue that
human beings are like whales and dolphins? Or is it just that I
am not to confuse their intelligences, cetacean and human, to
take one for the other?
I am also not certain that it matters. Since I am not an
animal behaviorist, I do not fall under the jurisdiction of their
gods: I can probably commit the sin of anthropomorphism with
impunity. Of course, I might be wrong about this. By virtue of
my tenuous membership in the academy, I may be bound by a
version of intellectual comity.'1 I have crossed the boundaries
altruism... is the sociobiological model for a system in which an individual
performs an altruistic act for another, nonrelated individual. Such an 'altruis-
tic act' is one that engenders a cost to the altruist. The compensating benefit
for this act is delayed, and contingent upon the cooperation of others." Chris-
tine M. Johnson & Kenneth S. Norris, Delphinid Social Organization and So-
cial Behavior, in DOLPHmN COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 335, 342 (Ronald J. Schusterman et al. eds., 1986).
15. Some scholars believe that epimeletic behavior might be attributable
to kin selection. Others suggest that the cetaceans' fluid social structure does
not allow stable schools of related individuals to form. Therefore, a theory of
kin selection could not explain their altruistic behavior. PETER G.H. EVANS,
THE NATURAL HISTORY OF WHALES AND DoLPHINS 203 (1987).
Other naturalists believe that expectations of reciprocity underlie
epimeletic behavior. In the absence of strong evidence that cetaceans can rec-
ognize other individuals (a necessary condition for reciprocity), this theory
seems inapplicable. I& at 204. As one researcher warned, however, "we are
still far from understanding the full content of vocalisations by any species."
16. One of the most deceptive, and therefore one of the most danger-
ous, pitfalls awaiting the observer of dolphins is reliance on anthropo-
morphism.... The observer is led to describe the behavior of the
animal in human terms, and ascribe to the animal motives that he
cannot be sure are actually there, as he is incapable of seeing inside
the mind of the animal to determine its purposes. Some descriptions
of dolphin behavior abound in statements of purpose that can prop-
erly be ascribed only to humans. It is sincerely to be hoped that such
accounts, most of which are misleading and probably inaccurate, will
not gain credence in the literature to the extent that they are believed
implicitly by other workers in the field.
Margaret C. Tavolga, Behavior of the Bottlenose Dolphin, in WHALES, DOL-
PHINS, AND PORPOISES, supra note 7, at 718, 729.
17. "Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obli-
gation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its ter-
ritory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
1992]
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of my own competence, and when venturing into a foreign land,
I may have to submit to the authority of foreign deities.
So perhaps I do sin, but the fact is I recognize the behavior
of those elephants as they gather around a dying bull, sweeping
their trunks over his parched body and facing his death with
reverence. I recognize the behavior of those whales and dol-
phins as they nudge a floundering member of their school to-
wards the air. It does not matter to me if you call the behavior
human or if you call the behavior elephantine or cetacean.
What matters to me is that I have seen the behavior before. I
see something there that has meaning for me.'
My father died last year.
He was ninety-two pounds when he died. During those last
few months, my mother was with him every day, to sit beside
him, to read to him, to tune the radio to his favorite station, to
dress his bedsores, to remind the nurses to turn him over from
side to side. He could not talk or see, but she thought that he
might be able to hear the music, the books, the words of love
and affection.' 9
I was far away. Inside the body they had both given me,
another struggle was going on. As he was painfully pulling
the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
18. I am undoubtedly guilty of taking an anthropocentric approach to the
study of animal behavior. Harry F. Harlow, a scholar of animal psychology,
was unabashed about his commission of this variant of the sin of
anthropomorphism.
Throughout my entire academic life I had never suffered for research
ideas, since I simply stole the research ideas from human studies or
human problems. I always believed that I should never do anything
with monkeys that would not have significance with man... I firmly
believe that one should never study problems in monkeys that cannot
be solved in man. What direction my research might have taken had
this not been true, I have no idea.
E.W. Menzel, Jr., How Can You Tell if an Animal is Intelligent, in DOLPHIN
COGNITION AND BEHAvIOR: A COMPARATIvE APPROACH, supra note 14, at 167,
173 (quoting HARRY F. HARLow & CLARA MEARS, THE HUmAN MODEL: PRI-
MATE PERSPECTIVES 1 (1979)).
19. "Extensive research on the auditory brain-stem function of comatose
patients shows that the majority have normal brain-stem auditory evoked re-
sponses (BAERs), a recording of afferent nerve impulses, regardless of the
level of coma-" John LaPuma, M.D. et al., Talking to Comatose Patients, 45
ARCHIvEs OF NEUROLOGY 20, 21 (1988). Normal BAERs suggest that many co-
matose patients can actually hear. There are anecdotal accounts of comatose
patients who have recovered and can remember the words of encouragement
from doctors and family members. I&x
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away, his granddaughter, curled up tightly inside of me, was
hanging on. Because I was her vessel, I could not move. The
seas were too turbulent. And so we were both bed-bound, my
father and I-each of us intent on an act of creation, a moment
of definition, one of us at the beginning and the other at the
end.
My father managed his mission before I could bring her to
him. I am sorry he did not get to see those dark brown eyes, or
to feel the cool alabaster of her skin. I love her all the more for
the tentative way in which she arrived, but I will always regret
that she kept me in my bed. That I was not able to sit beside
him, read to him, tune the radio to his favorite station, or turn
his fragile body from side to side.
I belonged there, inside that green curtain in the nursing
home, with my mother, my brother and my sister. I wanted to
attend.
In many ways, a dying human being is like any other dying
animal: an organism in extremis. 20 The body's task is win-
nowed down to the bare essentials: heartbeat and breath,
heartbeat and breath. Maintaining homeostasis is all that mat-
ters. The mind-the thinking, expressive, remembering part of
the human being--often withdraws, sacrificed on the crumbling
altar of survival. There is a turning in toward the self, a curva-
ture of the spine that directs the remaining life force towards
the center. The knees of a dying human being are tucked up
under the body; the arms are folded in like a praying mantis, a
caricature of mute supplication. It is more than just a meta-
phor: we literally do curl up and die.2 1
This does not happen in isolation. A human being usually
dies in the presence of others. Someone keeps vigil on his go-
ing out, a vigil known as the deathwatch.22 Depending upon
the time and place, the deathwatch has a distinct mise en sc6ne.
In Western culture, up until the end of the nineteenth century,
the deathwatch looked something like this:
20. "In extremis" means "at the point of death." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DIcTIoNARY 779 (25th ed. 1990).
21. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
22. Originally "deathwatch" referred to a small beetle that makes a tick-
ing sound that supposedly presages death. Since about 1890, it has meant
either "a vigil kept over the dead or dying," or "the guard set over a criminal
before his execution." WEBSTER's NnmrH NEW CoLL GLATE DICIONARY 328
(1991).
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Edvard Munch, Death in the Sick-Room (prob. 1893). Photo-
graph courtesy of the Nasjonalgalleriet, Oslo. By permission
of the Oslo Kommunes Kunstsamlinger Munch-museet and
Arne Munch-Ellingsen
Dying was a public affair. As soon as serious illness made
its presence known, the windows and doors were closed, the
candles were lit, and the sickroom filled up with people.23 Eve-
23. PHILIPPE Amtks, THE HouR OF OuR DEATH 18-19 (1981). Saint-Simon
described a dying woman in the early eighteenth century: "[S]he lay in bed
with all her bed-curtains open, candles all around the room, and women keep-
ing vigil around her.... She summoned all her servants, down to the lowest
one, asked their forgiveness, confessed her sins, and presided... over.., her
own death." LouIS DE ROuvROY SAINT-SIMON, MEMOIRES 486 (1901), quoted in
ARItS, supra, at 18-19.
Franz Kafka described a similar deathwatch occurring almost two centu-
ries later:
The bed was set up in the middle of the room, the candlesticks were
borrowed from friends and relatives. . . Some forty men stood
around his bed all day to receive inspiration from the death of a pious
man. He was conscious until the end and at the right moment, his
hand on his breast, he began to repeat the death prayers. During his
[Vol. 77:1
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ryone came: family, friends, neighbors, fellow workers, the
faithful, sometimes even strangers.24 When Emma Bovary ate
suffering and after his death the grandmother, who was with the wo-
men gathered in the next room, wept incessantly, but while he was
dying she was completely calm because it is a commandment to ease
the death of the dying man as much as one can. 'Vith his own
prayers he passed away." He was much envied for this death that fol-
lowed so pious a life.
FRANz KAFKA, THE DIARIES OF FRNZ KAFKA, 1910-23, at 103-04 (Max Brod
ed., 1964).
A more disturbing Kafkaesque description of a deathwatch occurs in A
Country Doctor. In this story, the family and village elders strip a doctor who
failed to save a boy with a worm-ridden wound. As they strip him, a school
choir sings: "Strip his clothes off, then he'll heal us;/ If he doesn't, kill him
dead?/ Only a doctor, only a doctor." FANz KAFKA, A Country Doctor, in
THE PENGUIN ComPLETE SHORT STORIES OF FRANZ KAFKA 220, 224 (Nahum N.
Glatzer ed., Penguin Books 1983) (1917). Surely, the story is an account of a
doctor's nightmare.
24. In the Jewish tradition, members of the community, discharging their
duties to visit the sick, would attend the deathwatch. One source of Jewish
law concerning visitation of the sick, death and mourning is the Shulhan
Arukh, compiled in the sixteenth century by Rabbi Joseph Karo of Safed.
Rabbi Moses Isserles of Kracow composed the glosses that accompany almost
every paragraph of the work and added traditions of the Ashkenazic commu-
nity to Karo's compilation, which derived primarily from the Sephardic tradi-
tion. JEwISH REFLECTIONS ON DEATH 15 (Jack Riemer ed., 1974).
Chapter 335 of the Shullian Arukh covers visitations of the sick: "It is a
religious duty to visit the sick. Relatives and close friends should enter at
once, others after three days. If the illness is serious, both groups can visit
him at once." SHULHAN ARUIM 335:1 (Chaim N. Denberg trans.), in JEWISH
REFLECTIONS ON DEATH, supra, at 17, 17.
Specific rules govern seating ("One who visits the sick.., should sit in
front of the patient, for the Divine Presence rests above a sick person." Id);
when to visit ("One should not visit the sick during the first three hours of the
day... and not during the last three hours of the day ...." Id); what lan-
guage to pray in (if in the presence of the sick person, in any language; if not
in his presence, in Hebrew. Id- at 18.); whom to visit (Refrain from visiting
those who suffer from diseases that might be too embarrassing or uncomforta-
ble to withstand a visit. Id); and how the sick person should look after his
debts and outstanding credits. I&
Chapter 339 covers how to treat someone who is dying:
One who is dying is considered a living being in all respects. We may
not tie up his jaws, nor remove the pillow from under him, nor place
him on sand, nor summon the town on his behalf, nor close his eyes
before his soul departs. And whoever closes his eyes before death, is
regarded as a murderer. One may not rend garments nor make a lam-
entation for him nor bring a coffin into the house for him before he
dies.
I& at 18-19. Once again, there is a religious duty to attend the dying person:
'WThen a person is about to die one should not leave him so that he does not
depart this life alone. Gloss: It is a mitzvah to stand by a person during the
departure of his soul." Id at 19.
Confession by the dying person is part of the Jewish tradition as well. It
is encouraged "as a rite of passage to another phase of existence .... The con-
1992]
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arsenic, her doctor considered bringing his two sons to witness
her death, "in order to accustom them to great occasions; that
this might be a lesson, an example, a solemn picture, that
should remain in their heads later on."25 Only a maternal veto
kept them away.
There were different roles to play in the deathwatch. De-
pending upon the circumstances of the patient-social, eco-
nomic, and medical-a doctor would be called.2 6 The doctor's
fessional on the deathbed is the recognition of the ending of one cycle and the
beginning of another." Audrey Gordon, The Psychological Wisdom of the
Law, in JEWISH REFLECTIONS ON DEATH, supra, at 95, 96. Gordon also empha-
sizes the psychological advantage of witnessing the death; it "does not permit
the mourner to escape the reality of death; it bids him see it." Id. at 97.
25. GusTAvE FLAUBERT, MADAME BovARY 236 (Paul De Man trans., W.W.
Norton 1965) (1857). One literary critic claimed that the Victorians in particu-
lar used deathbed scenes to encourage piety. "It allowed for a moral lesson. It
strengthened social and religious values by rallying the faithful and troubling
the doubters." Eric Rhode, Death in Twentieth-Century Fiction, in MAN'S
CONCERN wITH DEATH 160, 160 (Arnold Toynbee et al. eds., 1968).
Arias argued that Flaubert's vivid and medically detailed description of
Emma Bovary's hideous and agonizing death by suicide foreshadowed the
modern notion of the "dirty death." ARIts, supra note 23, at 568. Arias con-
trasted the early nineteenth century, in which death was seen as beautiful, to
the second half of the nineteenth century, when death was "sometimes even
depicted as disgusting." Id. at 569. As further evidence of the view that death
was dirty and indecent, he also discussed Leo Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ily-
ich, an unsentimental and relentlessly realistic portrayal of the dying process.
The protagonist, a former judge, dies a painful, protracted death. Tolstoy de-
tailed the pain, odors, discomfort, denial, isolation, and anger that terminal ill-
ness and impending death can generate. In the death scene of the last chapter,
the doctor, priest, and members of the family were called. Ilyich, however,
took three terrible days to die. He screamed incessantly and "struggled in that
black sack into which he was being thrust by an invisible, resistless force."
LEO TOLSTOY, The Death of Ivan Ilyich, in THE GREAT SHORT WORKS OF LEO
TOLSTOY 247, 301 (Louise Maude et al. trans., Harper & Row 1967) (1886). Fi-
nally, when the gasping and rattling in his throat became inaudible, he heard
someone say, "It is finished!" I& at 302. He repeated to himself, "Death is fin-
ished ... it is no more!" Id. He "drew in a breath, stopped in the midst of a
sigh, stretched out, and died." Id. It is a horrible scene, a deathwatch to
remember.
26. Each family and each illness presented different facts that determined
whether the doctor would play a role in any given deathwatch. I use the term
"doctor" generically. Different places and different historical periods have
seen a variety of practitioners and healers. Individuals who did not consider
themselves to be doctors (and whom others did not consider to be doctors)
would also provide medical care: midwives, apothecaries, and bone-setters, to
name only a few. GEORGE ROSEN, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN MEDICAL
PRACTICE 1875-1941, at 2 (Charles E. Rosenberg ed., 1983). In this country, as
late as 1864, one observer noted that practitioners of medicine included "allo-
paths of every class in allopathy, homeopaths of high and low dilutions;
hydropaths mild and heroic; chronothermalists; Thomsonians, Mesmerists,
herbalists, Indian doctors, clairvoyants, spiritualists with healing gifts, and I
[Vol. 77:1
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role was that of referee. He presided over the body's decline,
calling the shots and keeping score. The doctor would declare
death the winner, closing the eyelids as a sign the game was
over.27 There was little he could do. Although a doctor could
know not what besides." Id. at 15 (quoting THOMAS L. NICHOLS, FORTY YEARS
OF AMERIcAN LIFE 226 (1937)).
Nor were this country's physicians a monolithic group in terms of train-
ing, social standing, or methods of practice. In the early nineteenth century, a
handful of successful urban practitioners-such as Henry James's character,
Dr. Austin Sloper, father of Katherine Sloper, the remarkable heroine of
Washington Square-comprised the top of the hierarchy. They enjoyed for-
mal medical training, often with hospital experience and education in Edin-
burgh or London, and competed for the wealthiest and most socially
prominent patients. Most of the nation's physicians, however, trained under
the apprentice system, and may never have attended formal lectures or seen
the inside of a hospital. Many apprentice-trained physicians competed directly
with the other assorted practitioners. IMi at 3-4.
Even though alternative healers existed, most families in the nineteenth
century turned to physicians in the face of serious illness. The question was
not whether to call the physician, but when. The answer depended, among
other things, on whether the patient lived in a town, city, or rural setting;, and
on the patient's cultural background and economic status. Id. at 2. In general,
the poor received inferior medical care. "Physicians render curable diseases
mortal, in many instances, by their connecting the measure of their services to
the sick with pecuniary considerations. This is one reason why more of the
poor than of the rich die of mortal epidemics." BENJAMIN RUSH, On the
Causes of Death In Diseases That Are Not Incurable, in SIXTEEN INTRODUC-
TORY LECruREs (1811), reprinted in MEDICAL AMERICA IN THE NiErTEENTH
CENTURY 90, 92 (Gert H. Brieger ed., 1972). The poor tended to wait until the
very last minute to call the doctor because of the extravagant charges for med-
ical advice. 'These delays, though apparently originating with patients, should
be traced wholly to the conduct of physicians." I&
The type of illness could also determine whether to call a doctor. For ex-
ample, doctors often were not called for seriously ill infants, since most people
felt there was little that anyone could do. Some adult diseases never war-
ranted medical intervention: ailments such as rheumatism, mild diarrhea, in-
fluenza, or malaria where it was endemic, almost never triggered a call for the
doctor. With influenza, for example, the patient invariably recovered, and
with rheumatism, he almost never did. ROSEN, supra, at 2-3.
27. Closing the eyes of the dead appears to be a very old custom, common
to most cultures.
And God spoke unto Israel in the visions of the night, and said, Jacob,
Jacob. And he said, Here am I. And he said, I am God, the God of thy
father- fear not go down into Egypt; for I will there make of thee a
great nation: I will go down with thee into Egypt; and I will surely
bring thee up again: and Joseph shall put his hand upon thine eyes.
Genesis 46:2-4.
The practice of closing the eyes of the dead developed from the fear that
some sort of danger or curse would threaten a living person seen by the
corpse's eye. People often believed that anyone "who came within the field of
vision of a dead person was thereby doomed to follow soon that person to the
grave." WEBB GARRISON, STRANGE FACTS ABOUT DEATH 29 (1978).
It was not always easy to keep the eyes closed before rigor mortis set in;
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try to make his patient comfortable, medical science had a lim-
ited arsenal to forestall or reverse the processs There was lit-
tle anyone could do but watch and wait.
A spiritual leader also played a role in the deathwatch. In
the Christian tradition, at a sign from the doctor that the end
was near, the priest or minister would be sent for. He would
say prayers and perform rituals on the body in preparation for
the transition from life to death.29 The presence of the spiri-
often the eyelids had to be weighted. Coins sometimes served this purpose.
They also provided the dead person with "the toll exacted for crossing into the
next world." Id.
28. Indeed, some doctors expressed a fatalism about certain kinds of ill-
nesses, wondering whether medical intervention could accomplish anything.
Jacob Bigelow defined a "self-limited disease" as
one which receives limits from its own nature and not from foreign
influences; one which, after it has obtained foothold in the system,
cannot, in the present state of our knowledge, be eradicated or
abridged by art, but to which there is due a certain succession of
processes to be completed in a certain time; which time and processes
may vary with the constitution and condition of the patient, and may
tend to death or to recovery, but are not known to be shortened or
greatly changed by medical treatment.
MEDICAL AMERICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, supra note 26, at 98, 99
(quoting JACOB BIGELOw, ON SELF-LmITED DISEASEs (1836)). The young med-
ical student "goes forth into the world believing that if he does not cure dis-
eases it is his own fault. Yet, when a score or two of years have passed over
his head, he will come at length to the conviction that some diseases are con-
trolled by nature alone." I& at 103. A doctor facing a self-limited disease
should not
frustrate the intentions of nature, when they are salutary, or embitter
the approach of death when it is inevitable.., we may do much good
by a palliative and preventive course, by alleviating pain, procuring
sleep, guarding the diet, regulating the alimentary canal-in fine, by
obviating such sufferings as admit of mitigation .... The longer and
the more philosophically we contemplate this subject, the more obvi-
ous it will appear that the physician is but the miniter and servant of
nature ....
Id. at 105-06.
29. One such ritual involves anointing the body of the dying person.
Anointing, the smearing or pouring of an unctuous substance (especially olive
oil) on a person, plays a part in the administration of certain Christian sacra-
ments, such as Baptism, Confirmation, and Ordination.
Catholics who are seriously ill receive the sacrament of the Anointing of
the Sick (formerly called Extreme Unction) from a priest. The rite involves
anointing the organs of the external senses with consecrated oil and praying at
each unction while mentioning the corresponding sense. Anointing of the
Sick, 1 NEw CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 568-75 (1967). The recipient must be
baptized and "have attained the use of reason," reflecting the theological tradi-
tion that "this Sacrament is a complement of the Sacrament of Penance." Id.
at 573 (discussing the competing purposes underlying the anointing of the
sick). '"To receive the Sacrament, an adult possessing the use of reason must
have an intention to receive it." Id. That intention need never have been ex-
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tual leader was not only for the benefit of the dying person; he
was also there for the participants of the deathwatch. It was a
religious occasion and required the authority of a holy man.
But the most important role in the deathwatch was played
by the dying person. The spotlight fell on him. It was his day
to die, and he had certain obligations. Before lapsing into si-
lence, he was expected to bid farewell to those he loved, to
make gifts, to extract promises, to make amends for ancient
wounds, and to make preparations for his departure.30 During
his own deathwatch, the dying person knew just what to say; he
pressly formulated; it may be implied, even if the subject is now unconscious,
from his or her desire to live and die as a Catholic. Today, theologians do not
wait until the subject is in the last moments of life, believing that the sacra-
ment's maximum benefit can be derived as soon as the subject is in danger of
death from sickness or old age. Thus, it may be received as many times as the
subject succumbs to serious illness. I&
"All Protestants reject the Anointing of the Sick as a Sacrament insti-
tuted by Christ.... Calvin not only denies its Sacramentality, but goes to the
excess of designating it as 'merely playacting."' Idr at 574 (citing JEAN CAL-
VIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1466 (John T. McNeill ed. & Ford
L. Battles trans., Westminister Press 1960) (1536)). The English Book of Com-
mon Prayer originally recognized the practice in 1549, but it was deleted in
1552. The Scottish and American Prayer Books, however, contain an optional
provision for the rite. Id.
30. It became customary to record the alleged final utterances of famous
people, presumably for purposes of instruction. Religious leaders in particular
seemed to plan their last words with great care. For example, Martin Luther
supposedly said on his deathbed, 'Father in heaven, though this body is break-
ing away from me, and I am departing this life, yet I know that I shall forever
be with thee, for no one can pluck me out of thy hand." GARRISON, supra note
27, at 99. Henry Ward Beecher uttered, "Now comes the mystery," and closed
his eyes. Id- at 101. Statesmen, too, seem to have given their last words seri-
ous consideration. Thomas Jefferson said, 'q resign my soul to God, and my
daughter to my country." Id. at 103.
If we are to believe the accounts, others were not so well-prepared for the
performance of their dying words, distracted perhaps by the event of their
own death. Some dying words were simple requests concerning the arrange-
ment of the sickroon Goethe said, "Macht doch den Fensterladen in
Schlafgemach auf, damit mehr Licht herein komme." ("Open the shutters in
the bedroom and let in more light"). I at 102. A stern housekeeper attended
Carl Jung in his final illness; he gasped his final words to his son as she left
the room: "Quick, help me out of bed before she comes back or she will stop
me. I want to look at the sunset." I& at 99.
My favorite last words say something about the experience of dying itself.
Several people left messages of hope for the deathphobic. Cotton Mather al-
legedly cried in exultation, "Is this dying? Is this all? Is this what I feared
when I prayed against a hard death? Oh, I can bear this! I can bear it!" Id at
100. Louis XIV supposedly spoke similar words, "J'avais cru plus difficile de
mourir" ("I imagined it was more difficult to die."). Id at 103. Thomas
Edison's words are particularly moving to me. In his final moments of con-
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was relieved of the burden of originality. The script was writ-
ten for him.
The deathbed scene was more than a convention of art and
literature.31 It was played over and over again, in cities and in
sciousness, he gasped, "It's very beautiful ... over there." Id. at 102. I can
bear the cessation of self, but not the cessation of aesthetic experience.
There is also a Hasidic tradition of recording the dying words of famous
teachers and leaders of the community, in the belief that, since how a man
meets his death is the product of how he has led his life, one might capture a
whole life's philosophy in how a man chooses to die. Thus, recording the last
moments of the masters became a sacred task. JEWISH REFLECTIONS ON
DEATH, supra note 24, at 16. One such collection is the Histalkut Hanefesh,
edited by Benjamin Mintz in 1930. Each description contains a deathwatch.
For example, "at the hour of the death of the Ari, all of his students gathered
around him." HIsTAiu HANEFESH (Samuel H. Dresner trans.), in JEWISH
REFLECIONS ON DEATH, supra note 24, at 25, 26. On the last evening of Baal
Shem Tov's life, "his intimates were gathered around him and he preached to
them about the giving of the Torah." I. When death came to Rabbi
Elimelekh, he "placed his hands upon the foreheads of his four disciples and
gave them each a portion of his soul." Id. at 28-29.
31. Probably the most famous dying scene in Western civilization is the
death of Jesus. See Mark 15:1-39. Jesus was crucified, "a Roman penalty re-
served for slaves and selected criminals, with the condemned person usually
dying from a combination of exhaustion and exposure." DEATH IN LITERA-
TURE 119 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1980).
Another famous deathwatch in Western civilization is the death of Socra-
tes as portrayed by Plato. PLATO, Phaedo, in THE WORKS OF PLATO 109 (Irwin
Edman ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1956) [hereinafter Phaedo]. Phaedo re-
lates the conversation between Socrates and one of his students, Crito, after
Socrates decided to submit to his death sentence. As the students entered,
Socrates was bidding farewell to his family. This deathwatch was a time for
philosophic exploration, embracing such subjects as the relationship of soul to
body, the crime of suicide, the soul's immortality, and the nature of knowl-
edge. Indeed, there was so much philosophic exploration that the attendant
who was to give Socrates the poison worried about its effectiveness, for talking
"increases heat, and this is apt to interfere with the action of the poison; per-
sons who excite themselves are sometimes obliged to take a second or even a
third dose." Id at 117. Socrates advised the attendant to "mind his business
and be prepared to give the poison twice or even thrice if necessary." Id-
When Socrates eventually stopped the dialogue and took the poison, his stu-
dents began to weep; he asked them not to, because "a man should die in
peace." Id at 189. Finally, when he was on the very edge of death, Socrates
uncovered his face (he had covered himself up) and reminded Crito that "I
owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt?" Id And then
Socrates died.
The epic of Gilgamesh also contains a famous death scene. Gilgamesh,
who reigned in the Mesopotamian city of Uruk during the third millenium,
was said to be two parts god and one part man. JOHN GARDNER & JOHN
MAYER, GILGAMESH 67 (1984). The epic portrays his friendship with Enkidu, "a
child of the mountain" who grew up with wild animals. Id. at 77. Gilgamesh
and Enkidu embarked on a journey to make a name for themselves, during
which they offended the goddess, Ishtar, who placed a curse on Enkidu. Gil-
gamesh attended Enkidu at his sickbed for over 12 days, and, upon Enkidu's
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small towns, and in isolated farmhouses. Just as family and
friends convened at the birth of a baby,3 2 so they reconvened at
his death.33 With the passage of time, of course, the constitu-
ency of the deathwatch would change; different faces attended
the entrance and the exit. But every human being was more or
death, addressed the counselors of Uruk in one of the most beautiful laments
in all literature. Id at 183-95.
One of the funniest death scenes in literature is in Lewis Carroll's
Through The Looking-Glass And What Alice Found There. The Walrus and
the Carpenter lured the Oysters out for a walk, and then ate them, but not
without much carrying on by the Walrus:
"I weep for you," the Walrus said:
"I deeply sympathize."
With sobs and tears he sorted out
Those of the largest size,
Holding his pocket-handkerchief
Before his streaming eyes.
"0 Oysters," said the Carpenter,
"You've had a pleasant run!
Shall we be trotting home again?"
But answer came there none-
And this was scarcely odd, because
They'd eaten every one.
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALIcE FOUND
THERE 81-82 (Octopus Books 1981) (1897). Here was an unsentimental Victo-
rian death scene.
32. Cultural patterns vary greatly regarding pregnancy, labor, delivery,
and the postpartum period. In almost all cultures, however, others attend to
and assist the mother during labor and delivery. One anthropological study
found that in the great majority of cultures-58 out of 60--older women actu-
ally assisted the mother during childbirth. Other cultures allowed the hus-
band, and occasionally the father-in-law, to be present for the birth. MIKE
SAMUELS, M.D. & NANCY SAMUELS, THE WELL PREGNANCY BOOK 15-16 (1986).
Anyone who is interested in the experience and institution of motherhood
should read Adrienne Rich's Of Woman Born. In particular, her chapter enti-
tled "Alienated Labor" is relevant to the birth-watch. For me, the most mem-
orable birth-watches in literature occur in Sigrid Undset's novel, Kristin
Lavransdatter.
33. In a beautiful piece, Morris Adler discusses the importance of the
community and the home in sharing sorrow over the death of one of its
members:
Thus does a community symbolically and actually share in the sorrow
of one of its members. The grief of the individual reechoes in the life
of the group.... The religious service of this little group, represent-
ing the larger community, takes place in the home. It is a tribute to
the central position of the home. Where a family lives and loves and
fashions the most intimate bonds to link persons one to the other,
there you have a sanctuary no less than the synagogue. Its holiness is
of no lesser kind than that with which the formal house of prayer of
the entire community is invested. The poignancy and sanctity of grief
are best expressed in the intimate sanctuary of the home.
Morris Adler, We Do Not Stand Alone, in JEWISH REFLECIONS ON DEATH,
supra note 24, at 164, 164-65.
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less assured that his birth and death would be witnessed.34 Ul-
timately, our coming in and going out might have been lonely,
but at least we were not alone; the community gathered around
to attend, to keep vigil, to create a warm space to envelop us.35
That warm space was called "home."
We no longer die at home. Starting in the 1930s, the locus
34. In my presentation of the deathwatch, I assume that the members of
the deathwatch are themselves alive. Katherine Anne Porter made me ques-
tion this assumption. In Pale Horse, Pale Rider, Miranda, a 24-year-old jour-
nalist, almost died of influenza at the very end of the First World War. As she
fell ill, she thought that she ought to go home, since "it's a respectable old cus-
tom to inflict your death on the family if you can manage it." KATHERINE A.
PORTER, PALE HORSE, PALE RInER 141, 182 (1990). She chose to stay in her
room, however, and was eventually taken to the hospital, presumably to die.
Miranda "sank easily through deeps under deeps of darkness until she lay
like a stone at the farthest bottom of life." Id. at 199. Pulled toward a "hard
unwinking angry point of light," she reached "a deep clear landscape of sea
and sand, of soft meadow and sky," where "[m]oving toward her leisurely as
clouds through the shimmering air came a great company of human beings...
all the living she had known. Their faces were transfigured, each in its own
beauty, beyond what she remembered of them .... ." I& at 199-200. They en-
circled Miranda "smoothly on silent feet" and she moved easily among them.
I& at 200. Medical intervention brought her back to life, but she felt a stran-
ger to her own body. She mourned "for what she had so briefly won," but did
not let on to her friends who visited her the next day. I& at 204-05.
Miranda's experience made me think that there may be a parallel to the
deathwatch on the other side, a mirror image of our gathering at her bedside,
in which others move toward her on silent feet. The ritual may have two
parts, a farewell and a greeting.
35. Emily Dickinson wrote a poem about a deathwatch from the point of
view of the dying person who is aware of those gathered around her bed, wait-
ing for death to come:
I heard a Fly buzz-when I died-
The Stillness in the Room
Was like the Stillness in the Air-
Between the Heaves of Storm-
The Eyes around-had wrung them dry-
And Breaths were gathering firm
For that last Onset-when the King
Be witnessed-in the Room-
I willed my Keepsakes--Signed away
What portion of me be
Assignable-and then it was
There interposed a Fly-
With Blue-uncertain stumbling Buzz-
Between the light-and me-
And then the Windows failed-and then
I could not see to see-
EMILY DICKINSON, 'Ding," in FINAL HARvEST. EMILY DIcKINSON'S POEMS
111-12 (Thomas H. Johnson ed., 1961) (1896).
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of our dying moved from the home to the hospital or some
other health-care facility.e On the surface, it seemed like the
logical thing to do. After all, sick people went to the hospital
because all those things that sick people needed were located
there: doctors, nurses, laboratories, new diagnostic and thera-
peutic technologies. Because all of those things had been so
wildly successful in the recent past, we had a new expectation
of survival: Dying people came to be viewed as sick people.3s
36. The dying person's bedroom has moved from home to hospital due to
both our change in attitudes and "technical medical reasons." In the hospital,
death can remain hidden: "The hospital is the only place where death is sure
of escaping a visibility-or what remains of it-that is hereafter regarded as
unsuitable and morbid. The hospital has become the place of the solitary
death." ARits, supra note 23, at 571.
Ariis sees a relationship between our change in attitudes toward death
and our move from the home to the hospital as the place where death takes
place. He argues that in the second half of the nineteenth century attitudes
toward death changed, death came to be seen as improper, unseemly, and
It is indecent to let someone die in public. It is no longer acceptable
for strangers to come into a room that smells of urine, sweat, and
gangrene, and where the sheets are soiled. Access to this room must
be forbidden, except to a few intimates capable of overcoming their
disgust, or to those indispensable persons who provide certain serv-
ices. A new image of death is forming, a hidden death, hidden be-
cause it is ugly and dirty.
Id at 569.
Society's migration from the country to urban centers may also have af-
fected our attitudes toward death. In a radio interview for "Fresh Air with
Terry Gross," writer Grace Paley read one of her poems:
I am afraid of nature
because of nature I am mortal
my children and my grandchildren
are also mortal
I lived in the city for forty years
in this way I escaped fear.
GRACE PALEY, "Fear," in NEw AND COLLECTED POEMs 59 (1992). After read-
ing the poem, she remarked:
I really meant what I said. I was simply thinking of the movement of
life and death, in the fields and in the mountains, and in the animals
around me, which are very close to you, much more close to you. You
know, we think about the cities as being so dangerous, and full of
guns and so forth, but in a very strange way, you are really closer to
birth and life and death in the countryside.
Fresh Air with Terry Gross (WHYY, Inc., aired on member stations of Na-
tional Public Radio, Mar. 26, 1992).
37. The very term "dying" is difficult to define. For an excellent discus-
sion of the semantic complexities involved in the use of the term "dying," see
DAVID SUDNOW, PASSING ON: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF DYING 61-72
(1967). While one can properly say of all persons that they are dying from the
moment of birth onward, most people in Western society use the term to refer
to a certain class of states and persons. Id at 61. Sudnow points out that "dy-
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And sick people went to the hospital.
That simple move from dying person to sick person, from
the home to the hospital, had hidden, undreamed-of conse-
quences. When we left our homes, we lost power over our own
deathssa and over the deaths of those we love.39 Once inside
the hospital walls, dying became the sole province of medicine,
and this has had a profound effect on the deathwatch. The
deathwatch has almost disappeared.4°
ing" seems to be an essentially predictive term, the "likelihood of death within
some temporal perspective." Id, at 64. Some argue that "dying" is a state in
which a person suffers from an irreversible disease known to produce death.
Id. at 65. In a hospital setting, "'dying' takes on its central significance insofar
as death is considered likely on the current admission, for it is then that the
hospital, its personnel, and its activities are directly involved in the affair of
the death." Id. at 71. I use the term "dying" to refer to someone who is ex-
pected to die within a relatively short period of time. I realize that the defini-
tion is not altogether satisfactory, but I do not believe more precision is
necessary to understand the twentieth-century deathwatch.
38. Ted Rosenthal recorded his shock when he first discovered that he
might not have control over the circumstances of his death. Having just been
diagnosed with terminal acute leukemia, he wrote:
My only request was-the thing I was most concerned about was that
should I die, I wanted a warning in advance of dying so that I could
get out of the hospital, get back to California, get into the country and
die there. And I was shocked when the doctor said, 'We'll do the best
we can." I thought he would say more than that. I thought he would
say, "Sure, we'll do that for you," but he said, 'We'll do the best we
can.$
TED ROSENTHAL, How COULD I NOT BE AMONG You? 31 (1973). The physi-
cian's response indicated that he regarded himself as the person in control of
the deathwatch, not the patient.
39. The death scene in John Gunther's Death Be Not Proud is one of the
earliest descriptions of a hospital deathwatch and the powerlessness that fam-
ily members can feel when a loved one dies in that setting. JOHN GUNTHER,
DEATH BE NOT PRouD 183-89 (1949). When Johnny Gunther took a sudden
turn for the worse because of a cerebral hemorrhage, his parents had him im-
mediately moved to the hospital. Everything about the move was a disaster.
The emergency door at the hospital was locked. The switchboard had gone to
pieces. The nurse did not know what to do. An attendant downstairs was hys-
terical. The cab driver who drove them back was drunk. Id. at 187. When the
end was near, someone rang an emergency bell, and after "all those months of
doctors and doctors and doctors, it happened that no doctor was there at that
precise moment." Id. at 188.
The last few lines about the hospital deathwatch are for me deeply mov-
ing: "Johnny died at 11:02 p.m. Frances reached for him through the ugly,
transparent, raincoat-like curtain of the oxygen machine." I& at 189. It is a
terrible thing to have to hold a dying son through a layer of hostile plastic.
40. Other factors have undoubtedly contributed to the disappearance of
the deathwatch. One author suggested that improved obstetric and pediatric
care has cut down dramatically on the types of death that most commonly oc-
curred in the presence of the family. MELVIN J. KRANT, M.D., DYING AND DiG-
NITY: THE MEANING AND CONTROL OF A PERSONAL DEATH 7 (1974).
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In the late twentieth century, most of the people who once
gathered around the bed in Munch's painting have been ex-
cluded.4 ' Even those who remain have a small role to play, and
that role is defined not by social custom or religious tradition,
but by what is deemed medically necessary.4 It is true: we
Furthermore, in today's society, the elderly live separated from their adult
children. Thus, the most likely candidates for dying generally do so out of the
sight of their children and grandchildren. I&x at 9.
41. There are no visitors' waiting rooms on the ward itself; the only
place a visitor can await the beginning of visiting hours is in the gen-
eral hospital lobby, at the front of the building, which, with its long
benches, resembles a train station. If, during a visit with a patient, a
relative is asked to leave the room, he must stand in the ward corri-
dor. None of the doors to the individual rooms is dosed ... so that a
visitor can witness nearly everything that goes on in neighboring
rooms.... During visiting hours, as one walks down the hall to a pa-
tient's room, he is quite likely to see several patients' bodies exposed
as bed clothes are changed or examinations conducted.
SUDNOW, supra note 37, at 19 (describing the visiting facilities of a large, ur-
ban, West Coast charity hospital).
Once a hospital deems a patient to be dying, it "posts" his name on the
"critical patients' [sic] list." Once "posted," a patient theoretically has the
right to receive visitors day and night, not just during appointed visiting hours.
Posting also notifies key hospital personnel that a death may be forthcoming.
The hospital drafts tentative autopsy schedules based on the posted lists. Id at
72-73.
In Quartet in Autumn, Barbara Pym describes a hospital deathwatch cut
short by the arbitrary imposition of a no-visitation rule. BARBARA PYM, QuAR-
TET IN AUTUMN (1977). The novel concerns four single elderly people who
worked in the same office. After her retirement, one of the women collapsed
and was taken to the hospital to die. I&i at 172-73. When her friends came to
see her, the nurse always refused to let them visit the dying woman, saying
that 'Miss Ivory was quite comfortable." Id. at 176. The nurse explained that
the patient must be "kept very quiet, no excitement." I& Consequently, Miss
Ivory died alone. As one of her survivors put it, "If they said, 'No Visitors,'
then we can't very well barge in." Id.
42. The medical staff of one large, urban charity hospital did not en-
courage relatives to be present in the dying person's room:
Before death, with relatives continuously present in the "dying" pa-
tient's room, a more constant vigilance over the patient's condition
must be maintained, this requiring, in effect, the removal of a nurse
from other activities to spend her time exclusively at the bedside.
The routine handling of death as it occurs on the medical wards at
County requires that the ward be kept relatively free of outsiders,
whose mere presence exacts greater demands on the behavior of staff
than the likelihood of a death would normally warrant.
SUDNOW, supra note 37, at 85-86. The staff said that they were "shielding" the
relatives from the "unpleasantness of seeing someone die." I&. at 86. This ex-
clusion of relatives and "shielding" does not seem to occur in middle-class, pri-
vate hospitals where "relatives are considered specifically entitled to be
present at the bedside when the patient 'expires."' Id.
The term "deathwatch" has a more specific meaning to the nursing per-
sonnel on medical and surgical units, referring to "guarding a dying patient in
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usually do not die alone. If we are lucky,4s someone will still
be in the room, but that someone will most likely be a medical
professional, someone whose job it is to be in the room.44
If that room is in an intensive care unit (ICU), the death-
watch is only a shadow of its former self, a sketch from mem-
ory, a vestigial impression laid down in the sand. Just as dying
moved from the home to the hospital, within those walls dying
moved from the wards to the inner sanctum of the ICU.4 5
anticipation of his death." I&. at 83. During the nursing deathwatch, "the pa-
tient is treated as in a transitory state, the relevant facts about him being the
gradual decline of clinical life signs." Id As the patient gets closer to death,
"his status as a body becomes more evident," and the nurses' attention shifts
from caring for his discomforts and administering medical treatment to the
"sheer activity of 'timing' his biological events." I& at 83-84.
43. George Orwell described how hospitals sometimes deprive the poor of
a deathwatch altogether:
I could see old Num6ro 57 lying crumpled up on his side, his face
sticking out over the side of the bed, and toward me. He had died
sometime during the night, nobody knew when. When the nurses
came, they received news of his death indifferently and went about
their work. After a long time, an hour or more, two other nurses
marched in abreast like soldiers, with a great clumping of sabots, and
knotted up the corpse in the sheets, but it was not removed till some
time later.
GEORGE ORWELi, How the Poor Die, in SHOOTING AN ELEPHANT 18, 24 (1950).
The denial of the deathwatch has a disparate impact on the hospitalized
poor. Deaths on medical and surgical wards in charity hospitals "more often
than not occur with no staff members present." SUDNOW, supra note 37, at 47.
Frequently, the roommates of the patient will notice the death before mem-
bers of the staff. I&. at 45. To avoid this, hospitals often transfer patients who
are expected to "terminate" to private parts of the hospital; curtains may be
drawn around them. I&. at 48. This setting makes those areas of the wards
"much less conducive to social interaction and the consequent dangers of dis-
covery that a history of friendliness between patients and an interest in the
happenings of one's roommates would entail." I&.
44. One study of mourning behavior in Great Britain in the 1960s reported
the following regarding the decline of the deathwatch:
Most people, it would seem, now die alone, except for medical attend-
ants; less than a quarter of the bereaved were present when their rel-
ative died, and nearly two-thirds of those present were women....
[N]early half of the widowed were present at the death of their part-
ner. A child was present in a quarter of the cases when a parent died;
but, with insignificant exceptions, brothers or sisters are absent when
their siblings die. Nearly all the children died in hospital, alone.
In the upper middle and professional classes it is rare for the be-
reaved person to be present at death (less than 1 in 8); as one de-
scends the class structure, presence becomes more common, reaching
nearly a third in the unskilled working class.
GEOFFREY GORER, DEATH, GRIEF, AND MOURNiNG 5 (1965). But see supra note
42 and accompanying text for a study suggesting the contrary in American
hospitals.
45. Over the past 40 years, hospitals have developed "special care units:
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There death has become mechanized; the struggle for heartbeat
and breath has been taken over by machines. For the sick,
these machines buy valuable time; they temporarily perform vi-
tal functions until the body is ready to work again.46 But for
the dying, these machines just prolong that process.47 Never-
preoperative, postoperative, neonatal, coronary, burn, and trauma centers."
THOMAS A. RAFFIN ET AL., INTENSIVE CARE: FACING THE CRITICAL CHOICES 5
(1989). Underlying the creation of a special unit is the principle that patients
with similar medical problems can be treated more efficiently if they are gath-
ered together in one location. Id The first special care unit, established in
1923, was a postoperative recovery room. Specially trained nurses could easily
detect and correct common postoperative problems, such as airway blockage or
bleeding. Id. In 1942, a Boston area hospital set aside a ward to treat 39 burn
victims of the Coconut Grove nightclub fire. This burn unit served as the
model for the modern ICU. Id During World War II and the Korean and
Vietnam wars, the organization of special care units improved. Id. As cardiac
surgery progressed in the late 1950s, hospitals set up coronary care units to ac-
commodate the intensive nursing and complicated monitoring devices required
for postoperative patients. Other medical specialties, such as respiratory and
physical therapy, also contributed to the developments of the ICU. Id- at 5-6.
In the early 1960s, only 10% to 20% of the hospitals in the United States had
ICUs. Id. at 5. Now most of the nation's 6,000 hospitals have ICUs. Id. at 4. A
smaller hospital located in a rural area may have only a two-bed ICU, primar-
fly for cardiac monitoring. A major acute-care hospital in an urban area, how-
ever, may have several ICUs with large populations of patients and
postoperative complications. Id.
46. Overall, the survival statistics of ICU patients are rather heartening:
70% to 80% of ICU patients leave the unit alive. Some kinds of patients, how-
ever, do better than others. Postoperative patients who were relatively
healthy to start with fare well. For example, "there is only a four to five per-
cent mortality rate nationally" for coronary artery bypass operations. Id-
Trauma victims also tend to survive. Id. Predictably the old, the frail, the crit-
ically ill, and patients with multiple medical problems do not do well. For ex-
ample, a patient with respiratory failure who requires artificial ventilation for
more than 72 hours faces depressing odds: 40% to 60% die. Id. at 14. The pa-
tient who has another disease has a much greater chance of dying. Of those
patients with renal failure and respiratory failure, 80% to 90% die. Ninety
percent of patients with cardiac arrest do not come out of the ICU alive. Id.
The condition of the patient's body upon admission to the ICU, therefore,
largely determines his chances of survival.
47. While life-sustaining equipment may prolong the process, the longer a
patient remains in the ICU the less likely she is to leave alive. Typically, pa-
tients suffering from acute Organ System Failure ("OSF") are transferred to
the ICU. See William A. Knaus, M.D. et al., Prognosis in Acute Organ-System
Failure, 202 ANNALS OF SURGERY 685, 685 (1985) (describing the prognosis of
patients in acute Organ System Failure). For all medical and most surgical ad-
missions, a single OSF lasting more than one day resulted in a mortality rate
approaching 40%. Id Two OSFs for more than one day increased the death
rates to 60%. Id Advanced age increased both the probability of developing
an OSF and of dying once that OSF occurred. Id. Mortality for patients with
three or more OSFs who lived after three days was 99%. Id-
These estimates, while not prescriptive, provide a basis for discussion with
the patient or his family and if "the decision is to reduce treatment, it will be
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theless, because being sick and dying have become indistin-
guishable conditions, intensive care is usually lavished upon
every patient without discrimination.
There is very little beauty in the ICU. It pulsates with the
rhythmic hum of life-support machines.48 It is aggressively
clean. The smells of sickness and death have been washed
away with a fluid the color of aquamarine. Day and night,
night and day, fluorescent lights cast their purple-yellow glow
on the scene, making the healthy look like the sick, the sick
look like the dying, and the dying look already gone.
The deathwatches that take place there are sparsely popu-
lated. Visiting is only permitted for small groups of close fam-
ily members, since an ICU is a labor-intensive operation,
designed to facilitate nursing, not visitation.49 In the ICU, nurs-
ing consists primarily of the manipulation of machines. The
machines are large, three-dimensional objects that take up lots
of room; so are people. There is no space in the room for a
large deathwatch, and the absence of chairs sends the message
that no one is expected. Visitors have to stand.
What is it like to participate in a deathwatch in such a
place? Often it is a struggle just to get there. Since the hospi-
tal is usually located miles away, each visit may be preceded by
a long solitary drive, with time to spare for dreadful anticipa-
tion. Once the car is finally parked, there is that terrible jour-
consistent with acknowledged ethical practice of not prolonging death unnec-
essarily (death with dignity) and of distributing medical resources equitably so
that scarce resources will more likely be available to those that can benefit."
Id at 692.
48. Molly Haskell described her first ICU visit, when her husband had
fallen ill from some mysterious infection. She, too, was struck by the bizarre
physical environment of the ICU, its isolation from the rest of the hospital,
and the predominance of machines:
The ICU was itself an otherworldly experience. I was the only visi-
tor-they'd agreed to let me in for a few minutes before regular
hours. It was an antiseptic enclosure cut off from the rest of the hos-
pital and the flow of life by its restricted visiting hours (11:00 to 11:45
in the morning, 5:00 to 5:45 in the evening). It was like an airship,
suspended in space, sterile because there were none of the ordinary
signs or sounds of life, only the whirring and clicking of machines sur-
rounding mummylike patients, each click signaling that death had
been forestalled by another moment.
MOLLY HASKELL, LOvE AND OTHER INFEcTIOus DISEASES: A MEMOIR 149-50
(1990).
49. In a normal hospital unit, there is approximately one nurse per eight
beds; in an ICU, there is usually one nurse per patient. The critical condition
of most of the patients and the complex monitoring and life-sustaining equip-
ment require such intensive nursing care. RAFFIN, supra note 45, at 4.
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ney through the hospital corridors to reach the ICU:5° The
eyes do not obey the order to stare straight ahead, but instead
dart in and out of rooms, left and right, drawn by the undenia-
ble attraction of someone else's darkest night. Once through
the maze, a "security" guard yields up a laminated cardboard
pass, bearing the number of the bed that holds the dying
person.
Visiting hours are strictly limited. An ICU deathwatch is
therefore episodic. It is sliced into thin slivers of time, and the
attendance of such a death becomes a series of black-and-white
stills. Upon each successive visit, a new image of a body frozen
in time is created and added to the pile of memories. It is never
clear which image is the last until someone announces that the
series is over.
So for brief intervals, day after day, night after night,
sometimes for twenty minutes, sometimes for half an hour, seg-
ments of the deathwatch take place. Several feet away, one set
of outlets over, there lies another person, sick or dying, dying
or sick, and perhaps another deathwatch. At best, members of
the nursing staff move silently in and out of the cubicle, moni-
toring machines. At worst, they make cheerful, brittle remarks
about "our night," or "our day." It is difficult to talk at all, and
even more impossible to exchange words of intimacy. It is not
a good place for prayer or resolution,51 or even idle chatter. It
is not a good place at all.
50. One of the most disturbing aspects of being in a hospital is the disori-
entation one feels in the maze of hallways, waiting rooms, elevator banks, and
patients' rooms. One study has focused on the prerequisites for "wayfinding"
through a complex and unfamiliar environment. Jain Malkin, Wayfinding.:
An Orientation System for Hospitals, PRoGRassrvE ARCHrrECTURE, Nov. 1989,
at 107, 107. Behavioral scientists seem to agree that the degree of sameness or
variation of interior spaces will affect one's ability to recognize and use a
landmark. Id Similarly, being able to see one part of the building from an-
other helps maintain a point of reference. The overall complexity of the lay-
out naturally will also affect the comprehensibility of the environment. Id.
Various design techniques can facilitate wayfinding, however, such as appro-
priate signage, the use of a main artery, and the use of landmarks to serve as
points of reference. Id. A deathwatch seems like a poor time to be taxing
one's cognitive processes by engaging in spatial problem-solving.
51. The Catholic chaplain in one large urban charity hospital in the late
1960s made rounds every morning and administered Extreme Unction to all
Catholic patients appearing on the "critical patients' [sic] list." SUDNOW, supra
note 37, at 72-73. After completing his rounds, he stamped an index card with
a rubber stamp which read:
Last Rites Administered
Date: Clergyman:
Every day he consulted the files to see if new patients had been admitted to
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Sometimes the common law reminds me of Columbus,
Ohio, where I grew up. In this country, new ideas, fashions,
and expressions all tend to start on either edge of the continent
and slowly roll inward, like a billiard ball on a slightly elevated
field of green felt. Contrary to the parochial opinions of those
who have lived their entire lives on the East or West Coast,
new ideas, fashions, and expressions eventually do make their
way to Columbus, Ohio, provided they were important enough
at their point of origin. They just get there later, sometimes by
several years.
It is the same with the law. If some new problem is gener-
ated from a dramatic change in social reality, that new problem
will slowly roll towards the appellate courts. Just as it may
take a new idea several years to reach Columbus, Ohio, it may
take a new problem several years to reach judicial attention.
Arrival at both destinations, however, is ensured by the force of
gravity.
Thus it was inevitable that the horrors of the late-twenti-
eth-century deathwatch would eventually land in the pocket of
an appellate court. The jurisdiction was New Jersey; the case
was In the Matter of Karen Quinlan, an Alleged Incompetent.52
What an odd expression: "In the matter of." In many
ways, the case of Karen Quinlan was about the matter of Karen
Quinlan. Perhaps because it was the first such case to reach an
appellate court, there are pages and pages of medical details
about her body, its functions, its posture, and its ghastly depen-
the wards and/or put on the critical list. The stamp prevented him from per-
forming the rite twice on the same patient. Id
52. Karen Quinlan was 21 years old when, for unknown reasons, she suf-
fered two 15-minute periods of interrupted respiration that resulted in irre-
versible brain damage. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1975), modified and remanded, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert denied sub nom.
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) [hereinafter QuinZan I]. She was
not brain dead, however, according to the definition promulgated by the Ad
Hoe Committee of Harvard Medical School, but was instead described as being
in a "persistent vegetative state." Id at 810. She could not maintain her vital
processes without the assistance of a respirator. Id. at 812. After a long period
of time, when it became apparent that her condition was irreversible, her fam-
ily and her parish priest agreed that she should be removed from the respira-
tor. Id- at 812-13. When her doctor refused, her father, Joseph Quinlan,
petitioned the court to appoint him as guardian of the person and property of
his daughter. He also proposed that the letters of guardianship, if granted,
contain the express power to authorize the discontinuation of all extraordi-
nary medical procedures. I& at 815.
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dence on machines.se Although no photographs of Karen Quin-
lan in her semi-vegetative state were ever published,54 the
lower court described her in this graphic word picture:-5
In the decorticate posturing the upper arms are drawn into the side of
the body. The forearms are drawn in against the chest with the hands
generally at right angles to the forearms, pointing towards the waist.
The legs are drawn up against the body, knees are up, feet are in near
the buttocks and extended in a ballet-type pose.56
Who was this ballerina? Why were we so hypnotized by
her curling in, 57 by the merger of her body with machines?
Was this close scrutiny an effort to conquer our own fear?
What were we afraid of? Some unnameable malevolence often
associated with other forms of the living dead?-s Of a human
53. The lower court devoted fully one-third of its opinion to medical de-
tails about Karen Quinlan's body. Id at 806-2. Later decisions about termina-
tion of life-support systems have winnowed the medical details down to a few
terse paragraphs at the beginning of the opinion. See, eg., Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), af'd sub nom Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
54. It was not for want of trying on the part of the media. Toward the
end of her ordeal, armed deputies had to guard Karen Quinlan's room in the
nursing home 24 hours a day. One reason for the tight security was the me-
dia's repeated efforts to get a photograph of her. It cost the taxpayers an aver-
age of $4,199 a month. JOSEPH QUINLAN Er AT., KAREN ANN: THE QUINLANS
TELL THEIR STORY 315-16 (1977). Members of the press offered the Quinlans
as much as $100,000 for a photograph of their daughter, and that was only a
"starting figure." I& at 223.
55. Interestingly enough, the graphic word picture was the only image to
which Judge Muir, author of the lower court opinion, would permit himself
access. Karen Quinlan's attorney, Paul Armstrong, urged Judge Muir to "per-
sonally witness and appreciate Karen's condition" in the hospital ICU, but
Judge Muir did not feel that was appropriate, "recognizing that emotion is an
aspect that I cannot decide a case on." I& at 214-15 (quoting the trial court
transcript).
56. Quinlan I, 348 A.2d at 807.
57. Once the cognitive function of the brain is gone, the central nervous
system acts in a more primitive fashion. PAUL SCHILDER, THE IMAGE AND AP-
PEARANCE OF THE HUMAN BODY 255 n.1 (1950). Thus, in an individual in
whom only the brainstem is active, certain bodily reactions, such as grasping
and sucking, are still present. Certain "primitive defense reflexes" persist as
well. I& This turning in of Karen's limbs toward the body is a manifestation
of such a primitive defense reflex.
58. I am surprised that no science-fiction writer has chosen the perma-
nently unconscious patients in an ICU as suitable subjects for possession by
evil spirits (at least no science-fiction writer that I know of). A person in a
semi-vegetative state has all the indicia of having experienced a "false death,"
or having the look of the living dead.
The death rituals of the Haitian Voudoun are directed at preventing both
a false death and a false life:
The initial act of the survivor is to determine that the death is real or
a false death brought on by magic. For, if the regular rituals that dis-
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being who has turned into a machine?59 Or were we just afraid
of ourselves in a similar position, spinning our own futures
from a web of dreadful possibilities?6°
sociate the soul from the body should be performed in ignorance of
the fact that the death is false, the body would remain as a live but
emptied vessel, subject to the direction of any alien force (usually the
malevolent one which engineered the magic precisely for such a pur-
pose). The dread zombie, the major figure of terror, is precisely this:
the body without a soul, matter without morality.
MAYA DEREN, DIVINE HORSEMEN: THE IrvING GODS OF HArri 42 (1953). "A
zombie is nothing more than a body deprived of its conscious powers of cere-
bration." Id at 43 n.*.
The fear that the zombie generates may be the same fear that a human
being in a semi-vegetative state generates. In both, consciousness has ceased,
but the body's existence continues. To be possessed by the Haitian god, the
o, the "self must leave .... The serviteur must be induced to surrender his
ego ..... " I& at 249. A human being in a semi-vegetative state has already
permanently lost the self. This would make the permanently unconscious pa-
tient in an ICU extremely vulnerable to possession, or so it seems to me.
59. Haskell, for example, described the inhuman appearance of the pa-
tients in the ICU:
I walked along the small passageway, between two glass panes, where
the patients, four on the right, two on the left, were lined up side by
side, with tubes of the most expensive lifesaving machinery in the
world reaching like tentacles into every orifice, and with their faces,
peering out from oxygen masks, unrecognizable as to sex and age.
They weren't humans but cyborgs, half man-half machine, new arriv-
als on display for the planet of near-death.
HASKELL, supr note 48, at 149-50.
60. Schilder writes about the "deep community between the postural
models of human beings." SCRnLER, supra note 57, at 44.
The postural model of our own body is connected with the postural
model of the bodies of others. There are connections between the
postural models of fellow human beings. We experience the body
images of others. Experience of our body-image and experience of the
bodies of others are closely interwoven with each other.
I& at 16. The postural model of Karen Quinlan's body may threaten us be-
cause we identify with it and experience it as potentially our own.
Another psychologist theorized that the degree to which seeing the dis-
ablement of another person provokes an anxiety response depends upon how
definite one feels about one's own body boundaries. When an individual sees
the mutilated or deformed body of another, this stimulus is threatening be-
cause it suggests that the same thing could happen to the perceiver. Thus, the
less definite the perceiver's body boundaries are, the more disturbing the per-
ception of body disablement in another will be. SEYMOUR FISHER, BODY EXPE-
RIENCE IN FANTASY AND BEHAVIOR 245-46 (1970) (describing R.L. Masson, An
Investigation of the Relationship Between Body-image and Attitudes Ex-
pressed Toward Visibly Disabled Persons (1963) (unpublished Ph.D disserta-
tion, University of Buffalo)).
The fear stemming from deformation in another is not confined to the
human species. For example, one adult male member of a troop of chimpan-
zees had been stricken by polio. When he shuffled up to the feeding area,
dragging a useless arm behind him, "the group of chimps already in camp
stared for a moment and then, with wide grins of fear, rushed for reassurance
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Those are questions I cannot answer, and questions the law
does not ask. Instead the cases purport to be about Karen
Quinlan and her right of privacy and self-determination. And
in a sense, that is indeed what they are about. At least they are
about the Karen Quinlan who used to be.61
But the cases are not only about Karen Quinlan, that tragic
ballerina; they are also about the horrors of the late-twentieth-
century deathwatch. Her family asked the court: Who is the
choreographer here? Why is our daughter still dancing? The
music has stopped, and still we stand silently at her bedside,
forced to witness her agony, day after day, night after night,
and still nothing happens. Karen has no more story to move
through, no more reason to cross the stage. Why doesn't the
curtain come down, for God's sake? For Karen's sake? For our
sake? Has time stopped? Are we trapped in her deathwatch
for eternity?
Her doctor would not let her go, 62 so Joseph Quinlan filed
a petition in Chancery Division seeking guardianship over the
to embrace and pat each other while staring at the unfortunate cripple." JANE
VAN LAWICK-GOODALL, IN THE SHADOW OF MAN 217 (1971).
61. The trial court heard testimony on whether Karen Quinlan would
elect, if competent, to terminate the respirator. QUINLAN, supra note 54, at
208-14 (citing the trial transcript). She had made several statements to family
members and friends about various friends and relatives who were themselves
trapped in interminable deathwatches, including an aunt and a close family
friend who had died from cancer. Id. at 209-10. Karen Quinlan seemed to
have been consistent in her belief that she "would not want to be kept alive
that way." Id at 211. Her mother, Julia, testified that Karen Quinlan not only
made such statements in the context of terminally ill relatives or friends, but
also in "just general conversation. We had discussed the fact of being kept
alive by extraordinary means, not referring-not making references to any in-
dividual." Id.
The Attorney General cross-appealed, challenging on hearsay grounds the
trial court's admission of Karen Quinlan's prior statements about her distaste
for continuance of life-support systems in circumstances not unlike her own.
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653 (N.J.), cert denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) [hereinafter Quinlan II]. Both the lower court and
the Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed that the statements were "remote
and impersonal, lack[ing] significant weight," rendering their admission insig-
nificant. Id- Almost 10 years later, the Supreme Court of New Jersey changed
its mind, stating that its earlier decision to disregard Karen Quinlan's com-
ments to friends and family about artificial life support had been erroneous.
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985).
62. After her family requested that Karen Quinlan's treating physician,
Dr. Morse, discontinue the respirator and offered to release him from liability,
Dr. Morse "felt he could not and would not agree to the cessation of the respi-
rator assistance." Quinlan I, 348 A.2d 801, 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975),
modified and remanded, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). He concluded that "to terminate the respira-
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matter of Karen Quinlan, and power over her death.6s What
the Quinlans really wanted was spiritual release for Karen and
permission to return to the nineteenth-century deathwatch of
Munch's painting. They wanted to gather around her bed as a
family and let nature take its course. Then, "if it is God's will
to take her, she can go on to life after death."'64 They wanted
the doctor to give up his fight and retire into the corner to as-
sume his former role of referee. They wanted their parish
priest to come forward, anoint their daughter, and prepare her
for the journey home. They wanted her deathwatch to come to
an end, to move her from that lonely threshold, and to give
themselves the freedom and the right to grieve.
The Quinlans' struggle over Karen's deathwatch captured
the public's imagination. Later, many others would become si-
lent stars in similar constellations,65 but Karen Quinlan's
deathwatch was the first, the prototype. Although her story
was deeply embedded in the soil of New Jersey, it transcended
the boundaries of fact and became a twentieth-century tragedy.
Over ten years later, another young woman lay in a Mis-
souri state hospital in a "persistent vegetative state,"' ' that
tor would be substantial deviation from medical tradition, that it involved as-
certaining 'quality of life,' and that he would not do so." Id.
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
64. Quinlan I, 348 A2d at 813.
65. In numerous cases since Quinlan II, at least 23 state courts have ad-
dressed the issue of the removal of life-sustaining treatment. See, eg., Ras-
mussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc); In re Drabick, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert denied sub nom. Drabick v. Drabick, 488
U.S. 958 (1988); Lovato v. District Ct., 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979) (en banc); Mc-
Connell v. Beverly Enters., 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989); In re Severns, 425 A.2d
156 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re L.H.R., 321
S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984); In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. 1990);
Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d
1015 (La. 1982); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Riddlemoser, 564
A.2d 812 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497
N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); Cruzan v.
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en bane), off'd sub nom Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); McKay v. Bergstadt, 801 P.2d
617 (Nev. 1990); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987); In re Westchester
County Medical Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988); Leach v. Ak-
ron Gen. Medical Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1, (C.P. 1980); In re Estate of Dorone, 502
A.2d 1271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), qff'd, 534 A.2d 452 (Pa. 1987); In re Jane Doe,
533 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1987); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987) (en banc), cor-
rected, 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992) (en
banc).
66. Dr. Fred Plum coined the phrase "persistent vegetative state," refer-
ring to
a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its internal controls.
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same physical and spiritual limbo which had held Karen Quin-
lan captive for so long. The victim of a car accident at twenty-
five, a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube had kept Nancy
Cruzan alive without cognitive function for over five years, and
"[m]edical experts testified she could live another thirty
years."6 7 With such oppressive longevity, the parents of Nancy
Cruzan were not likely even to survive their daughter's death-
watch. She might outlive them all and die alone, attended only
by some indifferent state employee in the first quarter of the
twenty-first century.
Like the members of Karen Quinlan's deathwatch, Nancy
Cruzan's parents brought their lament to the judicial system,
first to the state courts,6s and finally to the United States
Supreme Court.6 9 The Cruzans wanted much the same thing.
relief for Nancy and for themselves; power over their daugh-
ter's death; permission to bring her deathwatch to an end. As
Joseph Cruzan put it, "It just consumes me trying to figure out
what to do. I feel as Nancy's father, I've let her down .... It's
like having a death in the family, and the state says, 'I'm sorry,
but you can't bury that person.' 70
Even if the state is not an active player in the conflict 7' and
It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pulmonary
ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activ-
ity of muscles and nerves for low-level conditioned responses. But
there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness
of the surroundings in a learned manner.
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987).
Why the term "vegetative" has never been stated. My sister-in-law, Joyce
Clark Harmon, R.N., M.S., worked for over 10 years in an ICU, and in a liquid
conversation one evening, she told me of the terminology that ICU nurses and
doctors use. There were private names for certain kinds of patients, names
that were cautiously revealed as if they were a source of shame. Someone in a
coma was "gorked out." An indigent patient with poor hygiene was a
"dirtball." The badly burned were "crispy critters," and those with only lower
brain functions were "veggies," "rutabagas," or "squash." (Humor is insulation
from the stress of working with the critically ill.) I am struck, however, by
the repetition of the vegetable metaphor even in the formal medical
terminology.
67. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct 2841 (1990).
68. Id.
69. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
70. Laurie Abraham, Ethicists Try to Define Status of Vegetative Patients:
Dead? Alive? Treatment Plans Hang on Decisions, AM. MED. NEws, Feb. 24,
1989, at 3, 32.
71. Karen Quinlan's father, Joseph, started the lawsuit by seeking guardi-
anship of the person and property of his daughter. Quinlan I, 348 A.2d 801, 806
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), modified and remanded, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.),
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we merely feel its presence in the wings, the state is always
there in some sort of directorial capacity. By providing a judi-
cial forum, the state constructs the theatre in which these con-
flicts are resolved. It then lines up the players, deciding who
may address the audience, and who may not; at the same time,
the state decides whose interests matter, and whose do not.
And when the families of Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan
petitioned the courts, the state decided to focus on the rights of
the silent daughters who lay curled up in those hospital beds,
waiting for some way, some day, to die. The members of the
deathwatch were pushed to one side.
True, they were needed procedurally: someone had to file
the petition and ask for relief. The law provides a mechanism
for invoking the rights of those who cannot speak for them-
selves,72 but once that mechanism is activated, the law ignores
cer denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). He amended
the pleadings to seek a restraining order to prevent the Morris County prose-
cutor, the attending and treating physicians, and St. Clare's Hospital from in-
terfering with the exercise of the authorization sought, and to enjoin the
prosecutor from prosecuting for homicide when the authorization sought was
affected. Id. At a pretrial conference, the Attorney General intervened, the
basis for his action being "the interest of the State in the preservation of life,
which has an undoubted constitutional foundation." Quinlan 11, 355 A 2d 647,
651-52 (N.J.), cer denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
In Cruzan v. Harmon, the confrontation between the family and the State
of Missouri was more direct, due in part to the fact that Nancy Cruzan was a
patient in a state hospital. 760 S.W.2d at 411. In addition, Cruzan v. Harmon
was a product of Missouri law in which the legislature had set its mind to pre-
serving human life, almost at any cost. Legislation in that state concerning
abortion, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.010 (Vernon Supp. 1992), evidences this intent,
as does its living will statute, which does not "condone, authorize or approve
mercy killing or euthanasia nor permit any affirmative or deliberate act or
omission to shorten or end life." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.055(5) (Vernon 1992).
The Missouri Supreme Court found this legislation to be an "expression of the
policy of this State with regard to the sanctity of life." Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d at 420.
Other states have developed a line of analysis for addressing these issues.
In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts articulated a bal-
ancing test that has been cited in many other jurisdictions. The Saikewicz
court invoked the following state interests: "(1) the preservation of life;
(2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention
of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession."
Id. at 425. Against these interests the court balanced the individual's right to
refuse life-prolonging medical treatment. Id.
72. Incompetency can arise in a variety of circumstances: infancy;, mental
retardation; mental illness; disease, such as senile dementia or a stroke; or as
the result of an accident. Incompetency plays a role in a court's determination
of what test to apply in cases involving the discontinuance of life-sustaining
treatment. Generally, courts apply one of two tests: substituted judgment or
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the petitioner, and focuses instead upon the silent party.7 3 The
guardian may be procedurally expedient, but once the lawsuit
is launched, he can be left on the shore. Substantively, he is
dispensable, and that is the way it is supposed to be.
But in these deathwatch cases, the petitioners are more
than nominal, procedural plaintiffs, triggering a piece of litiga-
tion that could not have started in any other way. The petition-
ers are substantive plaintiffs as well, not just hollow masks
through which resounds the pain of another. They too are ag-
grieved; they too are in pain. It may be derivative pain, the
best interests. Stewart G. Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes
Them and By What Standards?, 41 RUTGERs L. REV. 505, 525-30 (1989). The
best interests test is usually used when the patient has never been competent
or has never expressed her views on treatment. Id at 518-20.
The law concerning minors tends to provide prototypical procedures and
substantive law regarding how to make decisions for incompetent persons. In-
fants, for example, are legally incapable of consenting to medical treatment.
Id at 507. Thus, a parent or legal guardian must consent before a child can
receive treatment, unless there is some kind of emergency. See, e.g., RJ.D. v.
Vaughn Clinic, 572 So. 2d 1225, 1230 (Ala. 1990). If for some reason, the par-
ent's decision endangers the child, the courts will take over, usually invoking
the doctrine of parens patriae. See, eg., Newark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108,
1116 (Del. 1991); Favier v. Winick, 583 N.Y.S.2d 907, 910 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
For a discussion of the evolution of the doctrine of parens patriae, see Neil H.
Cogan, Juvenile Law: Before and After the Entrance of Parens Patriae, 22
S.C. L. REV. 147, 155-161 (1970) (discussing the roots of the English Chancel-
lor's parallel jurisdiction over infants and "idiots"); Lawrence B. Custer, The
Origin of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978). Courts
tend to use the "best interests of the child" standard in making decisions for
infants under their supervision, appointing a guardian who serves as an officer
of the court. See, eg., People ex rel G.S., 820 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Colo. Ct. App.
1991); In re D.L., Jr., 589 N.E.2d 680, 684 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
73. In Quinlan I, Judge Muir addressed whether Karen Quinlan's father
had "standing to pursue a constitutional right on behalf of an infant," and
found that the only cases where this was true involved "continuing life-styles."
Quinlan I, 348 A.2d at 822 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923)).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed with Judge Muir's holding that
"there is no parental constitutional right that would entitle him to a grant of
relief in propria persona." Quinlan 11, 355 A.2d at 664. Thus Karen's constitu-
tional rights alone were to be vindicated "by Mr. Quinlan as guardian." Id-
The Supreme Court of New Jersey's opinion also suggests that an individ-
ual's constitutional right to refuse medical treatment is not destroyed because
she can no longer exercise that right due to incompetency, someone acting as
guardian for the incompetent will exercise this right. Id The Massachusetts
Supreme Court later picked up the same thread, stating: "Mhe State must
recognize the dignity and worth of [an incompetent] person and afford to that
person the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent per-
sons." Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 428.
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pain of watching a loved one linger on in misery, but that does
not rob it of its authenticity.
It went on for months and months, and because we live so
far apart, my family had to keep vigil on the telephone. Over
the years, this is how we have come to share our lives. We call
each other often and talk the private language of our family.
Distance does not have to defeat psychic intimacy.
With my mother, the interval of silence between calls is
about two weeks long. If more time goes by, I do not feel right
in my skin, always imagining the worst: maybe she has been
devoured by the San Andreas fault; maybe she is ill, or de-
pressed. When we finally do talk, it is a relief. At first, we
cover the intervening weeks with broad, bold strokes of gener-
ality. Later, after assurances of reasonably good health, happi-
ness, and terrestrial stability, we exchange bursts of fabulous
details about what was said and what was worn and what was
said and what was eaten. We say nothing of consequence.
Rather, the words exchanged form a crazy quilt of velvet and
cotton, of flower prints and moir satin, joined together by me-
tallic threads and rickrack, by the unfinished sentences of
mother and daughter, and by their shared assumptions and
history.
But when my father was sick, there was a new and horri-
ble dimension to our conversations. I had to ask, and she had
to answer, "How is Daddy?"
There were only two responses: "Just the same," or
"Worse." Then there were the words of elaboration.
They were not words about my father. They were not
words about the man who gave his children a sense of belong-
ing in the world, a love of music, travel, and history. They
were words about my father's body. About his broken, infected
skin. About his bladder and his bowels. About what came out,
and what went in. About how his hands had frozen into the
shape of a garden trowel. About how he moaned all the time,
like some miserable animal, beyond names, beyond faces, be-
yond recognition.
And yet, not beyond pain.
I hated those conversations, and I hated having to repeat
them to my brother and sister on the telephone. They left all
of us somber and silent. But as much as I hated those conversa-
tions, I knew we had to have them. The three of us needed to
know what was going on and, more importantly, our mother
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needed to tell us. Just as my father was wrapped in his own
chrysalis of pain, separated from her by the gauze of disease
and debilitation, so too was my mother in pain as she watched
him die. It was not a pain to be borne alone.
It is the pain of those elephants in Botswana who were re-
luctantly forced to desert the old dying cow in their search for
food and water. It is the pain of agitated cetaceans who sur-
round a distressed companion, or support his failing body at the
surface of the water so that he may breathe. It is the pain of
members of human deathwatches, those who gathered around
the dying person's bed in Munch's painting, those who gather
around the interminably ill person's bed in twentieth-century
hospitals. It was the Quinlans' pain, and the Cruzans' pain. It
was my mother's pain as she turned my father's body from side
to side, over and over again. It was my pain, and the pain of my
brother and sister.
But it is not a pain that the law is willing to recognize.
Although the anguish of the members of the deathwatch may
echo in the courthouse halls, we do not allow that anguish to
penetrate the courtroom walls. It is a fiction held tightly into
place by the mortar of another fiction. We pretend that we are
listening to the voices of the silent curled up daughters; we
make decisions to terminate the life-sustaining treatment in the
name of their autonomy.74 Our fictional attention to the words
74. Autonomy basically means the right to be accorded the respect of
others and to exercise free will in the sphere of personal action. Most of our
notions of autonomy derive from Kantian philosophy. Kant based his theory
on the rational being, or venunjftwn, who exercised practical reason to legis-
late for himself according to his conception of law. IWMANUEL KANT, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF THE M-rAPHYSICs OF MORALS Passim (Lewis W. Beck trans., Bobbs-
Merrill 1959) (1785).
In the context of health care, autonomy is the patient's right to make his
own decisions regarding medical treatment. Tort law has developed two theo-
ries which seek to secure for the patient such self-determination. First, the
law has concluded that a physician commits a battery when performing a med-
ical procedure that goes beyond the scope of the patient's consent, thus becom-
ing an intentional touching of a tortious nature. See, e.g., Schloendorff v.
Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ('Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his body ...."). The second doctrine, informed consent, is based on negli-
gence. The issue here is whether the physician made a full and complete dis-
closure to the patient of all the possible risks of a procedure or treatment so
that the patient could make a truly informed decision. See Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-92 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)
(defining the scope of disclosure for physicians). Corollaries to this doctrine
are the patient's right to refuse medical treatment based upon the information
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of someone who is not there ensures another pretense: we do
not hear the voices of those who are there, the members of the
deathwatch. Their pain may exist as a matter of human psy-
chology, but it does not find expression in pleadings, deposi-
tions, transcripts, briefs, or appellate decisions. And as far as
provided and the duty of the health-care providers to respect the patient's
choice. Through these tort theories, courts have recognized that patients
should be protected from unwanted bodily intrusions. Id at 781.
The other theory which ensures respect for the patient's choice regarding
medical treatment is the constitutional right of privacy, first articulated in this
context in Quinlan II. Some courts have refused to address the constitutional
issue, and insist on relying exclusively on the common law right. E.g., In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985) (stating that the court need not decide
the constitutional issue because the common law right to self-determination
encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d
64, 70 (N.Y.), cerL denied sub nom. Storar v. Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (same).
In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, the Supreme Court determined
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment created a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest that embraced the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment. 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990). Thus a competent person has
"a constitutionally protected right to refuse hydration and nutrition." l. at
2852. These rights are not absolute, however, and must be weighed against the
state's interests. Id. at 2853.
Courts have extended these common law and constitutional rights of self-
determination to incompetent patients. The problem has been how to exercise
such rights since some form of surrogate decisionmaking must be invoked.
For a thorough discussion of the various tests governing termination of life-
support systems from incompetent patients, see Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating
Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1988) (criticizing the current tests used
by courts and arguing for a family-based presumption in life-support decision-
making); see also I nda Fentiman, Privacy and Personhood Revisited" A New
Framework for Substitute Decisionmaking for the Incompetent Incurably Ill
Adult, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 801 (1989) (examining the state's role in health-
care decisionmaking and defining the role individuals should have in those de-
cisions).
One test, often used, is the doctrine of substituted judgment, in which the
surrogate puts herself in the position of the incompetent patient and decides as
he would decide under similar circumstances. It is a subjective test, seeking to
determine not what most people would do under similar circumstances, but
what this particular patient, if competent, would do. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHIcAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BE-
HAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 132-
34 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT's COMMISSION]. For a discussion of the
problems associated with the substituted judgment doctrine, see generally Al-
len E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29
UCLA L. REV. 386 (1981) (critiquing the current use of proxy decisionmakers
and discussing difficulties that the substituted judgment standard may encoun-
ter); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990) (discussing the dangers
presented by the doctrine); Walter M. Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine:
A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES L. & MED. 131 (1985) (critiquing the theory and
practice of the standard and proposing an alternative).
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the law is concerned, if their pain does not find expression on
the right pieces of paper, it does not exist at all.
II. PAINTIFFS, PROCEDURE, AND THE LIMITS
OF LAW WISHES
In my first year of law school, I had a recurring problem.
When I briefed cases, I could not remember who was the plain-
tiff and who was the defendant. The short hand versions of pi
and delta were unfamiliar and did not help; they only added to
my confusion. I was too embarrassed to reveal this rather fun-
damental deficiency to anyone, although now that I read an-
swers to law school exams, instead of write them, I realize that
my problem was not unique. At least once during each period
of bluebook blues, I encounter a student who zealously ana-
lyzes an entire baroque fact pattern, confusing the plaintiff and
the defendant.
In order to get straight who the plaintiff was, I used to re-
move the "1" from the word to create a new word: "Paintiff."
Paintiffs were people who came to the courthouse in pain.75
They had been hurt or injured somehow and were seeking a
remedy. It was easy to find them in a tort case, with all that
blood and torn tissue. In a property case, it was more difficult,
probably because I did not own much at the time. Finding the
paintiff in an easement case, for example, was hard for me. I
had to mentally move into somebody's house and start walking
all over the neighbor's yard, or else be walked all over. In Civil
Procedure, I never did find the paintiff, which undoubtedly ac-
counted for my poor performance in the course.76
75. Actually, "pain" originally meant "suffering or loss inflicted for a
crime or offense; punishment; penalty;, a fine." 2 COMPACT EDITION OF THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2054 (1971). It came from the Latin, "paena,"
which meant penalty or punishment.
If I had known my word derivations better, I would have picked the word
"complain" as my heuristic device since its original meaning evokes the appro-
priate imagery. To "complain" meant to "give expression to sorrow or suffer-
ing." It also came from the Latin, "corn" plus "plangere" meaning to lament
or bewail, and originally meaning to strike or beat the breast or head in sign of
grief. Circa 1450, "complain" also came to mean a "formal statement of a
grievance to or before a competent authority;, to lodge a complaint, bring a
charge." 1 i& at 491.
76. Once I had mastered the task of finding the plaintiff, my next intellec-
tual hurdle was to find the referents for the players in an appellate decision:
the Appellant and the Appellee. (Just as torts were not filled with strawber-
ries, there were no apples in judicial decisions.) In a sense, the appellant was a
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I have carried the heuristic device with me over the years,
asking of each case: Who is the paintiff? Who is in pain? What
is the nature of that pain? What caused that pain? What can
or should the law do about that pain? Do I care about that
pain?
My answer to that last question determines the degree of
attention I will pay to a judicial decision. Fortunately, I am not
a judge, but a curious reader of curious cases. I read them be-
cause I want to, not because I have to. A judge does not have
that luxury. He cannot put down a pleading because he is unin-
terested in the plaintiff's pain; he must take every complaint
seriously.77
Nor does the judge have the luxury of caring about the
pain of peripheral players in a lawsuit.78 The constraints that
the rules of procedure impose do not permit the judge's empa-
thy to graze in any pasture. He is confined by the artificial
boundaries of the grievance, by the way in which the pain was
packaged and presented.
meta-plaintiff, someone who came into the appellate court in pain from the de-
cision of the court below.
77. The judge has an obligation to engage in a "dialogue." Owen Fiss, The
Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1, 13 (1979). Our law of civil procedure, as well as the law of evidence, deter-
mines what claims the judge must adjudicate, and what witnesses the judge
must listen to in order to render his decision:
It is a dialogue with very special qualities: (a) Judges are not in con-
trol of their agenda, but are compelled to confront grievances or
claims they would otherwise prefer to ignore. (b) Judges do not have
full control over whom they must listen to. They are bound by rules
requiring them to listen to a broad range of persons or spokesmen.
(c) Judges are compelled to speak back, to respond to the grievance
or the claim, and to assume individual responsibility for that response.
(d) Judges must also justify their decisions.
Id.
78. A judge sometimes may consider, however, through a utilitarian anal-
ysis, the potential pain to the defendant if he would have exercised more care.
Nuisance law provides an example. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sug-
gests that, to determine whether "[a]n intentional invasion of another's inter-
est in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable," a judge may consider
whether "the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979). In determining the utility of
the defendant's conduct, one factor that a judge may consider, apart from the
social value of that conduct and its "suitability... to the character of the local-
ity," is "the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion." Id. § 828.
Thus, the judge may consider how painful it would have been to the defendant
to take the measures needed to avoid the harm or how painful it would be to
require him to "carry on his activity with more skill or care or in a different
manner or at a different time and thereby avoid a substantial part of the
harm." Id § 828 cmt. h.
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The judge is fenced in by words, but I am not.
Who are the paintiffs in a case like Quinlan or Cruzan? It
might be the silent, curled up daughters, but I doubt it. The
question of whether a person in a semi-vegetative state feels
pain would be answered, if at all, in a medical journal, not in a
law review. 79 Of course, there is always an epistemological
problem when we are talking about the pain of others. We can
only truly know our own pain, and must infer the pain of
others based on trust. We trust that when others wince, or cry,
or say they are in pain, they are experiencing an agony akin to
our own in similar circumstances8 ° Most of us do not let such
79. Of course the question could also show up in an interdisciplinary jour-
nal. See Michael P. McQuillan, M.D., Can People Who are Unconscious or in
the "Vegetative State" Perceive Pain? 6 ISSUES L. & MED. 373 (1991). McQuil-
lan distinguishes "between pain as a particular kind of sensation and the affec-
tive response to pain that is called suffering." I& at 377. McQuillan discusses
various clinical dilemmas, such as whether the human neonate and fetus per-
ceive pain, or whether a patient under general anesthesia or in a coma recalls
painful physical touches or unpleasant sensations. Id at 381-82. He concludes
that
the pathways sufficient for the perception and modulation of pain
need not rise nor descend to levels generally thought necessary for
consciousness. Pain may be expressed not only in language, but also
in autonomic and motor behavior that can be shown to correlate in a
linear fashion with subjective pain sensation.
Id. at 383. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that an unconscious person,
or one in a vegetative state, might perceive pain. Contra Ronald E. Cranford,
M.D., Termination of Treatment in the Persistent Vegetative State, 4 SEM-
NARS IN NEUROLOGY 36, 40 (1984) (arguing that patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state cannot perceive the pain of starvation or dehydration); Ronald E.
Cranford, M.D., The Persistent Vegetative State. The Medical Reality (Getting
the Facts Straight), HAsTINGs CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 26 (same).
See generally Francis J. Keefe & Laurence A. Bradley, Behavioral and
Psychological Approaches to the Assessment and Treatment of Chronic Pain, 6
GEN. Hosp. PSYCmATRY 49, 50 (1984) (describing a system of assessing a pa-
tient's pain based upon five "pain behaviors": guarding, bracing, rubbing, gri-
macing and sighing); Daniel N. Robinson, Pain and Suffering:
Psychobiological Principles, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcS 1177, 1180-81
(Warren T. Reich ed., 1978) (discussing the differences between the issues of
pain and suffering).
I should perhaps acknowledge here a certain crudeness in my use of the
term "pain" with respect to the members of the deathwatch. In McQuillan's
terms, I am actually referring more to their suffering-presumably psychic,
emotional, and spiritual-although certainly that pain could manifest itself in
physical sensations. The pain that the members of the deathwatch witness is
the particular kind of physical sensation that is experienced by the dying per-
son, whatever that sensation may be.
80. Sometimes this philosophical problem is referred to as "knowledge
solipsism." C.D. Rollins, Solipsism, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 487,
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philosophical quandaries get in the way of feeling the pain of
others, however. We let empathy do the job that philosophy
cannot handle.
But the pain of Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan, if it
ever existed, was so alien to us because it registered on a body
that was no longer familiar. We could not crawl into their
minds and feel at home there, the way we might crawl into the
mind of another who is conscious and alert and inhabits a ner-
vous system much like our own. If Karen Quinlan and Nancy
Cruzan felt pain, it was not a pain that I can claim to under-
stand. I can only respond on the level of abstraction: If they
felt pain, whatever that might have meant to them, I too would
have wanted that pain to come to an end. If they were in fact
paintiffs, their petitions should have been granted.
But it does not take much imagination to feel the pain of
the members of Karen Quinlan's deathwatch, or of Nancy
Cruzan's, or to appreciate how they were paintiffs in their re-
spective cases."' Perhaps it would help to have lived through a
similar deathwatch, to have turned one's own father's body
from side to side, over and over again. Perhaps, but it hardly
seems a requisite to feeling empathy that we should have to
wear the same shoes to understand the pressure of the
leather-only that we should have the same kind of feet.
487 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). It differs from the more familiar form of solip-
sism, the metaphysical claim that only the self exists. Id- at 488. "Knowledge
solipsism" is a much less radical claim that the self is the origin of the knowl-
edge of existence. I&e "Ilt does not assert that there is one, and only one,"
source of knowledge. Me at 490. Rather, it rules out the possibility that one
could have direct knowledge of the sensations of others. Id at 491. We can
only know own our sensations, and our "knowledge" of the feelings of others
must be indirect, based on probability or analogy. L at 490; see also JOHN
WIsDoM, OTHER MINDS (2d ed. 1965) (considering, through a series of essays,
whether we ever know what anyone else is thinking, feeling, or experiencing).
81. In Quinlan I, the court heard evidence that Karen Quinlan herself un-
derstood the pain of the members of the deathwatch, at least before she lost
her cognitive function. QUINLAN, supra note 54, at 209-13 (quoting from the
trial transcript). Karen Quinlan's sister, Mary Ellen, testified regarding
Karen's feelings about the deaths of two people who were well-known to her
Karen was talking about Mr. Birch dying, and her girl friend's father
dying. But when she talked to me, she was saying, in so many words,
that she wouldn't want to be kept alive because she watched part of
the family die, too. Not just the person who died legally. And she
was saying that, like she was very good friends with this girl, and she
watched what this girl went through-and that was what she was re-
ferring to, to me, when she said she wouldn't want to be kept alive.
I& at 213.
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One day last spring, I was at the beach with my friend. Ac-
tually, we were having lunch in the front seat of her car, a fero-
cious March wind having blown away our plan of eating with
our feet in the sand. The sky was full of luminous, silver
clouds; the water was choppy, slate gray.
I had been telling her about my concern for the families of
Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan, for the members of the
deathwatch. "They are the ones in pain in those cases, not the
patients. As far as anyone can tell, the patients are not even
aware of their situations."
She knew what I was talking about, having gone through
the prolonged death of her mother last year. "In some ways,
what you say is right, of course," she said. 'ook at my mother.
Her dying almost killed my sister and me. Even though she
was virtually gone, we still felt we had to go see her every
night. Night after night, week after week, through those end-
less yellow halls, into that dark little room." She rested her
sandwich on her lap and stared out at Long Island Sound
through the car window. "And there she was, skin and bones,
her mouth open, her eyes staring blankly at the wall." She
picked up her sandwich and took a bite. "I don't know why we
went at all," she mumbled. "She didn't even know we were
there."
I did not respond, but left her in silence with her dredged-
up pain. Then, after a while, I said, 'You see what I mean,
then. The pain in that situation didn't really belong to your
mother, even though that is what the law pretends. If she had
been on life-support systems, year after year, and you and your
sister didn't feel you could stand it any more, keeping vigil over
her in that awful situation, you would have to petition a court
to withdraw the medical treatment. But you wouldn't petition
in your own name. You'd have to bring the lawsuit in her
name. Then the court would use a legal fiction called 'substi-
tuted judgment'8 2 to make the lawsuit sound as if your mother
82. The doctrine of substituted judgment appeared, in the context of med-
ical decisionmaking, in Quinlan I, 348 A.2d 801, 819 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1975), modified and remanded, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom.
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The court stated: '"The assertion
that Karen would elect, if competent, to terminate the respirator requires
careful examination." Id. The need to use the legal fiction that Karen Quin-
lan was making the decision herself, that the court was merely placing itself in
her place and acting as she would have acted in similar circumstances, stems
from her incompetency and the court's desire to "afford to that [incompetent]
person the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent per-
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were doing the asking, even though the pain belonged to you
and your sister-to the members of the deathwatch. The law
doesn't directly confront your pain." I paused for a moment,
coming up for air. "I hate that kind of pretense in the law."
She did not respond at first to my spate of words, but un-
wrapped a baggie of quartered apples. Then, because she is
who she is, she sought refuge in the comforting impersonality
of legal discourse, in the sanctuary of words that do not self-
refer.
"You don't mean to suggest, do you, that we grant the
members of the deathwatch some sort of legal recourse?"
I knew that her question was coming. There is a wonderful
sameness to our friendship, to the patterns of what we say and
what we do not say to one another. I start off by worrying
about something. I keep it to myself. It lives inside me for a
long time, slowly building pressure against the walls of my
body, but never crossing the somatic boundary. Then, in the
pale hours of one sleepless morning, it begins to pour out of my
mouth and my nose and my ears like ectoplasm, like cool,
white steam, and I try to hold it in my hand, to make it palpa-
ble, to give it shape, to find it a name.
Within a day or so, I bring my worry to her, crudely
formed in new sentences, tentative and conditional, and it al-
ways sounds clumsy when it hits the air.ss What does she do
with it, this tender, fledgling expression of concern? She tries
to cram it into "some sort of legal recourse." It is her way of
sons." Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
428 (Mass. 1977).
83. Something always happens to my ideas when they move from the in-
side of my mind to the ears of another human being. I found a description of
the same phenomenon while reading The House at Pooh Corner.
Eeyore had been bounced into the river, and Pooh had suggested that he
throw a large stone into the water so that Eeyore would be washed to the
shore. A.A. MLNE, THE HOUSE AT POOH CORNER 97-103 (Ernest H. Shepard
illus., 2d prtg. 1961). The plan backfired. Eeyore claimed that he had to dive
underwater to avoid being hit by the stone, and was critical of Pooh's idea. Id.
at 102. Piglet tried to comfort Pooh.
"It's just Eeyore," said Piglet. "I thought your Idea was a very
good Idea."
Pooh began to feel a little more comfortable, because when you
are a Bear of Very Little Brain, and you Think of Things, you find
sometimes that a Thing which seemed very Thingish inside you is
quite different when it gets out into the open and has other people
looking at it.
Id- My problem, I suspect, has something to do with being a Bear of Very Lit-
tle Brain.
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dealing with the unknown.8 4
"I don't know. I've just started thinking about it."
"Well, what sort of lawsuit do you think it would be? I
mean, there has to be some sort of right that's being infringed
upon." She was sputtering in that ineffable way that only those
who teach law can sputter. 'What kind of right do you want to
give to the members of the deathwatch? And what kind of
remedy are you going to grant them if someone infringes on
that right?"
Socratic Sputter .... Pedagogical Sputter .... Critical
Sputter. I was searching for the right kind of sputter.
"It's all well and good to talk about hating the legal fiction
and having the law be honest and confront the real pain di-
rectly," she continued. '"ut you really have to give the lawsuit
more structure than that. Define the harm done to the mem-
bers of the deathwatch-your paintiffs, as you call them-and
decide what you want done about it."
Structural Sputter.
My friend is a great believer in the natural order of things.
She needs to know that the plaintiff has a substantive right,
and that for infringements of that right there is an ideal rem-
edy. Ubi jus, ibi remedium.8 5 I hear her humming over the
breakfast dishes, carefully putting the plates on the dish
drainer in descending order, the forks and spoons all facing the
same way. Closely related to the dichotomy of right and rem-
edy is the dichotomy of substance and procedure. It holds that
procedure is distinct from substance. We use procedure as a
means of fashioning the remedy, and the remedy, in turn, as a
means of protecting against the infringement of the substantive
right.86 Her beliefs are motivated by a deep need for symmetry
84. It may also be a way of justifying her own existence as a student and
teacher of law. She needs the apparent neutrality and abstraction of legal
rhetoric to create the illusion that law consists of a body of secret knowledge-
secret knowledge that she has mastered and is now charged with the sacred
duty of transmitting. For an excellent discussion of the critical legal scholars'
critique of the mystifying function of legal rhetoric, see J. Paul Oetken, Form
and Substance in Critical Legal Studies, 100 YALE L.J. 2209, 2213-16 (1991).
85. This nineteenth-century maxim means, literally, '%vhere there is a
right, there is a remedy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (6th ed. 1990); see
also Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of
Ideal Lawsuit Structure From the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1989) (exploring the normative values beneath the rhetoric of pro-
cedural reform and tracing the development of the rules that define the party
structure of a lawsuit).
86. See, e.g., 1 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
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and logical progression, by the sense of control that she derives
from those little numbered boxes into which she puts her ideas.
From a dish drainer properly used.
I drive her crazy with my messy mind, by the way I move
unpredictably, and often irresponsibly, from thought to
thought, making connections between wildly disparate things.
Not only do I throw plates on top of knots of forks and spoons,
but often I do not wash the dishes at all.
It is odd that we are such good friends, but we need each
other. I need her to return to, to her model of social reality and
legal order, to the comfort of her certitude. She needs me to
depart from, to disturb.
And I was not sure whether the members of the death-
watch needed either of us. It was something to think about on
a windy March day.
For a while, I stopped talking to my friend about the death-
watch because some of my questions were philosophical. Not
only does she not like to ponder philosophical questions, she
does not like me to ponder philosophical questions.87
I started out trying to identify my paintiffs. In trying to de-
termine who the members of the deathwatch might be, I found
myself all alone at one end of the spectrum. That solitude it-
self prompted this question: Is the deathwatch of necessity a
Secs. 90-91 (Spencer W. Symons ed., Lawyers' Co-op. Publishing Co. 1941)
(1881).
87. I have often wondered why my friend does not like me to ask philo-
sophical questions. I suspect that her fear is not for me, but for herself. Few
people remember what happens in the end of The Adventures of Alice in
Wonderland. After Alice wakes up, she tells her sister, who in the beginning
of the story was reading a book with no pictures or conversations in it, all
about her adventures in her "curious dream." LEwis CARROLL, THE ADvEN-
TURES OF ALICE IN WONDERLAND 192 (John Tenniel illus., MacMillan 1929)
(1865). Alice then runs off, and her sister "sat still just as she had left her,
leaning her head on her hand, watching the setting sun, and thinking of little
Alice and all her wonderful Adventures, till she too began dreaming after a
fashion." Id. at 194. She dreamed of Alice looking up at her before the dream
had started, "and still as she listened, or seemed to listen, the whole place
around her became alive with the strange creatures of her little sister's
dream." Id. at 194-95. Suddenly, the sister's world became inhabited with a
White Rabbit, a March Hare, the Queen of Hearts, a baby sneezing on a Duch-
ess' knee, a shrieking Gryphon, a squeaking Lizard, a sobbing Mock Turtle,
and "the choking of the suppressed guinea-pigs." Id. at 195. Maybe my friend
is worried that like Alice and her sister, my dreams too will be infectious. She
might herself slip into the unfamiliar, disturbing world of philosophic
ruminations.
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two-part relation? Could I be the only member of my own
deathwatch, all alone in the forest, under falling trees, keeping
a solitary vigil over my dying body?sa
In some sense, and for a while, it seemed to me that I
could. After all, the role of a dying person would be no differ-
ent from the other roles that I have played. Since the first time
I leaned over and apprehended that chasm between self and
other, I have watched myself perform: the role of child; the
role of mother; the role of student; the role of teacher. They
are all different persons. Indeed, our idea of persons comes not
only from seventeenth-century notions of moral agency, but
also from a more ancient source, the Greek theatre.8 9 "An ac-
tor dons masks, literally per sonae, that through which the
sound comes, for the many roles he acts."9°
Some roles I chose to play, and others were forced upon
me, but inside, there is an inner self who sometimes takes part,
and sometimes does not.91 Pain and joy command her partici-
88. The allusion here, of course, is to the famous hypothetical concerning
whether a tree that falls in an empty forest makes a sound. George Berkeley
(1685-1783) addressed this philosophical issue as he sought to refute a version
of materialism, predominant in the seventeenth century, that argued that im-
mediate objects of perception exist independent of the mind. In the Three Di-
alogues, Berkeley claims that sounds "have no real being without the mind."
GEORGE BERKELEY, TH=RE DiALoGUES BETWEEN HYLAs AND PHiLoNOuS 22
(Colin M. Turbayne ed., Liberal Arts Press 1954) (1713). Once we conceive of
any "thing," we bring it into a relationship with the percipient-ourselves-
and thus Berkeley concludes that nothing can exist independent of the mind.
1d, at 42. For a good explanation of Berkeley's theories, see H.B. Acton,
George Berkeley, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILosoPHY 295 (Paul Edwards ed.,
1967); Colin M. Turbayne, Introduction to TmREE DL&OGUES BETWEEN HYLAS
AND PHILONOUS, supra, at vii
89. Am6lie 0. Rorty, A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves,
Individuals, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 301, 309 (Am6lie 0. Rorty ed.,
1976).
90. Id.
91. George Herbert Mead observed the same phenomenon:
The self, as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social
structure, and it arises in social experience. After a self has arisen, it
in a certain sense provides for itself its social experiences, and so we
can conceive of an absolutely solitary self. But it is impossible to con-
ceive of a self arising outside of social experience. When it has arisen
we can think of a person in solitary confinement for the rest of his
life, but who still has himself as a companion, and is able to think and
to converse with himself as he had communicated with others. That
process to which I have just referred, of responding to one's self as an-
other responds to it, taking part in one's own conversation with
others, being aware of what one is saying and using that awareness of
what one is saying to determine what one is going to say thereafter-
that is a process with which we are all familiar.
GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOcETY 140 (Charles W. Morris ed., 1934).
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pation, but always she watches and listens. When I am alone
and playing no role, she is there with me, and we talk up a blue
streak.92 She is my constant companion and the only witness to
the various roles that I have come to play. Sometimes she
writes under my name.93
92. A blue streak is "something moving very fast," or "continuous, rapid,
or interminable speech: to talk a blue streak." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 229 (2d ed. 1987). Its parallel in the British ver-
nacular is to "talk the hind leg off a donkey," which describes a victim of "log-
orrhea or logomania." WILLIAM & MARY MORRIS, HARPER DICTIONARY OF
CONTEMPORARY USAGE 574 (2d ed. 1985). Logomania is "abnormal talkative-
ness," whereas logorrhea is "pathologically excessive and incoherent talkative-
ness." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1331 (1986).
In an essay on psychotic polar bears, Patricia Williams writes eloquently
about the cacaphony of multiple voices, suggesting that their competition may
foster personal growth and the discovery of new ideas:
It is also wise, I know, to maintain some consciousness of where I am
when I am other than the voice itself. If the other voice in my head is
really me too, then it means that I have shifted positions, ever so
slightly, and become a new being, a different one from her, over
there. It gets confusing sometimes, so I leave markers of where I've
been, particularly if it's not just a voice but a place that I want to
come back to in time.
PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 207-08 (1991). With
respect to my own inner dialogue, we are definitely logomaniacal, and when
worried, we suffer from logorrhea.
93. I found my own thoughts echoing in part of a poem that I read re-
cently by Ray Bradbury:
I do not write-
The other me
Demands emergence constantly.
But if I turn to face him much too swiftly
Then
He sidles back to where and when
He was before
I unknowingly cracked the door
And let him out.
Sometimes a fire-shout beckons him,
He reckons that I need him,
So I do. His task
To tell me who I am behind this mask.
He Phantom is, and I facade
That hides the opera he writes with God,
While I, all blind,
Wait raptureless until his mind
Steals down my arm to wrist, to hand, to fingertips
And, stealing, find
Such truths as fall from tongues
And burn with sound,
And all of it from secret blood and secret soul on secret ground.
RAY BRADBURY, "The Other Me," in ZEN IN THE ART OF WRITING: ESSAYS ON
CREATVITY 140-41 (1989). At the end of the poem, he asks:
Did R.B. write that poem, that line, that speech?
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There is no doubt that she would attend at least the early
stages of my deathwatch. But upon the disappearance of that
inner self, the cessation of that private dialogue, someone else
would have to see it through, to keep solitary vigil over my dy-
ing body. Otherwise, there would be no one to watch the death.
I could die all alone in the forest, under falling trees, but I
could not be the only member of my own deathwatch.
So I guess that by definition the deathwatch must be a two-
part relation. There will always be one who watches, and one
who is watched: one
v
e
r
t
i
c
a
1 and the other horizontal.
I had settled in my own mind that the deathwatch must be
a two-part relation;94 at a minimum, there would always be one
No, inner-ape, invisible, did teach.
His reach, clothed in my flesh, stays mystery;
Say not my name.
Praise other me.
ICE
94. 'This two-sidedness ... is a fundamental feature of death-not only of
the premature death of the spirit, but of death at any age and in any form.
There are always two parties to a death; the person who dies and the survivors
who are bereaved." Arnold Toynbee, Epilogue to MAN'S CONCERN WrrH
DEATH, supra note 25, at 257, 267. Those who strive to "deprive death of its
sting" by holding that death is nothing more than an annihilation of the per-
son who dies overlook the "crucial fact that, in a death, there are two parties
to the event.... [Mian is a social creature; and a fact of capital importance
about death's sting is that it is two-pronged." IM at 270.
Dr. Cicely Saunders, founder of St. Christopher's Hospice in London, pre-
fers to invoke the words spoken in the Garden of Gethsemane, "Watch with
Me," to capture the needs of the dying. Cicely Saunders, Watch With Me, 61
NuRsING TiMES 1615, 1615 (1965). Her version of the deathwatch is more com-
munal; the dying person and the members of the deathwatch are in collabora-
tion, or at least witness the arrival of death together.
I have tried to sum up the demands of this work we are planning in
the words 'Watch with Me." Our most important foundation for St.
Christopher's is the hope that in watching we should learn not only
how to free patients from pain and distress, how to understand them
and never let them down, but also how to be silent, how to listen and
how just to be there.
I& at 1617.
1992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
who watches, and one who is watched. But that statement
marked both the beginning and end of certainty. Beyond the
notion of a two-part relation, I had to deal with probability.
How was I going to identify who the watchers and the watched
might be?
More likely than not, the dying member of the deathwatch
would be a single individual. Of course, there have been in-
stances of corporate death throughout history, due to natural
disasters or the cruelty of man.95 In our own century, the scale
of slaughter during warfare has grown to appalling propor-
tions.96 When the number of those dying increases substan-
tially, the deathwatch becomes a social convention that must
give way to utility. Contemporary accounts of the bubonic,
pneumonic, and septicaemic plagues of fourteenth-century
Western Europe and Asia, for example, often remarked upon
the disappearance of the deathwatch.97 In some instances, the
95. There is an entire body of literature on the deathwatches of the Holo-
caust. One of the most painful pieces to read is Elie Wiesel's The Death of My
Father. Wiesel, present at his father's death in Buchenwald, found no solace
in the circumstances of his father's death or the deathwatch imposed upon him
as the survivor.
His death did not even belong to him. I do not know to what cause to
attribute it, in what book to inscribe it. No link between it and the
life he had led. His death, lost among all the rest, had nothing to do
with the person he had been. It could just as easily have brushed him
in passing and spared him It took him inadvertently, absent-
mindedly. By mistake. Without knowing that it was he; he was
robbed of his death.
ELm WIFSEL, The Death of My Father, in LEGENDS OF OUR TIME 1, 2 (1968). In
a sense, Wiesel describes a failed death and a failed deathwatch.
96. From the late seventeenth century through the beginning of the twen-
tieth, Westerners abided by "relatively humanitarian" standards for the con-
duct of war. Arnold Toynbee, Death in War, in MAN'S CONCERN WITH
DEATH, supra note 25, at 145, 148. Those standards plummeted when the
Germans invaded Belgium in August of 1914, as civilians were no longer
spared from the atrocities of war. Id. Horror "swept across the Western
world" in 1937 with the bombing of Guernica, Spain, which indiscriminately
made victims of civilians of all ages. The bombings of the Second World War,
however, dwarfed those of the First World War and the period succeeding. Id.
Sadly, those bombings "caused less perturbation. For producing a shock, atro-
ciousness, by itself, is not enough; there must also be novelty." Id
97. See generally PHILIP ZIEGLER, THE BLACK DEATH (1969) (synthesizing
both contemporary accounts of the medieval plagues and the analyses of mod-
ern scholars to present the origins, spread, and social and economic impact of
the plagues in Western Europe). Cy. DANIEL DEFOE, A JOURNAL OF THE
PLAGUE YEAR 99-100 (Louis Landa ecL, Oxford Univ. Press 1969) (1722)
(describing the effect of the Great Plague of 1665 on the deathwatch). Because
of the risk of infection, no one wanted to participate in deathwatches, and sick
people wandered into the countryside to die alone:
It was known to us all that abundance of poor despairing Creatures,
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deathwatch had to be legislated against, to impede the spread of
disease. 98 But while there have been many instances of corpo-
rate death throughout history, that is not the norm. Most of us
will die alone, and those are the deathwatches that I am inter-
ested in, with one individual lying down. After all, as with our
births, we tend to die seriatim.
More likely than not the other part of the relation, those
who watch, will also consist of more than one person. It will
probably be a group. A group is defined as a "number of indi-
viduals assembled together or having some unifying relation-
ship."99 But beyond this nebulous definition, how do we
determine what individuals are in that number? What does it
who had the Distemper upon them, and were grown stupid or melan-
choly by their Misery, as many were, wandred [sic] away into the
Fields, and Woods, and into secret uncouth Places, almost any where
to creep into a Bush, or Hedge, and Die.
Id. at 100. Defoe described the plague's disastrous effect on the birth-watch as
well:
(O]ne of the most deplorable Cases in all the present Calamity was
that of Women with Child;, who when they came to the Hour of their
Sorrows, and their Pains came upon them, cou'd neither have help of
one Kind or another, neither Midwife or Neighbouring Women to
come near them ....
Id at 115-16.
98. For example, an Italian statute mandated isolation of the dying and
prohibited others from nursing them:
Everyone sick of the plague is to be brought out of the town to the
fields, there to die or recover. Those who have nursed plague patients
are to remain secluded for ten days before having intercourse with
anyone. The clergy are to examine the sick and report to the authori-
ties on pain of being burnt at the stake and confiscation of their pos-
sessions. Those who introduce the plague shall forfeit all their goods
to the State. Finally, with the exception of those set apart for the
purpose, no one shall administer to those sick of the plague on pain of
death and forfeiture of their possessions.
JoHANNEs NOmL, THE BLACK DEATH: A CHRONiCLE OF THE PLAGUE CoMPILD
FROM CONTEMPORARY SOURCES 73 (C.H. Clarke trans., abr. ed. Unwin Books
1961) (1924).
99. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 539 (1990).
The term "group" may be used, in sociology and anthropology, in at least
two ways. Elizabeth Bott, Urban families: Conjugal Roles and Social Net-
works, 8 Hum. REL. 345, 347 n.3 (1955). In one sense, it can "describe any col-
lectivity whose members are alike in some way." Id. In a more narrow sense,
and in the sense that I am using the term here, "group" refers to units that
"have some distinctive interdependent social relationships with one another,"
ie., organized groups. Id. In an organized group, the individual members
"make up a larger social whole with common aims, interdependent roles and a
distinctive subculture." I& at 347. Presumably a deathwatch constitutes an or-
ganized group, in the sense that its members have a common aim, but it would
be fleeting in duration and possess no formal governing structure.
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mean to assemble?1°° What is the unifying relationship? Is
there some organizing principle for their identification? And
even if we could identify the members of the deathwatch, what
would the law have to do with that entity?
At first, I decided that I could always rely upon the nuclear
family as my organizing principle.101 At the deathwatch, I
100. For example, are public executions a form of deathwatch? For a his-
tory of public executions, see MCHEL FOUCAULT, DICipLiNE AND PUNISH 32-
69 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977). Consider how many qualities
of a private deathwatch are present in this description of a hanging:.
Death by hanging, like most kinds of death in the eighteenth century,
was public. Not isolated from the community or concealed as an em-
barrassment to it, the execution of the death sentence was made
known to every part of the metropolis and the surrounding villages.
On the morning of a hanging day the bells of the churches of London
were rung buffeted. The cries of hawkers selling ballads and 'Last
Dying Speeches' filled the streets. The last preparations for death in
the chapel at Newgate were open to those able to pay the gaoler his
fee. The malefactors chains were struck off in the press yard in front
of friends and relations, the curious, the gaping and onlookers at the
prison gate. The route of the hanging procession crossed the busiest
axis of the town at Smithfield, passed through one of the most heavily
populated districts in St. Giles's and St. Andrew's, Holborn, and fol-
lowed the most-trafficked road, Tyburn Road, to the gallows. There
the assembled people on foot, upon horseback, in coaches, crowding
near-by houses, filling the adjoining roads, climbing ladders, sitting on
the wall enclosing Hyde Park and standing in its contiguous cow pas-
tures gathered to witness the hanging.
Peter Linebaugh, The Tyburn Riot Against the Surgeons, in DOUGLAS HAY ET
AL., ALBION'S FATAL TREE 65, 67 (1975).
In our own century, and outside the context of criminal punishment, the
media will publicize a deathwatch. Have all those who read or hear about the
event in some sense "assembled" and become members of the deathwatch? In
the early 1970s, the horrors of toxic poisoning were being discovered in the
fishing and farming town of Minamata on the southern Japanese island of
Kyushu. W. EUGENE SMITH & An.EEN SMITH, MINAMATA (1975). "[P]arades of
politicians and governmental environmentalists would move rapidly from
home to home among a select few patients, bowing, listening, looking sad and
moving on. All this was dutifully and 'objectively' recorded by reporters and
cameramen." 1d, at 61. The photograph of a cluster of cameramen and politi-
cians around the bed of a man dying from Minamata Disease is incredibly
moving, indeed as are all the photographs in this remarkable book. Id,
101. '"The term nuclear family refers to a unit consisting of husband, wife,
and dependent offspring. The nuclear family is generally contrasted with the
extended family, typically a residential unit composed husband, wife, depen-
dent offspring, and married sons and their spouses and offspring." Michael
Gordon, Introduction to THE NUCLEAR FAMILY IN CRISIS: THE SEARCH FOR AN
ALTERNATIVE 1 (Michael Gordon ed., 1972) [hereinafter NUCLEAR FAMILY IN
CRISIS].
Sociological literature often uses these terms more loosely, however. Id.
at 1-2. For example, a nuclear family that happens to have other adult mem-
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would get out a piece of yellow chalk and draw a circle on the
floor around the spouse and the children, or the mother and fa-
ther and the dying person's siblings. 0 2 All the other members
bers residing with them (besides the mother and father, such as an unmarried
sibling of one of the parents, or a widowed parent or grandparent), may be la-
beled an "extended family." I&
102. Many other commentators have argued that the family should decide
whether to terminate life-support systems. See eg., Corrine Bayley, Who
Should Decide?, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY
AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 3, 9 (A. Edward Doudera and J. Douglas Pe-
ters eds., 1982) [hereinafter LEGAL & ETHICAL ASPEcrs]; Richard P. Byrne,
Deciding for the Legally Incompetent. A View From the Bench, in LEGAL &
ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra, at 25, 25; cf Robert M. Veatch, Limits of Guardian
Treatment RefusaL" A Reasonablenew Standard, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 427,441-42
(1983) (arguing that "bonded guardians," who may be family or close friends of
the patient, should make decisions). This deference to family decisionmaking
reflects a long tradition of noninterference by the state in family matters.
Martha Minow, The Role of Families in Medical Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV.
1, 13-14. I italicize the term "long" because the view of the family as a sphere
of privacy and autonomy is primarily a product of the nineteenth century. See
generally LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND:
1500-1800 (1977) (arguing that in earlier centuries, the state did not perceive
distinct boundaries between the family and society and intervened more di-
rectly in family life).
Notions of familial privacy and a tradition of noninterference in the fam-
ily developed from a broader nineteenth-century tradition of liberal individu-
alism, as embodied in John Stuart Mill's Harm Principle:
[Tihe principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the
plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject
to such consequences as may follow- without impediment from our
fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even
though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong....
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing
our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive
others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the
proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and
spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live
as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems
good to the rest.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11, 14 (David Spitz ed., Norton Books 1975)
(1859).
Expanding Mill's principle from the individual to the family, however, has
some inherent conceptual difficulties. In particular, the meaning of "harm to
others" is unclear in a context in which, by definition, there are interpersonal
relations. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1840 (1985). Any time the law
deals with one person's relationship to another, there is the risk of harm to
others. Schneider argues that "not only are there many opportunities within
families to harm other members; there are many incentives," including psy-
chological and "financial interest[s] in a decision adverse to the interests of
other family members." Id-
The constitutional right of privacy, discovered in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the penumbrae of the Bill of Rights, derives in part from legal prin-
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of the deathwatch who might be gathered around the bed
would be outside the circle; their toes would be covered with
the yellow dust of exclusion. I would not let them sue because
of their tenuous relationship with the dying person.
That sounded like a good rule to me, both for its apparent
simplicity and accuracy. Simple because of its ease of applica-
tion: To find the potential paintiffs, a court would only have to
consult a roughly-hewn family tree. Accurate because in Quin-
lan and Cruzan, the two most famous cases, the moving parties
had been the parents of the dying person, even if the siblings
had been left out. It seemed like a harmless expansion to in-
clude the brothers and sisters in such a lawsuit, and if the dying
person were married, it seemed appropriate to look to the
spouse and children too.
When I was learning how to sew, my mother used to com-
plain that I could complicate anything. Any time a single
stranded thread presented itself in a furrow of fabric, my fin-
gers would mysteriously find a way to turn that single stranded
thread into an octopus with snarled limbs.
Sartorially speaking, she was right. Later she used to ac-
cuse me of the same tendency in my everyday dealings with
life. I could start out with a single-stranded choice of what to
order for lunch, and my mind would mysteriously find a way to
turn it into a tangled moral choice about eating meat.
Philosophically speaking, she was wrong. I did not create
that knot of threads; it had been there long before I opened the
menu. The difference was that I had seen the knot, and per-
haps because the threads lay close together, she had seen only a
single strand. What looked to her like filial alchemy was in
fact just her misperception of the problem's simplicity.
ciples relating to the family. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)
(finding that privacy rights in the marriage relationship are "older than the
Bill of Rights"). The privacy doctrine has "some extension to activities relat-
ing to marriage ... procreation ... contraception ... child rearing and educa-
tion." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citing, respectively, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42
(1967); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 286 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); see
also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976)
(holding that "the State may not constitutionally require the consent of the
spouse... as a condition for abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy").
The law still uses a "rights approach" in these cases, however, regarding the
family as a collection of individuals. See Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of
the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 329, 331 (characterizing the Court's role with
respect to the family as "addressing conflicting claims of individual and com-
munity, of liberty and authority.").
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So it was with the circle on the floor around the nuclear
family. The longer I lived with that organizing principle, the
more the problem increased in complexity, and as my fingers
discovered the density of the knot, I came to appreciate the
crudeness of my solution. What had seemed like a rule en-
dowed with the virtues of simplicity and accuracy turned out to
be an unyielding formal abstraction that flew in the face of
reality. 03
By looking at the other deathwatch cases, the other cases
in which pleadings were made to terminate life-support sys-
tems, I became convinced that my yellow chalk line was a use-
less convention. Some of those people who participated most
intensely in deathwatches were not members of the dying per-
son's nuclear family.1°4 Some of those dying persons did not
have any members of the nuclear family to gather around
them;10 5 at times it was difficult to find a family member who
103. One scholar notes that "the concept of the family is culturally deter-
mined and subject to ethnic and cultural variations." Walter 0. Weyrauch,
The Family as a Small Group, in GROUP DYNAMIC LAW: EXPOSITION AND
PRACTICE 153, 154 (David A. Funk ed., 1988).
Legally, a family group may be based on consanguinity, or affinity by
marriage alone; but there may be de facto relationships also, without
blood relationship or marriage, and these may or may not be legally
recognized. ... [S]mall group classifications, regardless of whether
they originate in psychology, sociology, or anthropology, do not neces-
sarily coincide with legal classifications.... [L]egal classifications [of
family] tend to be more narrow and rigid than group classifica-
tions.... [They are] "cerebral"... [a]bstract and relatively removed
from specific factual situations.
a at 155-56.
104. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 54 (N.Y.), cert; denied sub nom.
Storar v. Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (local director of 83-year-old incompetent
patient's religious order applied to be appointed committee of his person and
property, with authority to remove the respirator, patient's 10 nieces and
nephews supported application); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985)
(nephew, only surviving blood relative, appointed guardian of 84-year-old in-
competent aunt whom he had known for over 50 years and had visited once a
week for four or five years); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987) (friend who
had lived with patient for several years and whom patient had previously au-
thorized to consent to medical treatment sought appointment as guardian and
approval of state Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly for withdrawal
of medical treatment); In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (second cousin,
and only living relative, of incompetent patient sought guardianship and peti-
tioned for authority to terminate artificial feeding).
105. See, eg., In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (incompetent
92-year-old patient, in a psychiatric hospital for 57 years, represented by court-
appointed temporary guardian; no mention of any family members); In re
Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1983) (hospital and guardian petitioned to termi-
nate life-support systems for patient, retarded from birth, who had no rela-
tives or close friends with whom medical staff could consult). These patients
1992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cared enough to come forward to serve the role of procedural
plaintiff.1°6 And in other instances, there were bitter conflicts
over who would be a member of the deathwatch and who
would not: instances where members of the nuclear family
sought to exclude others from the circle who could not claim
consanguinity. 107
had both been mentally disabled and institutionalized for a long period of time
and, therefore, were not part of any social network. Their personal histories
almost guaranteed that no one would be present for their deathwatches.
In a beautiful essay, Kathryn Montgomery Hunter confronted the prob-
lem of decisionmaking for a homeless patient, William T., who "lost contact
with his family-, he was lost to work and friends and a home before he was
through adolescence." Kathryn M. Hunter, Limiting Treatment in a Social
Vacuum: A Greek Chwrus for William T., 145 ARcmvES INTERNAL MED. 716,
719 (1985). She suggested the image of a Greek chorus, consisting of all those
in the hospital who have cared for him. the attending physicians, residents,
nurses, and other personnel. Id. at 718. In the absence of any family and in
the context of ample resources, this informal, ad hoc group would assemble to
advise William T's attending physician. Id.
William T.'s life intersects the lives of those who hoped to cure, who
never meant to become gatekeepers to medical care or arbiters of
death. Some of them believe their care was wasted on William; some
believe it was their duty. Some believe both things at once. For their
own well-being and the well-being of their profession, a ritual that
takes note of these intersecting lives and crossed purposes is required.
We cannot ask for one better than that which served Sophocles and
his inescapably tragic view of human life.
Id. at 719.
106. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 679 (Ariz. 1987) (en
banc) (incompetent patient represented by public fiduciary; three siblings "did
not take an active role in the determination of Rasmussen's treatment, they
expressed a willingness to abide by the decision to place DNR and DNH orders
on Rasmussen's medical chart"); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Mass. 1977) (superintendent of institution
where mentally retarded 67-year-old patient had lived for almost 50 years peti-
tioned for appointment of guardian ad litem with authority to make medical
treatment decisions regarding his leukemia: "Two of his sisters, the only
members of his family who could be located, were notified of his condition and
of the hearing, but they preferred not to attend or otherwise become in-
volved"); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 335-37 (Minn. 1986) (incompetent pa-
tient represented by court-appointed conservator and court-appointed counsel;
a first cousin testified he saw patient "at least once a week"); In re Ingram, 689
P.2d 1363 (Wash. 1984) (attorney for son of incompetent patient petitioned
court for authorization to perform needed cancer surgery which patient op-
posed having).
107. See, e.g., In re Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (1986). Sharon Kowalski, a
27-year-old woman, suffered brain damage from a car accident. Kowalski cur-
rently lives in a nursing home; she has the mental capacity of a four- to six-
year-old child, and her ability to communicate is severely limited. She often
gives inconsistent responses to questions. Kowalski's family and her room-
mate of four years, Karen Thompson, have litigated extensively over the is-
sues of guardianship and visitation. Thompson and Kowalski "had exchanged
rings, and named each other as beneficiary in their life insurance policies." Id-
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At first glance, Quinlan and Cruzan may have looked like
the norm, but upon closer scrutiny that was an illusion. As
with so many aspects of human relations, there really was no
norm, or what was passed off as the norm turned out to be
someone's unarticulated aspiration.li 8 This did not mean there
at 863. Thompson characterized their relationship as lesbian, although Kowal-
ski's parents were not aware of the nature of the relationship, nor had Kowal-
ski "admitted it prior to the accident." I&
Both Thompson and Kowalski's father, Donald, petitioned for guardian-
ship. The probate court appointed Donald Kowalski, but granted both parties
equal visitation rights, access to financial and medical records and the right to
confer with Kowalski's financial and medical overseers. The relationship be-
tween Thompson and Kowalski's family deteriorated, however, and eventually
the trial court terminated Thompson's access to Kowalski's records and over-
seers. The trial court also gave Donald Kowalski the power to limit visita-
tions, and he immediately terminated Thompson's visitation rights, based
primarily on expert psychiatric testimony that Kowalski became depressed af-
ter Thompson's visits. I at 864.
On appeal, Karen claimed that her confidential relationship with the
ward, which was essentially that of spouse, warranted her appointment as
guardian. The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, upheld the trial court's
appointment of the father as guardian, including his power to determine who
might visit his daughter. Thompson later brought another appeal, and lost
that round as well. In re Kowalski, 392 N.W.2d 310 (1986).
Recently the Minnesota Court of Appeals granted guardianship of Sharon
Kowalski to Karen Thompson. In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991). In 1990, "Tr. Kowalski resigned his guardianship, citing heart
problems and weariness with the extended court proceedings." Tamar Lewin,
Disabled Woman's Care Given to Lesbian Partner, N.Y. Tms, Dec. 18, 1991,
at A26. The trial court had granted guardianship to a "neutral" third person
in an effort to allay hostilities between Kowalski's family and Thompson. 478
N.W.2d at 794. The Court of Appeals set aside the appointment, holding that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Thompson's petition for guardi-
anship. Id. at 794-95. The court found that "Sharon has the capacity reliably
to express a preference... and she has clearly chosen to return home with
Thompson if possible. This choice is further supported by the fact that
Thompson and Sharon are a family of affinity, which ought to be accorded re-
spect." Id. at 797.
108. Some have argued that the ideal of the nuclear family is an anachro-
nism as well. Colonial families were "extensions of the larger community"
and also served as the primary unit of economic production, education, and so-
cialization of the young. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family
Law, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 430, 435 (1985). The same was true of the preindustrial
family in England. In the mid-eighteenth century, "work, religion, recreation,
and amusements were confined to a small, relatively undifferentiated commu-
nity." NEIL J. SMELSER, SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: AN
APPLCATION OF THEORY TO THE BRrIsH COTTON INDUSTRY 183 (1959).
The introduction of factory methods of production and the move from the
country to the cities led the father, and later the mother, to work outside the
home. This decline of domestic economic production meant that public au-
thorities assumed increasing responsibility for the education and socialization
of the young. Teitelbaum, supra, at 436. Others have taken on most of the
1992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [
were no deathwatches with members of the nuclear family in
close attendance. Most were.1°9 It just meant that the scene
with the members of the nuclear family gathered around the
dying person's bed was only the most common of the many
kinds of deathwatches. And by drawing the chalk circle at
those heels, and those heels only, the state would be implicitly
sanctioning one pattern of family life and punishing all others.
I did not want any part of a project like that. Even though
I came from a nuclear family much like the Quinlans and the
Cruzans, I can see that there are many kinds of gardens to
grow in, and that human love and intimacy can flourish in any
kind of soi1110-- or in no soil at all, like stubborn moss in the
traditional functions of the family, and the ideal family of the eighteenth cen-
tury has become little more than a romanticized social construction.
Clearly, the constituency of the modern family has changed. For example,
the percentage of single-parent families is steadily increasing. The United
States Census Bureau's 1985 estimates indicated that more than one out of five
American families with children were single-parent families. Alan L. Otten,
Deceptive Picture: If You See Families Staging a Comeback, It's Probably a
Mirage, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1986, at 1. In 90% of these, the head of the
household was a woman. IM The Census Bureau also indicated that in 1986
just eight percent of households in the United States consisted of "traditional
family units" in which the parents were married for the first time. Roberta
Ostroff, Growing Up Behind Locked Doom- A Look Inside America's Hidden
System of Teen Control, RIo.,NG STONE, Nov. 20, 1986, at 71, 76.
There have been many excellent recent contributions to the history of
families and family law. See, e.g., MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985);
STONE, supra note 102; Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that
Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819; Lee E. Tei-
telbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1135.
109. Spouses of the dying person brought the largest number of cases. See,
e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984)
(wife); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986) (wife);
In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987) (husband); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738
(Wash. 1983), overruled by In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984)
(husband).
110. People in the industrial West from traditional nuclear families often
assume that this family structure is universal. Scholars, however, have de-
bated that issue. George P. Murdock, for example, argued that the nuclear
family was not only universal, but typically had four functions: sexual, eco-
nomic, reproductive, and educational. GEORGE P. MURDOCK, SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE 2-3 (1949). Murdock defined the family as "a social group characterized
by common residence, economic cooperation, and reproduction" that includes
"adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sex-
ual relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexually co-
habiting adults." Id, at 1. It sounds a great deal like Leave it to Beaver.
Anthropologist Melford Spiro's study of kibbutz life in Israel challenged
Murdock's assumptions. Spiro initially concluded that, at least in a familial so-
ciety like the kibbutz, the nuclear family could be eliminated. Melford E.
Spiro, Is the Family Universal-The Israel Case, 56 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 839
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cracks of city sidewalks, or graceful epiphytes suspended in air.
To exclude from the deathwatch those who have truly loved
the dying person, just because their names cannot be painted
on a family tree, seemed not only arbitrary, but an act of cru-
elty.'1  There had to be some other organizing principle, some
(1954), reprinted in NUCLEAR FAMILY IN CRmsis: supra note 101, at 81, 89.
Spiro later altered his interpretation of the data from the kibbutz study, con-
cluding that the strong role of the nuclear family in the socialization of chil-
dren required a reconsideration of his previous conclusion that "marriage and
the family are not universal." Melford E. Spiro, Addendum, 1958, in A MoD-
ERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY (Norman Bell & Ezra Vogel eds., 1968), re-
printed in NucLEAR FAMILY IN CRisis, supra note 101, at 89, 92.
111. If courts apply formal, abstract legal classifications, such as those de-
fining "family," regardless of the reality of group dynamics, "the impact of this
is felt by the persons concerned as being severely damaging, if not disastrous.
In other words, a result supported only by law is likely to be perceived as in-
humane and unjust." Weyrauch, supra note 103, at 156. Homosexual partners
who are in permanent, monogamous relationships certainly must perceive the
law this way.
Given the Supreme Court's holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), it is unlikely that the Court will recognize family groups consisting of
homosexual partners any time soon. Hardwick challenged the constitutional-
ity of a Georgia sodomy statute which he had been charged with violating for
engaging in oral sex with another consenting adult in the privacy of his home.
Id at 187-88. The Court framed the issue as "whether the Federal Constitu-
tion confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Id
at 190. "Six decades of privacy precedents from Meyer v. Nebraska and Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma to Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade were dismissed
in two brisk paragraphs as having no relevance to this issue, since those cases
involved rights related to 'family, marriage or procreation.'" LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAw § 15-21, at 1422 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting
Bowers) (citations omitted).
Sometimes when things are darkest in federal constitutional jurispru-
dence, hope flickers in the state courts. Consider the case of Braschi v. Stahl
Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). Braschi examined a New York City rent
and eviction regulation providing "that upon the death of a rent-control ten-
ant, the landlord may not dispossess 'either the surviving spouse of the de-
ceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family who has
been living with the tenant"' Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 50 (quoting 9 NYCRR
2204.6(d)) (emphasis supplied by the court). The appellant had lived with a
rent-controlled tenant for over 10 years as a "permanent life partner." They
regarded one another, and were regarded by friends and family, as spouses.
The two men regularly visited each other's families and attended family func-
tions together. Id at 55. Futhermore, they shared finances and the appellant
was the beneficiary under the statutory tenant's life insurance policy and will.
On the tenant's death, the landlord served the appellant with a notice to ter-
minate since he was not a family member of the decedent. The Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the term family
should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized
their relationship by obtaining... a marriage certificate or an adop-
tion order. The intended protection against sudden eviction should
not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead
should find its foundation in the reality of family life.
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other way of determining who should be able to bring their
pain to the court's attention, and who should not.
I was finding no answers in the law. Then one day while
hiding in a colleague's kitchen at a party, I broke the cardinal
rule of academic socializing-Thou Shalt Not Discuss Ideas-
and vented my frustration. Someone casually suggested that I
look into "network theory" in sociology." 2 Maybe the mem-
bers of the deathwatch did not belong to a nuclear family, but
instead belonged to a network. Maybe that was a way to figure
out who deserved to be the paintiffs in my lawsuit, and who did
not, by throwing a net into the sea.
So I read up on networks. It was not a very productive in-
quiry, probably due to my lack of expertise and my visceral
reaction to the ugliness of sociological prose. But it did lead me
to some literature about the characteristics of the interactional
process. This literature suggested a different kind of organiza-
tional principle, based not on status, but on the content,
directedness, durability, intensity, and frequency of the interac-
tion between the dying person and the member of the
deathwatch." 3
Maybe I could convince judges to sit down and look not at
the formal relationship the two parties bore to one another, but
at their behavior towards one another. Thus siblinghood, for
example, would not qualify a potential paintiff, but a history of
mutual regard and affection over a long period of time, the
number and regularity of contacts between them, a record of
honoring reciprocal obligations, evidence of freedom to exercise
the rights and privileges of friendship, the right to confide, and
I& at 53.
112. With a "network formation... some, but not all, of the component
individuals have social relationships with one another.... They do not form
an organized group, but there will be varying degrees of connectedness be-
tween them." Bott, supra note 99, at 347. In a dispersed network "there are
few relationships amongst the component units"; in a highly connected net-
work there are many such relationships. Id. at 348. Conceptually, the network
fits in somewhere between the family and the total social environment. For a
further discussion introducing the concept of social networks, see J. Clyde
Mitchell, The Concept and Use of Social Networks, in SOCIAL NETWORKS IN
URBAN SrruATIONs: ANALYSES OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN CENTRAL AF-
RICAN TowNs 1 (J. Clyde Mitchell ed., 1969).
113. See MrCHELL, supra note 112, at 20-29.
Another sociologist defined the "strength" of an interpersonal tie as a
"combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy
(mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie."
Mark Granouetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1361
(1973).
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to be confided in, the right to hurt, and to be hurt, the right to
forgive and to be forgiven."14 It would be like one of those tests
that one finds in women's magazines: Is Your Relationship an
Intimate One? Do You Deserve Standing In Your Loved One's
Deathwatch?
It all sounded like a lot of work, and I could see that oppo-
sition to an organizing principle would soak up so much judicial
time and energy. The nuclear family was a much easier rule to
apply, and judges might not have the skill, resources, or inclina-
tion" 5 to discover whether what looks like a single strand of
114. This kind of functional test for family status is not unheard of in the
law. For example, the Oregon legislature allows someone who "has estab-
lished emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child" to peti-
tion the court for custody of the child or visitation rights. On. REv. STAT.
§ 109.119(4) (1991). The child-parent relationship is defined as:
a relationship that exists or did exist, in whole or in part, within the
six months preceding the filing of an action under this section, and in
which relationship a person having physical custody of a child or re-
siding in the same household as the child supplied, or otherwise made
available to the child, food, clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries
and provided the child with necessary care, education and discipline,
and which relationship continued on a day-to-day basis, through inter-
action, companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled the
child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the child's physical
needs.
Id,
The Oregon statute is modeled on the concept of the "psychological par-
ent." Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers. Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-
traditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459, 487 n.131 (1990). Polikoff suggests ex-
panding the definition of parenthood to include anyone who performs
"parenting functions" and whom the child views as a parent. Id. at 490-91.
Consideration of those parents' "actions and intent.., in creating additional
parental relationships" would protect the autonomy of the child's legal par-
ents. Id. at 491; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an
Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Promise of the
Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879 (1984) (describing parental
rights and responsibilities and proposing an 'alternative functional test for
identifying the "psychological parent").
115. Deeper values than just the ease of administration are undoubtedly at
stake. The family traditionally has been the subject of constitutional protec-
tion: "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and
pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural." Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (Powell J.). In Moore, the
Court held that a local zoning ordinance which defined single family dwellings
to exclude a woman living with two grandchildren violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 499. While Moore declared the
virtues of the family tradition and expanded them beyond the nuclear family,
the Court in dictum spoke only of blood relatives ("uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents") when defining the constitutional "family." d. at
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thread is really a tangled knot. That is so often the way it is
with good ideas: No one really likes them because they fre-
quently sound like a lot of work.- 6
I was beginning to feel desperate about my lawsuit. Who
were my paintiffs going to be?
"Do you know what really worries me about your
paintiffs?"
It was several weeks later, and my friend and I were sitting
alone quietly in the faculty library, grading papers, or so I
thought. It was raining, a good day for a meaningless task. It
had been weeks since we had discussed the deathwatch, and
504. The Court has specifically refused to extend the concept of family privacy
to groups of unrelated individuals living together in a single household. Vil-
lage of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (no family privacy rights in-
fringed by a local zoning ordinance that excluded households consisting of
unrelated persons from living in the village).
I hate making an argument based on familial privacy when the cases force
me to accept such a narrow definition of family. I suppose I could take solace
in Justice Brennan's decision in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816 (1977). That case addressed
whether a foster family deserved the same constitutional protection as a "nat-
ural" nuclear family. Justice Brennan discussed three elements that define a
"family" and "contribute to its place in our society": biological relationships,
emotional attachments and origins entirely independent of the power of the
State. I& at 843-45. Still, Justice Brennan's clear preference for a biological
relationship in his discussion of these factors does not give me much heart or
inspiration to make the argument.
116. Natalia Ginzburg came up with one of the most beautiful ways to de-
fine a family that I have ever encounterech
There are five of us children. We live in different cities now, some of
us abroad, and we do not write to one another much. When we meet
we can be indifferent and aloof. But one word, one phrase is enough,
one of those ancient phrases, heard and repeated an infinite number
of times in our childhood. We have only to say, 'We did not come to
Bergamo for a picnic,' or 'What does sulphuric acid pong of?.' for us to
pick up in a moment our old intimacy and our childhood and youth,
linked indissolubly with these words and phrases. One of them would
make us recognize each other, in the darkness of a cave or among a
million people. These phrases are our Latin, the vocabulary of our
days gone by, our Egyptian hieroglyphics or Babylonian symbols.
They are the evidence of a vital nucleus which has ceased to exist, but
which survives in its texts salvaged from the fury of the waters and
the corrosion of time. These phrases are the foundation of our family
unity which will persist as long as we are in this world.
NATALIA GINZBURG, FAMILY SAYINGs 23-24 (D.M. Low trans., Carcanet Press
1984) (1963).
It is difficult to imagine a court employing such a criterion as shared
"texts salvaged from the fury of the waters and the corrosion of time" to de-
fine a family, but for me, Ginzburg's test bears more truth than anything con-
tained in official reporters.
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whether its members should be able to bring their pain to
court. I felt smug. I had managed to bother my friend enough
with my problem that she had initiated the conversation on her
own.
'What paintiffs?" I pretended not to know what she was
talking about. Like someone with a secret passion who wanted
to hear her lover's name spoken, I wanted my problem to come
back to me through the voice of another. Besides, she always
lent grace to my ideas-grace and termination. She would cap-
ture the flailing legs of my newborn child and gently fold them
into the soft white fleece of a question mark.
"You know perfectly well what paintiffs. The Quinlans
and the Cruzans, the members of the deathwatch." I had not
fooled her. "Their pain is purely emotional, and the source of
that emotional pain is the physical pain of another."
"I'm not so sure that I am willing to admit their pain is
purely emotional," I responded. "For one thing, that pain could
manifest itself in physical symptoms, and for another, those
long, drawn-out 'medicalized' deathwatches can be a tremen-
dous drain on family resources.- 7 Besides, there is the spiritual
pain, the pain of watching someone you love in limbo, not being
able to return to whatever version of God you believe in." I
took a deep breath in recognition that I was about to tread on
some of the more tender grass of our friendship. "I probably
shouldn't say 'you,' since you may not recognize that spiritual
pain because of your profound skepticism about its premises."
"Well, it just doesn't sit right with me," she said, ignoring
my last comment, "letting people come into court and seek a
remedy for watching the pain of another. Don't you have to be
careful about granting them the status of substantive plaintiffs,
when the defendants aren't really doing anything to them? I
mean, what rights of theirs are being infringed upon? That's
one of the things standing is for, you know.'11 s Today she was
117. A good estimate of the basic cost in an ICU is $2,000 to $3,000 per day.
RAFFIN, supra note 45, at 183. Treatment for a patient on a respirator in an
ICU for more than 48 hours costs about $40,000. It also costs a lot to build an
ICU. In 1987, estimates placed the number of ICU beds at 60,000, with an ag-
gregate cost of approximately $40 to $50 billion. This figure represents 10% of
the nation's health-care costs and about one percent of its gross national prod-
uct. I&i at 184.
118. The Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of actual
"cases or controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. In order to raise a case or
controversy, a litigant "must allege personal injury fairly traceable to... alleg-
edly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Al-
len v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing Valley Forge Christian College v.
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not sputtering, but was proceeding, civilly. "To be sure that the
pain, as you put it, belongs to the plaintiff and not to somebody
else. You've got to put limits on who can sue."
"Is it time to yell Yazoo?"
Several years earlier when a colleague had taken unexpect-
edly ill in the middle of a semester, I had fallen heir to the re-
mainder of his Civil Procedure course. What a cruel twist of
fate for those poor, unsuspecting first-year students who still
harbored the illusion that their teachers knew something that
they did not. If it had not been for that colleague's vulnerable
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982)). The injury must be "distinct and palpable." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975). It cannot be "'abstract' or 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' Al-
len v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751 (citations omitted).
Standing is the "doctrine most central" to enforcement of the case or con-
troversy limitation. See TRmE, supra note 111, § 3-14, at 107. 'Whether a
party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain
judicial resolution of that controversy has traditionally been referred to as the
question of standing to sue." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32
(1972). Application of the doctrine centers primarily on the plaintiff, and only
peripherally on the issues she brings with her into court TRIBE, supra note
111, § 3-14, at 107.
In Valley Forge Christian College, the Supreme Court examined the
standing requirement and concluded that standing may be denied if a plaintiff
fails to meet one of the following three requirements. First, the plaintiff must
"rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." 454
U.S. at 474. Second, the plaintiff must state "'abstract questions of wide public
significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and
most appropriately addressed in the representative branches." Id. at 474-75
(citations omitted). Third, the plaintiff must present a claim falling within
"'the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitu-
tional guarantee in question."' Id. at 475 (citation omitted). Arguably my
friend's contention was that members of the deathwatch lacked standing to
terminate life-support systems based on numbers two and three in the Valley
Forge trio of standing sins.
This discussion is limited to problems of standing under the federal Con-
stitution, though the termination of life support cases implicate both federal
constitutional rights and common law rights of self-determination, and are
most often pursued in state courts.
Obviously, the Constitution's standing requirement applies only to the fed-
eral courts. The doctrine does not obligate state courts to require, for exam-
ple, an "injury in fact" before addressing federal claims. TRIBE, supra note
111, § 3-15, at 112-13. Nor does the federal doctrine of standing tell a state
court whether a potential plaintiff has standing to participate in a state judicial
proceeding. The principles embodied in the federal law of standing, however,
are found in state constitutions, statutes, and rules of civil procedure as well.
See generally 59 AM. Jun. 2D Parties Plaintiff 99 19-40, at 406-438 (1971) (out-
lining and comparing state standing requirements). Given the generality of
this discussion, I decided to limit it to the problems of standing under the fed-
eral Constitution and not to delve into the substantive laws regarding standing
in any particular state.
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constitution, I would never have known when to yell Yazoo, or
even that one could yell Yazoo, in any meaningful fashion.
I sometimes wonder what others outside the law world
would think about a constitutional theory known as the Yazoo
doctrine. A "Yazoo" should be a soft drink, a plastic party
favor to blow on, or a sneeze, not a legal doctrine.
Despite the aggressive silliness of its name, the Yazoo doc-
trine once stood for something. It held that a litigant may only
invoke his own constitutional rights and immunities; he may
challenge a law only if it applies to him.- 9 The Yazoo doctrine
rested on a view of constitutional adjudication that prohibited
courts from declaring the meaning of the Constitution or from
enforcing public norms.1 ° As Marshall insisted in Marbury v.
119. Yazoo & Miss. &R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217,219-20 (1912).
As with the development of substantive constitutional standards, courts have
had to determine the nature and procedure of judicial review through a slow
evolutionary process of interpretation. Part of the problem derives from the
paucity of words to interpret.
The text of the Constitution itself is characteristically terse about the con-
ditions under which constitutional determinations may be made and who may
obtain those determinations. It provides only that "the judicial power of the
United States" shall extend to certain enumerated "cases and controversies,"
including those "arising under the Constitution." U.S. CONST. art. M, §§ 1-2.
The Constitution also created the Supreme Court and limited its original
jurisdiction, leaving Congress to authorize such inferior courts as it saw fit and
to regulate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. I& Congress immedi-
ately enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, authorizing Supreme Court review of
certain state court constitutional determinations and establishing lower fed-
eral courts. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81 (1789). For an account
of this Act, see FEuX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BuswnFs OF
THE SUPREME CoURT 15-25 (1928). While the Act established the federal
courts, it said little about the conditions appropriate to constitutional determi-
nations, or who might obtain them.
120. See Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
277, 279 (1984). The Yazoo doctrine is part and parcel of the law of standing.
Standing, however, is only one of many judicial inventions designed to avoid
constitutional decisionmaking. Other doctrines also shut the door on potential
constitutional questions: ripeness, mootness, political question, and exhaustion
of remedies. See TRIBE, supra note 111, §§ 3-10 to -13, 3-29. These doctrines
reflect a strong ambivalence about the propriety of judicial review in a society
based upon democratic principles. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudi-
cation: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1366 (1973) [hereinafter Con-
stitutional Adjudication]. For a classic articulation of the view that judicial
intervention should occur only when absolutely necessary, and under carefully
circumscribed conditions, see James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). For
further discussions about the utility of these "rules of avoidance," see ALEXAN-
DER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Burton C. Bernard,
Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the United States Supreme Court. Liber-
ties of the First Amendment, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 261 (1951); Gerald Gunther, The
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Madison, the "province of the court is, solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals."' 2' Under this view, the judicial role in
constitutional litigation was analogous to the judicial role in
common law litigation.22 Judicial concern was thus limited to
the rights of litigants who had suffered an infringement of
their individual rights. A plaintiff could only bring his own
pain to court, not the pain of another, or the pain of a class of
personsm2S
Subtle Voices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expedi-
ency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 1 (1964); Henry P. Monaghan,
Overbreath, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 1.
121. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
122. See Note, Complex Enforement- Unconstitutional Prison Conditions,
94 HARV. L. REV. 626 (1981) (contrasting this older view of the judicial task, to
adjudicate discretely a particular incident or practice, with a more modern
view of the judicial task in complex litigation, to bring about systemic, struc-
tural reform of a social institution offensive to legal norms). See generally
Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 120, at 1365-68 (suggesting that consti-
tutional adjudication evolved around and remains a system aimed at prevent-
ing injury to private interests); Cass R. Sunstein, Judicial Relief and Public
Tort Law, 92 YALE L.J. 749, 758 (1983) (book review) ("Most of our public
law-both substantive and procedural-grows quite directly out of private law
and corresponding efforts to treat the government as a defendant in a private
lawsuit").
123. One way to view the deathwatch is to consider a lawsuit by its mem-
bers as a class action. The class action, a nontraditional procedural device,
challenges the individual autonomy of litigants in a typical lawsuit by provid-
ing a representative to litigate for or defend a class of persons who share a
common interest in a lawsuit.
The class action arose to promote judicial efficiency, to provide access to
the courts for small claimants, and to prevent inconsistent outcomes. 1 HER-
BERT B. NEWBERG, ON CLAss ACTIONS 8 (2d ed. 1985). The binding effect of a
class action on all members of the class and the due process requirements that
limit the use of this joinder device accomplish these policies. I& at 6, 8-11.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides authority and guide-
lines for bringing a class action in federal court. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Most state
courts have adopted an identical or similar rule. See, e.g., MINN. R. Civ. P.
23.01.
Deathwatches occur in isolated, unpredictable circumstances and form
small, ephemeral and informal groups. They do not therefore lend themselves
to the class action as a way of dealing with a multiplicity of law suits. Rule
23(a) sets out four requirements for a class seeking certification, which are
augmented by two additional requirements imposed by the federal judiciary.
First, each class must be so numerous that joinder is impracticable. All
the members of all the deathwatches at any given time, would arguably satisfy
this requirement. Obviously, the members of a single deathwatch are too few
to invoke a class action.
Second, the class must have a common question of law or fact. Assuming
that the issue for members of a deathwatch would invariably be the continu-
ance of life-sustaining medical treatment for an irreversibly comatose patient,
the class might indeed have common questions of both law and fact.
Third, the class must state claims derived from the same events or 'resting
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Of course, it is no longer in vogue to view constitutional lit-
igation as coextensive with private rights adjudication. No one
would be deemed radical for asserting that federal courts do de-
clare the meaning of the Constitution and enforce public
norms.1 24 This change in view has resulted in the erosion of
on the same legal theory. The events of each deathwatch would be different,
although the legal theory, if I could figure out what it was, would arguably be
the same.
Fourth, the class must have representation that fairly and adequately pro-
tects the interests of the members. Presumably representation in the case of a
deathwatch could meet this requirement.
Fifth, the class must be sufficiently identifiable. This is where I think the
class action analysis for the deathwatch really falls flat on its face. The
problems are already difficult if we look at a single deathwatch, as discussed
above. If we address all of the deathwatches taking place in a given jurisdic-
tion over a certain period of time, however, identifying members of the class
would be impossible.
Sixth, the class must be represented by someone who is a member of the
class to assure the rights of the entire class are being adequately litigated.
This does not pose problems for the deathwatch. In fact, in the termination of
life support cases, the petitioner tends to be a single member of the dath-
watch, representing the interests of others who also gather around the bed.
JACK H. FRDENTHAL ET AL, CIWL PROCEDURE 725-26 (1985).
Class actions in state practice generally mirror the federal requirements,
although some states, such as California and New York, have slightly less
stringent requirements. Id. at 738-40.
Rule 23(b) further mandates that the court certify each class action under
one of three categories enumerated by the Rule. Since I do not think the re-
quirements for certification can be met for members of either a single death-
watch or deathwatches in the aggregate, a further analysis of the kinds of
litigation that satisfy Rule 23(b) does not seem necessary.
124. "[A]s pervasive a role as disputation may play in litigation, it is equally
important to recognize that the function of the judge-a statement of social
purpose and a definition of role-is not to resolve disputes, but to give the
proper meaning to our public values." Fiss, supra note 77, at 30.
Fiss compared a model of adjudication described as "structural reform" to
the more traditional "model" lawsuit. Mi at 17-28. This latter form of lawsuit,
which he calls the "dispute resolution model" is "triadic and highly individual-
istic." Id. at 17. Such a lawsuit focuses on some incident of wrongdoing.
Conversely, the "structural reform" suit dwells not on a singular incident
of wrongdoing, "but rather upon the conditions of social life an6 role that
large scale organizations play in determining those conditions." I at 18. The
wronged party in a structural reform lawsuit is a group, not an individual.
Sometimes the group is defined by institutional affiliation: the inmates of X
prison, or recipients of welfare. id. Professor Fiss suggests two main features
of the group. First, it must exist "independently of the lawsuit." Id. Second,
the group is more than "simply an aggregation or collection of identifiable in-
dividuals." Id- For example, it is not necessary to know the names of prison
inmates. Future inmates, not yet identifiable, may be members of the group in
the sense that they can be harmed once they become inmates of the institu-
tion. The plaintiff in a structural reform lawsuit is not a victim, but a spokes-
person for the group. Id. at 19.
Other scholars have recognized that judicial decisions not only resolve dis-
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such doctrines as the Yazoo. Courts increasingly permit liti-
gants who fall under a statute's valid application to assert its in-
valid application with respect to persons not before the court.
The rules of third party standing have thus been reduced to
rules of judicial discretion. Once the private rights model was
rejected, more plaintiffs had access to the courts. Standing be-
came reduced to a requirement that the plaintiff be injured in
fact, and the courts interpreted injury expansively, to include
economic and even aesthetic injury. -z 5 A colleague's old class
notes, etched in my brain.12 6
If the standing requirement becomes more relaxed, does it
become a kneeling requirement? Or if doctrines like the Yazoo
disappear altogether, will litigants be able to lie down and roll
into court, the way children propel themselves down a hill?
And if we let everyone in pain sue from a horizontal position,
won't there be a terrible pile-up at the bottom of that hill?m
putes, but also give meaning to our public values. See, eg., GUIDO CALABESI,
THE CosTs OF AccIDENTS (1970) (examining the social policies of justice, loss-
spreading, and deterrence in a fault-based insurance system); Richard A. Pos-
ner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J. LEGAL STU. 29 (1972) (asserting that liabil-
ity for negligence, a judicial creation, brings about an efficient level of safe
behavior because rational maximizers will take precautions to avoid mishap
only to the extent the cost of avoidance is less than the cost of an accident).
125. See, ag., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) ("We do not
question that this type of harm may amount to an 'injury in fact' sufficient to
lay the basis for standing.... Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like
economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our so-
ciety .... ).
126, See iin:frc note 273.
127. Large piles of people at the bottom of a hill are only a problem if each
person litigates individually. If people organize into groups-indeed if collec-
tive litigation, rather than suits by individual plaintiffs, formed the basis of our
legal system-we could potentially handle the large numbers. As is often the
case, examination of another time and place can give us some insight into how
different our own world might be if we operated from different premises.
In a fascinating book, one scholar has explored the evolution of the class
action and argued that its history should begin during the medieval period.
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GRouP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACION (1987). More traditional histories of the modern class action
usually begin with the procedure of the late-seventeenth-century English
Chancery and focus on corporation theory and the growth of the doctrine of
individualism.
Yeazell characterized the seventeenth century as the transitional period of
group litigation theory. I&. at 24. The medieval period, Yeazell claimed, con-
tains the remote origins of the class action. Social organization in the middle
ages centered on the group, rather than the individual. Groups such as guilds,
parishes, and village communities lent support and much-needed assistance in
a harsh world. Id. at 85-96 (citing SusAN REYNOLD, KINGDOMS AND COMMuNI-
TIES IN WESTERN EUROPE 900-1300 (1984)).
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Is my friend right? Do we have to put limits on who can
sue? Should derivative pain be something that the law recog-
nizes-the pain of watching someone else's pain? Would that
result in a house of mirrors? Next year would we have to rec-
ognize the pain of watching someone else's pain caused by
watching someone else's pain?ms The law always seems to be
shutting doors to avoid the risk of infinity.' 9
For about a year of my life, I had to read to my daughter,
over and over again, with the maniacal love for repetition that
only a two-year-old has, a book called, What's The Dkffer-
ence? 13° On one side of the page there is a photograph, and on
the other the same picture appears, with one notable exception.
One side has the child laughing;, on the other, he is crying. One
side has the child with long, flowing hair; on the other, her hair
is braided. One side has the child standing in the sun; on the
other, he is in the rain. '"What's the difference?"
For months and months, my daughter dutifully played the
game: Here he is laughing, and there he is crying;, here her hair
is long, and there her hair is in braids; here he is dry, and there
he is wet. Then one day she asked, "Why is the boy crying?"
She had made a subtle shift in intellectual stance that only a
parent sitting on the bed reading the book for the thousandth
time would notice. It was the shift from asking what the differ-
ence was to wondering what made the difference.
Perhaps it was the repetition, the saying over and over
again, "What's the difference?", but somehow the structure of
that inquiry has become imbedded in my own intellectual
stance. I find that no matter what I am looking at or thinking
about, the thing or problem separates itself like a delicate piece
of cloisonn6 into two pools of enamel, on either side of a
128. This is just a variant of the "floodgates" argument, or the "there is no
point at which such actions would stop" argument. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d
912, 922 (1968) (discussed infra note 131).
129. California jurisprudence provides another formulation of the "flood-
gates" argument, one of my favorites. In a case decided before Dillon, which
considered the same issue of tort liability based upon the "plaintiff's appre-
hension of negligently caused danger or injury to a third person," the Califor-
nia Supreme Court rejected liability, characterizing such an expansion of the
duty of care to be an excursion into the "fantastic realm of infinite liability."
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 525 (Cal. 1963), over-
ruled by Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). The "fantastic realm of infi-
nite liability" properly belongs in the prologue of a Star Trek The Next
Generation episode.
130. BILL GiLHAM, WHAT's THE DrsRENCE (1986).
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smooth band of metal, sometimes silver and sometimes gold.
Two identical pools of enamel, with one notable exception.
"What's the difference?"
On one side, the plaintiff witnesses a bloody accident in
which his child is hurt, and sues for negligent infliction of
mental distress. On the other side, the plaintiff witnesses a
bloody accident in which a stranger is hurt, and sues for negli-
gent infliction of mental distress. In each picture, the plaintiff
is crying. "What's the difference?"
The factual answer is: On one side, the accident victim was
the plaintiff's child. On the other, the accident victim was a
stranger. From those facts, we could look up the rules in a
number of jurisdictions and come up with the legal answer:
One harm is compensable. One is not.' 3 '
131. Permitting a bystander to recover for the negligent infliction of
mental or emotional distress is a relatively new development in tort law. Tra-
ditionally courts would not compensate a plaintiff alleging mental distress un-
less the plaintiff could also prove accompanying physical injury. WILIAM L.
PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 34, at 213-15 (1st ed. 1941).
Eventually courts allowed compensation for mental distress if the plaintiff
suffered any physical impact, even without demonstrable physical injury. Id.
at 213-14. Most jurisdictions now permit compensation for the negligent inflic-
tion of mental distress to plaintiffs within the "zone of physical danger," even
in the absence of physical impact. Recovery, however, requires some physical
manifestation of the alleged mental distress. See generally John L. Diamond,
Dillon v. Legg Revisite&- Toward a UnfTed Theory of Compensating Bystand-
ers and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1984) (compil-
ing California cases following Dillon, suggesting that mechanical application of
the "zone of physical danger" rule results in inequitable denial of meritorious
claims, and arguing for a unified compensation theory awarding out-of-pocket
expenses to all foreseeable plaintiffs).
In Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), the California Supreme Court
extended the scope of the doctrine of negligent infliction of emotional distress
and compensated a bystander outside of the zone of danger. The court refused
to engage in the "hopeless artificiality" of denying recovery to the mother
"merely because of a happenstance" that placed her a few yards outside the
zone of danger. Id. at 915.
The case embraced forseeability of risk as the primary consideration in de-
termining whether the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and enu-
merated three factors for courts to take into account:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
as contrasted with one who was away from it. (2) Whether the shock
resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sen-
sory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted
with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as con-
trasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a
distant relationship.
Id. at 920.
The Dillon court applied an objective standard of foreseeability, inquiring
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But with respect to that legal answer, once we make the
shift from asking what the difference is to wondering what
made the difference, the task becomes more difficult. It is not
hard to see why witnessing the maiming of one's child should
be compensable. After all, parental love is primitive and deep,
and witnessing harm to one's child is worse than being harmed
oneself. What is not so easy to understand is why witnessing
harm to a stranger is not compensable. Although there is not
the same emotional attachment to the victim, it is still dis-
turbing to see the human body lose its integrity.
I once saw a man killed in southern France. I was on a
camping trip with friends, and we were driving behind a car
that was going too fast. The driver must not have seen the man
up ahead on his bicycle. He was thrown off his seat and sailed
high into the air, landing on his head in the road. His neck
snapped like a stalk of broccoli, and his skull cracked open. As
soon as the gendarmerie arrived, they covered his body with a
blanket, but until they came, we stood around and stared help-
lessly at the lifeless form on the road. I had never seen the
human brain before, but will never forget what memories look
"what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have
foreseen." I&L at 921. The Dillon court, like jurisdictions following the major-
ity rule, confined its holding to cases in which the plaintiff's mental distress
resulted in physical manifestations. I&
In 1989, the California Supreme Court clarified Dillon v. Legg, holding
that foreseeability alone was not sufficient to support a claim for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 (1989). To
support such a claim, the plaintiff must prove three things: a close relation-
ship between the plaintiff and victim; the plaintiff's presence at the scene of
the injury-producing event and contemporaneous awareness that the victim
was injured; and a resulting serious emotional distress--"a reaction beyond
that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an
abnormal response to the circumstances." Id at 829-30.
See generally Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for
Psychic Injury, 36 U. FL.A. L. REv. 333 (1984) (proposing a "full recovery" rule
compensating anyone for damages arising from the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, to induce caution in would-be tortfeasors, to make the largest
number of victims whole, and eliminate the potential for exclusion of seriously
injured plaintiffs' claims by arbitrary judicial rules); Virginia E. Nolan & Ed-
mund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging
from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1982) (compiling California cases, sug-
gesting that the aftermath of Dillon has been marred by judicial interposition
of arbitrary rules as barriers to recovery, and offering the concepts of foresee-
ability and seriousness of emotional injury as a construct for resolving future
cases); Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted
Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L.
REV. 477 (1982) (arguing for a reinstatement of the "zone of danger" rule on
the theory that it will most frequently allow recovery by the class of plaintiffs
contemplated by the rule).
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like: bloody cauliflower. I guess I got over it, but I suffered a
loss from witnessing the breaking of another human being. It
made me experience my own bodily fragility in a way that I
had never felt before or since. I have never again felt as solid
or as whole or as certain of my own boundaries. I felt the loss
of him too, deeply saddened, even though I had never known
the face that once graced the front of his shattered head.
The legal rules about compensability for witnessing harm
to others say something about the value that our culture places
on love for family and love for strangers. We are expected to
love our spouses and children very much, and strangers not at
all. It is just a variant of the drowning baby rule. Most of the
first year of law school, I wondered if I wanted any part of a
legal system that imposed no duty on me to save a stranger's
drowning baby. 32 I was given leave to watch that baby slide
132. Prosser blames the law's refusal to impose on a stranger the duty to
aid another human being in danger on the reluctance of courts to recognize
"nonfeasance" as a basis for liability. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 56, at 374 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROS-
SER & KEETON]. The examples discussed in Prosser's treatise are, at least to
me, morally repugnant.
The expert swimmer, with a boat and a rope at hand, who sees an-
other drowning before his eyes, is not required to do anything at all
about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and watch the
man drown. A physician is under no duty to answer the call of one
who is dying and might be saved, nor is anyone required to play the
part of Florence Nightingale and bind up the wounds of a stranger
who is bleeding to death, or to prevent a neighbor's child from ham-
mering on a dangerous explosive, or to remove a stone from the high-
way where it is a menace to traffic, or a train from a place where it
blocks a fire engine on its way to save a house, or even to cry a warn-
ing to one who is walking into the jaws of a dangerous machine.
I § 56, at 375 (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314 (1965) ("The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on
his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose
upon him a duty to take such action.").
For an early discussion of the failure to impose a duty to rescue, see Fran-
cis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others, Parts I and , 56 U. PA. L. REV.
217 and 316 (1908). For a more modern treatment of the duty to rescue, in-
cluding an "economic model of rescue," see William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic
Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 83 (1978).
Correspondingly, there is no criminal liability for failure to render aid to
another person who is in danger. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3 (2d
ed. 1986). The Anglo-American position on criminal omissions is not necessar-
ily shared by certain European codes. Many of those codes impose a duty to
rescue on anyone who could do so without endangering himself. See John P.
Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV L. REV.
1073, 1101 (1961); Joel Feinberg, The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the
Bad Samaritan, CRIM. J. ETMCS, Winter/Spring 1984, at 56, 68 (arguing in
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under the surface of the water just because I did not know his
name. This seemed wrong to me then, and seems wrong to me
now.
But the underlying cultural value that divides family from
stranger as appropriate objects of love, and therefore as sources
of derivative pain, does not even seem to be invoked when it
comes to the deathwatch. After all, most cases involving termi-
nation of life-support systems are brought by family members
or close friends. 33 We are not talking about the pain of watch-
ing strangers die prolonged and difficult deaths. We are talking
about the pain of watching our daughters and sons, our mothers
and fathers, our sisters and brothers, and our loved ones and
close friends die prolonged and difficult deaths.
On one side, the plaintiff witnesses a bloody accident in
which his child is badly injured. On the other, the plaintiff wit-
nesses his comatose child, curled up in a fetal position, main-
favor of imposing more positive duties of assistance on bystanders in cases of
"sudden and unanticipated peril to others that require immediate attention,
and are such that a bystander can either make an 'easy rescue' himself or else
sound the alarm to notify those whose job it is to make difficult rescues").
133. Spouses of the dying person brought the largest number of cases. See
supra note 109 and accompanying text. Where the incompetent patient was an
unmarried adult, the most common petitioners were the parents. See, eg.,
Foody v. Manchester Hosp., 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (father of 42-
year-old incompetent patient was conservator of the person; parents sought
authorization to discontinue extraordinary means); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d
947 (Me. 1987) (mother and guardian ad litem sought declaratory judgment re-
garding removal of 23-year-old incompetent son's feeding tube); Cruzan v. Har-
mon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (parents brought action as guardi-
ans to compel hospital to comply with their request to remove feeding tube
from comatose daughter); Quinlan I, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1975), modified and remanded, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert denied sub nom
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (action by father to terminate life
support for 21-year-old daughter); In re Storar, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980), rev'd, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert denied sub no. Storar v. Storar, 454
U.S. 858 (1981) (77-year-old mother petitioned for order terminating transfu-
sions for mentally retarded adult son with leukemia).
In cases of incompetent minor patients, the petitioner was almost invaria-
bly a parent. See, e.g., In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(parents of brain-damaged 10-month-old baby petitioned for approval to termi-
nate life-support system); In re L.H.R, 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984) (court en-
joined hospital from interfering with parents' and guardian ad litem's wishes
to have brain damaged newborn's life-support systems removed).
In some instances, a sibling or adult child served as petitioner. See, e.g., In
re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert denied sub nom Drabick v.
Drabick, 488 U.S. 958 (1988) (brother of incompetent 44-year-old patient was
conservator of the person and sought approval for removal of feeding tube).
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tained on a respirator or nasogastric feeding tube, suffering
interminably. 'T at's the difference?"
Even at the level of a two-year-old, I am hard pressed to
come up with an answer. Maybe there is no satisfactory an-
swer, no intelligent way to talk about the difference between
one nightmare and another. Maybe we just need there to be a
difference in order to draw a line; a line beyond which the law
will not go. A way for us to say with certainty: Some wishes
cannot be granted. Some wishes must be made upon a star.
There is a large bulletin board outside my daughter's kin-
dergarten classroom. It usually serves as a surface upon which
to staple recent student artwork. The pictures tend to have a
seasonal theme: Sights of Summer, Winter Wonderland. Or
they might reflect a class project or a field trip: Our Visit to
the Seashore; Why We Wash Our Hands; Growing Beans for
Fun and Profit. This spring, one of the teachers turned the bul-
letin board into a Wishing Wall. Each child was to make a
wish, and then draw a picture of the wish as it came true. The
wishes were sometimes funny, sometimes sad, and always re-
vealing. Lots of the children wished for Porsches or other
sleek machines. There were several wishes for cats and dogs.
A few properly indoctrinated children wished for peace or an
end to world hunger. I was somewhat abashed to find that my
own daughter had wished for golden hair that touched the
ground. My favorite wish was Matthew's. He wished for a
magic pebble that would grant all of his future wishes.
The Wishing Wall drove me to the dictionary. A wish
turns out to be a "feeling in the mind directed towards some-
thing which one believes would give satisfaction if attained,
possessed, or realized." It commonly denotes a "desire for
something not attainable by one's own effort," and is character-
ized as a "passive or inactive desire." A wish is "less emphatic
than craving, longing, or yearning, but includ[es] these as par-
ticular cases."'134
I began to wonder about my worry for the members of the
deathwatch, and to worry about my wonder. I had been enter-
taining the notion of giving them some sort of legal recourse, of
letting them sue the physicians and hospitals on their own be-
half, of seeking to terminate life-support systems because of
134. 2 COmpAcr EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3795 (1971).
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their own pain, and not because of the fictional pain of another.
Maybe that notion was nothing more than wishful thinking.
Of course, in a sense, all lawsuits are a form of wishful
thinking. The plaintiff may seek some reparation, some resto-
ration of the status quo.las Or he might ask the court to stop
others from doing something, or for permission to do something
to or for others in the future.13 A plaintiff might express
many desires: many cravings, longings, yearnings could make
their way into a petition.
So characterizing lawsuits as a form of wishful thinking
does not really advance the discussion. But assuming the role
of the grantor of wishes does, and that is what judges do: They
grant wishes. Lawsuits are expressions of a very particular
kind of desire. They express desires attainable by evoking the
power of the state. If a plaintiff is successful, there is an offi-
cial mechanism for enforcement of the judgment. It becomes a
wish come true.
What must it be like standing at the wishing wall in the
role of fairy godmother?'m Looking at those expressions of
childhood cravings, longings, and yearnings, the discerning
135. Restitution means the "restoration of property or money taken from
the plaintiff." DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1, at
222 (1973).
Punitive damages, as the name denotes, are punishment for particularly
egregious conduct to discourage such behavior in the future. Punitive damages
typically supplement other damage awards. I&L § 3.9, at 204.
136. For example, the plaintiff seeking specific performance requests the
court to make the defendant actually perform according to the terms of the
contract. I& § 12.2, at 795-96.
The injunction provides relief by compelling a defendant to act or refrain
from acting in a given manner. Failure to comply with an injunction consti-
tutes contempt of court, and may result in fines or imprisonment. I& § 2.10, at
105.
137. One interpretation of the Cinderella story, in which a fairy godmother
plays a pivotal role, suggests that pagans fashioned it as an anti-ecclesiastical
allegory. BARBARA G. WALKER, THE WOMAN's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MYTHS AND
SECRETS 168 (1983). "Ella was Hel, or Helle, daughter of Mother Earth, the
Goddess with her regenerative fires reduced to cinders. Her ugly stepmother
was the new church, [and] [h]er ugly stepsisters were the church's darlings,
the military aristocracy and clergy." Id.
Walker also relates an early German version of the story in which Cinder-
ella's real mother was the Earth. From beyond the grave, Earth, now dead,
heard her daughter's prayers and sent her a "fairy tree" that produced golden
apples, and other beautiful things. This "'fairy godmother' ... seems to have
been a ghost of the mother, the dispossessed Great Goddess in retirement un-
derground." I&
I do not mean to suggest that the fairy godmother in my text is a thinly
disguised pagan goddess, but only offer the footnote as an aside.
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fairy godmother would begin to ask: Which wishes can be
granted? Not all of them can be. She might be able to bestow a
Porsche, or a pet, or the means to acquire them. But unless she
is a deity, her powers are probably limited. She cannot, for ex-
ample, grant my daughter a head of golden hair. Neither does
she have the power to stop world hunger or the ravages of war.
For some wishes, we would do better not to call on her, but to
use Matthew's magic pebble instead.
Besides, there may be other restraints upon a fairy god-
mother. Not all wishes should be granted. Assuming she has a
conscience, granting some wishes 'may violate her sense of mo-
rality. And if she has tenure in her role of grantor of wishes,
she may have to look to the future and consider the ramifica-
tions of granting a new kind of wish. If similar wishes start ap-
pearing on the wishing wall, there may be a drain on scarce
resources: not enough Porsches or pets to go around. Or
maybe she wants to protect her aesthetic sensibilities so as not
to live in a world glutted with too many dogs and too many
cars. A fairy godmother must think about many things if she
intends to stay in her profession.
Courts, too, are grantors of wishes. Similarly, they must
confront the limitations of their powers and the restraints
placed upon them by, among other things, morality, and the
pressures brought to bear by consistency. A court must think
about many things when confronted with a new kind of wish.
Such things may exceed the boundaries of the petition, like rip-
ples that have significance to the pond way beyond that small
displacement of water where the pebble dropped in.
But it is not always so easy to tell what kind of wish we
have on our hands. What about my wishes on behalf of the
members of the deathwatch? Are they of the kind that cannot
or should not be granted?
In order to answer those questions, I would have to answer
my friend's questions from that windy March day. I would
have to articulate the wishes, pour them into a word mold, give
them shape and definition, and give them numbers for those
who need enumeration.
Consider the following hypothetical: The patient is a si-
lent, curled-up daughter. The petitioners are members of her
deathwatch, suing on their own behalf. The request for a judi-
cial order might be made in one of two ways:
Please order the doctors to terminate our daughter's life-support
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systems because we cannot bear the pain of watching her intermina-
ble dying.
Or, in the alternative:
Please order the doctors to release our daughter to us so that we
can remove her from the health care facility and terminate her life-
support systems because we cannot bear the pain of watching her in-
terminable dying.
The requests in the hypothetical are not so different from
those requests that are typically made when the members of
the deathwatch sue on behalf of the incompetent patient. After
all, no matter whose name is on the petition, the desired result
is the same: the termination of the life-support systems. But
when the members of the deathwatch sue as nominal, proce-
dural plaintiffs, the courts employ a legal fiction: a pretense
that the silent, curled-up daughter is doing the asking, and not
the people who file the petition.
What would we gain by dispensing with that pretense? Ju-
dicial honesty. Recognition by the courts that the members of
the deathwatch are people in pain. Release from the awkward-
ness of fabricating intent for someone who no longer has any
intent. Respect for a judicial system that confronts openly the
reality of a situation, a judicial system that does not need the
smoke screen of a legal fiction. 38
138. No one in the history of jurisprudence hated the dishonesty of the
legal fiction more than Jeremy Bentham. Bentham was no fan of the common
law, which he thought was plagued with "tautology, technicality, circuity, ir-
regularity, inconsistency .... But above all, the pestilential breath of Fiction
poisons the sense of every instrument it comes near." JEREMY BENTHAM, A
Fragment on Government, in 1 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 221, 235 n.s
(John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) (1776). "[I]n English law,
fiction is a syphilis, which runs in every vein, and carries into every part of the
system the principle of rottenness." JEREMY BENTHAM, Elements of Packing
as Applied to Juries, in 5 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra, at 61, 92 (1821).
Bentham particularly loathed the legal fiction due to its ability to make hid-
den changes in the law without legislation. It gave judges too much power to
determine "what shall be morality as well as what shall be law ... ." JEREMY
BENTHAM, Preface intended for the Second Edition of A Fragment on Govern-
ment, in A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERN-
MENT 502, 511 (James H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1977)
(1822).
Jurisprudes of the early twentieth century took up Bentham's scathing at-
tack on the legal fiction, although no one approached his level of rage or high
concentrations of bile. Roscoe Pound classified the use of legal fiction as
"spurious interpretation" which was to "make, unmake, or remake, and not
merely to discover .... It is essentially a legislative, not a judicial process,
made necessary in formative periods by the paucity of principles, feebleness of
legislation, and rigidity of rules characteristic of archaic law." Roscoe Pound,
Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLuM. L. REv. 379, 382 (1907). See also LON
FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967) and JOHN C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND
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But there is something more to gain from letting the mem-
bers of the deathwatch sue on their own behalf: a higher likeli-
hood that the petition to terminate the life-support systems will
be granted. Increasingly, high evidentiary standards must be
met in order to justify the creation of fictional intent.139
Cruzan is a perfect example. The state of Missouri required
"clear and convincing" evidence that Nancy Cruzan, before los-
ing cognitive function, would have wanted to terminate the life-
support systems had she known of her future situation.140 Un-
til new evidence was unearthed after the litigation,14' the peti-
tioners on Nancy Cruzan's behalf could not meet that burden.
They could not find a residue of the right words and, as a re-
sult, Nancy Cruzan was forced to stay alive. If there had been
SOURCES OF THE LAw 30-37 (1921), which both criticize the use of pretense in
judicial decision making. For a later twentieth-century discussion on legal fic-
tions, see Avi Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 821 (1986).
139. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985) (emphasizing need for
evidence of patient's former intent, including living wills, oral directives, reli-
gious beliefs, and any other information bearing on what course of treatment
patient would have chosen); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d
626, 631-40 (Mass. 1986) (authorizing guardian to take patient from hospital
that refused to remove feeding tube, emphasizing patient's expressed prefer-
ences and religious convictions). For a discussion of a related case, In re West-
chester County Medical Ctr., see infra notes 228-44 and accompanying text.
But see Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d at 640-46 (Nolan &
Lynch, JJ., dissenting) (expressing concern that there was insufficient evi-
dence of Brophy's former intent).
140. To effectuate the state's interest in the preservation of human life, the
Supreme Court of Missouri adopted a strict standard of clear and convincing
evidence for assessing the patient's former intent. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 424-26 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). Under this standard, no one could
make the choice to terminate life-sustaining treatment for an incompetent pa-
tient absent a living will or clear and convincing evidence of her former intent.
In Nancy Cruzan's case, her statements to her housemate in a "somewhat seri-
ous conversation that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life
unless she could live at least halfway normally," id, at 411, were deemed "un-
reliable for the purpose of determining her intent.., and thus insufficient to
support the co-guardians claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's
behalf." Id. at 424-26; see supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing
Cruzan).
141. Once the Cruzan case became a cause c6l6bre, three of her co-workers
came forward and presented sufficient evidence of her former intent. At a
hearing in November of 1990, the co-workers testified that they recalled
Cruzan saying she would never want to live "like a vegetable." Tamar Lewin,
Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by Debate Over Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
27, 1990, at Al. This new evidence, plus new testimony from her doctor that
her existence was "living hell," prompted Judge Teel of the Jasper County
Probate Court to give permission for removal of her feeding tube. Id. Nancy
Cruzan died 12 days later, at the age of 33, with her family at her bedside. Id.
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no legal fiction, the judge who heard the Cruzans' petition
might have been free to let her quietly go. As it was, the high-
est court in Missouri, later affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court, would not, perhaps could not, let her death-
watch come to an end.142
* ** ** *
Inherited from the utilitarian tradition, the cost-benefit
analysis bids us to focus on our plans and to assess their costs
and benefits should we bring them to fruition.14s As lawyers,
we do it every day. We look at a course of action, or at a rule,
and ask, "If we decide to act one way instead of another, or if
we decide to impose this limitation on our future actions, what
will the upshot be?"144 There is the exhilarating side of the cal-
culation: Who will be made happier, healthier, and wealthier
142. In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
Supreme Court of Missouri. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.
Ct. 2841 (1990). A state may apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in
proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of
a person in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 2854.
143. The cost-benefit analysis focuses on the probable results of our actions
or the enforcement of our rules. Hence, it is a form of consequentialism, a
doctrine holding that an action's value is always determined by its conse-
quences; that is, only by referring to an action's result can it be justified.
Amartya K. Sen & Bernard Williams, Introduction to UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND 1, 3-4 (Amartya K. Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
Indeed, a "quality-adjusted life-year" (QALY) is essentially a cost-benefit
analysis. A QALY "is a numerical description of the value that a medical pro-
cedure or service can provide to groups of patients with similar medical condi-
tions." John LaPuma, M.D. & Edward F. Lawlor, Ph.D., Quality-Adjusted
Life-Years: Ethical Implications for Physicians and Policymakers, 263 JAMA
2917, 2917 (1990). According to medical scholars,
The concept of 'cost per quality-adjusted life-year,' as a guideline for
resource allocation is based on six ethical assumptions: [1] quality of
life can be accurately measured and used; [2] utilitarianism is accepta-
ble; [3] equity and efficiency are compatible; [4] projections of com-
munity preferences can substitute for individual preferences; [5] the
old have less 'capacity to benefit' than the young;, and [6] physicians
will not use quality-adjusted life years as clinical maxims.
Id. A QALY "attempts to combine expected survival with expected quality of
life in a single metric." Thus, "if an additional year of healthy life is worth a
value of 1 (year) then a year of less healthy life is worth less than 1 (year)."
144. There are different kinds of utilitarianism. "Act" utilitarianism deals
with particular actions, or "where an agent has a choice between courses of
action (or inaction)." JOHN L. MACKiE, ETmICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG
125 (1977). Under an act utilitarian theory, we assess the "rightness or wrong-
ness" of each individual action directly by its consequences. J.J.C. Smart,
Utiliarianism, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 206 (Paul Edwards ed.,
1967). "Rule" utilitarianism "does not consider the consequences of each par-
ticular action but considers the consequences of adopting some general rule,"
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from our decision and in what way?145 Then there is the cold,
dark, November side of the calculation: Who will be made sad-
der, sicker, or poorer from our decision and in what way? Pre-
sumably, if we remain true to the tradition, we will choose the
course of action or the rule that will generate the greatest
number of benefits for the largest number of people, that will
maximize utility, as some are wont to say.14
As an intellectual endeavor, the cost-benefit analysis has
always made me both profoundly tired and depressed. Even
though my legal education was over many years ago, I still har-
and urges its adoption if the consequences of adopting it are better than those
of adopting some alternative rule. Id
145. Sen and Williams characterize utilitarianism as an intersection be-
tween two different theories: consequentialism and welfarism. Under welfar-
ism, the correct way to assess a state of affairs is to measure the aggregate
welfare or satisfaction that all the individuals included in the calculation expe-
rience. Thus, utilitarianism as a moral theory recommends that we choose ac-
tions on the basis of consequences and that we assess the consequences in
terms of welfare. Sen & Williams, supra note 143, at 3-4.
146. Although there are many precursors of utilitarianism, most histories
of utilitarianism begin with Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). By "utility," Ben-
tham meant
that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, ad-
vantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present case
comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to
prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the
party whose interest is considerec if that party be the community in
general, then the happiness of the community. if a particular individ-
ual, then the happiness of the individual.
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 2 (2d ed. 1823). An action conforms to the principle of utility
when "the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is
greater than any it has to diminish it." Id at 3.
The word 'Utilitarian' appears to have been coined by Bentham. He
used it first in a letter dated 1781, and again in a letter, dated 1801, in
which he said "A new religion would be an odd sort of thing without a
name", and proposed "Utilitarianism." Mill, however, seems to have
been unaware that Bentham used the word, for he claims to have
taken it over from John Galt's novel 'Annals of the Parish' (1821)
where a character applies it to Benthamite views; and in the essay on
Sedgwick's discourse to the University of Cambridge (1835) he feels it
necessary to explain it in terms of adherence to the principle of Util-
ity. The word 'Utility' was in fairly common use as a technical term
considerably earlier, and is to be found in the writings of Hume.
Mary Warnock, Introduction to JOHN STUART MILL, UTILTARIANISM, ON LiB-
ERTY, ESSAY ON BENTHAM, 1, 9 n.1 (Mary Warnock ed., 1962) [hereinafter
UTrrARIANiSM].
Sen has a much more accessible definition, taking "utility.. .to stand for a
person's conception of his own well being." J.A. Mirrlees, The Economic Uses
of Utilitarianism, in UTARIANM AND BEYOND, supra note 143, at 63, 64
(quoting Amartya K. Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 9 J. PHIL. 463
(1979)).
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bor resentment from the imposition of the cost-benefit analysis
on my thinking processes. It undercuts enthusiasm for new
ideas. It fosters conservatism. It neutralizes the passions. It
sucks the juice out of one's sense of injustice, leaving the pulp
and rind of a well-reasoned decision; a well-reasoned decision
that may not be the right thing to do.
Even though it makes me sad and weary, however, the
cost-benefit analysis is still a part of the way I look at the
world. So I am forced to look at the downside of my proposal:
What would we have to lose by granting the members of the
deathwatch the right to terminate their daughter's life-support
systems? What are the costs of dispensing with the legal fiction
that the request is being made by the silent curled-up daughter,
and not by her parents who are filing the petition?
The costs are high. Probably too high.
The most obvious cost would be the burden of judicial ad-
ministration. I ran into that problem when I started to draw a
circle of yellow chalk around the members of the deathwatch.
Without a neat and tidy organizing principle like the nuclear
family, the courts could spend all their time just trying to iden-
tify who the plaintiffs should be. Then there is the problem of
how to deal with potential conflicts among the members of the
deathwatch. What would a court do if half of the members
wanted to terminate life-support systems, and half did not?
Would hours of judicial attention be spent just trying to com-
pare relative degrees of intimacy? Because the group is infor-
mal, and the deathwatch ephemeral, there would be no internal
structure to deal with such disputes, just as there would be no
institutional criteria to determine who qualifies to be a member
and who does not.
Another cost of dispensing with the legal fiction is more
difficult to put a price tag on. It is the problem that my friend
alluded to when she said, 'Tou've got to put limits on who can
sue." This cost is generated by the tendency of ideas to migrate
and by the unpleasant reality of human greed. If we expressly
allow plaintiffs the right to assert a claim based on witnessing
the pain of another, how can we prevent that idea from moving
into new territory?
This might not pose a problem if courts limited the remedy
to issuing orders to terminate life-support systems in carefully
circumscribed situations. However, in recognizing new forms of
harm, the legal mind likes selectively to pilfer bits and pieces of
existing law to construct a new cause of action. In searching
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for analogous situations, courts would inevitably gravitate to-
ward that area of tort law in which plaintiffs have sought, and
have been awarded, damages for the negligent infliction of
mental distress caused by the plaintiff's witnessing harm to an-
other.147 And damages mean money, both for the plaintiff and
for the plaintiff's lawyer. If courts were cavalier about making
doctors and hospitals pay damages for the harm caused by wit-
147. See supra note 131. In a few reported cases, members of the death-
watch have asserted claims for intentional infliction of mental distress. In Es-
tate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984), the patient,
Mrs. Leach, suffered a cardiac arrest while in the defendant's hospital. She
was successfully resuscitated, but later lapsed into a coma. I&r at 1051. Several
days later, she was placed on a life-support system. Id. Her husband, advised
that she would never regain consciousness, petitioned the county probate court
to have the life-support system removed. The court ordered the hospital to
disconnect the life-support system, Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426
N.E.2d 809 (C.P. 1980), and Mrs. Leach finally died, almost five months after
being placed on the life-support equipment. Estate of Leach, 469 N.E.2d at
1051.
Mr. Leach and the children then sued in state court alleging, inter alia,
that placing Mrs. Leach on the life-support system without her consent consti-
tuted a battery. See i. at 1052 (discussing the court's disposition of this claim).
The part of the case that is of interest to me is the claim by the husband and
children for "mental anguish." Id. at 1055.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court's dismissal of the claim for
mental anguish on two grounds. First the court held that to the extent the
plaintiffs could demonstrate wrongful conduct increasing Mrs. Leach's suffer-
ing, they stated a cause of action. Id. Moreover, the court found that in light
of Ohio precedents, the family members' claim of mental anguish presented a
colorable legal claim. I&r
But see Hospital Dev. & Serv. Corp. v. Leatherbury, No. 82-22253 CV, (Fla.
Cir. Ct. June 3, 1983), aff'd, 446 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (per
curiam) (finding the defendant, admitted to the hospital after having at-
tempted suicide, had no right to die and dismissing the defendant's wife's
counterclaim against the hospital for intentional infliction of mental distress
upon her by the hospital's refusal to allow her husband to die from nontreat-
ment), discussed in A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interence with the Right to
Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 646 n.94 (1986).
In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court case a member of a deathwatch sued
a hospital for mental pain and anguish. Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556
So. 2d 559 (La. 1990). Lejeune was not about the termination of life-support
systems, however;, it was about another kind of nightmare. Mr. Lejeune lay in
a coma in the hospital. Shortly before his wife came into his room for her
daily visit, rats had gnawed at his face. A student nurse tried to clean some of
the blood away from the wounds, but the bites were still evident. Id. at 561.
In Mrs. Lejeune's deposition she statech 'They weren't cuts; you could tell it
was eaten-eaten by little rounds, and there was blood, and it was all... he
had some on his head, his face, his neck, and his nose. Now, you know that
rodent went into his mouth because they would feed him through the mouth,
and he had to breathe with his mouth open." Id at 571. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana held that she had "sufficiently stated a cause of action" for
mental pain and anguish against the defendant hospital. Id.
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nessing the pain of another, there would be an incentive for
creative plaintiffs' lawyers to look for similar situations in
which to sue. The contingency fee can be a catalyst to the im-
agination, 14 and an idea like compensation for derivative pain
might indeed have a tendency to wander.
Although the cost of a nomadic idea might be difficult to
assess, I am confident that the speculators of doom and gloom
in the insurance industry could put some sort of dollar figure
on a new kind of derivative pain. Similarly, someone could
probably predict the administrative costs of courts having to
identify plaintiffs or deal with intraparty disputes among the
members of the deathwatch. Some costs, however, do not lend
themselves to quantification. They take their toll on the
human body and on the human heart.
Such could be the most serious cost of dispensing with the
legal fiction: the risk of potential abuse. If we take our eyes off
the patient and direct our gaze towards the members of the
deathwatch, we might forget to ask whether that patient still
had something to say. The scenario that I have just sketched of
the late-twentieth-century deathwatch assumes a patient who
has substantially lost cognitive function, a Karen Quinlan or a
Nancy Cruzan. The medical determination of brain function
and the legal determination of incompetency, however, are
both capable of manipulation.149 The patient might be quite
148. This insight I must attribute to my friend and colleague, Nicola Lee,
Barrister at Law. One evening she was trying to explain to me how the prac-
tice of law in England differed from the practice of law in this country, and we
lit upon the subject of the contingency fee. She contended that the institution
of the contingency fee had an impact on the development of American law,
providing an incentive for plaintiffs' lawyers to be creative in formulating new
causes of action or in finding novel applications of the old ones. In England,
where there are no contingency fees, barristers tend to be more conservative
when initiating litigation. Actually, according to Nicola Lee, barristers tend to
be more conservative about everything.
149. In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980), is enough to make anyone
nervous about the reliability of incompetency proceedings. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court approved a lower court order permitting the petitioner, the
ward's temporary guardian, to stop dialysis on a 79-year-old man thought to be
incompetent due to "chronic organic brain syndrome." Two authors later
pointed out:
No psychiatric testimony was heard. Two written affidavits from phy-
sicians were presented which described Mr. Spring as suffering from
chronic organic brain syndrome or senility. The signature on one affi-
davit was completely illegible; the other affidavit was based upon an
examination of Mr. Spring conducted nearly 15 months prior to the
appointment of Mr. Spring's wife and son as temporary guardians and
their filing of the petition to terminate his hemodialysis treat-
ments.... The only medical testimony concerning Mr. Spring's com-
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alive, both mentally and physically, but be too old or too annoy-
ing or too inconvenient or too expensive or too aesthetically
unappealing or in some other way too much of a burden to have
around. Through the use of cooperative expert witnesses, such
a patient could find that her medical care has turned into her
deathwatch1so
petency, or lack thereof, came from a kidney specialist at the
institution where Mr. Spring received his hemodialysis treatment....
Based on this evidence, Mr. Spring was found incompetent and his
family was authorized to order that his dialysis treatments be with-
drawn ....
Lee J. Dunn & Nancy E. Ator, Vox Clamantis in Deserto. Do You Really
Mean What You Say in Spring, in LEGAL & ETHICAL ASPECTS, supra note 102,
at 177, 177-78; see also Peter M. Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly:
The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REv. 212 (1975) (arguing for the intro-
duction of full adversary proceedings before appointing guardians for the eld-
erly); S. Van McCrary & Terry A. Walman, Procedural Paternalism in
Competency Determination, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 108 (1990) (con-
cluding that full procedural protections-including the right to confront wit-
nesses, an appropriate standard of proof, consideration of alternative actions,
and an objective and impartial review board-are necessary to safeguard the
interests of the alleged incompetent in guardian proceedings). For a discussion
of recent efforts by states to revise their guardianship statutes, see Penelope
A. Hommell et al., Trends in Guardianship Reform Implications for the Med-
ical and Legal Professions, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 213 (1990).
150. With the high cost of medical care in this country, one of the greatest
risks of abuse is the sacrifice of patients because their continued treatment
drains resources. Soaring medical costs have been advanced in some instances
as a "valid reason for putting someone to death by the proponents of rational
and assisted suicides." Joseph Richman, Sanctioned Assisting Suicide. Impact
on Family Relations, 3 IssuEs L. & MED. 53, 61 (1987).
In the 11 years from 1976 to 1987, spending for medical care exceeded
inflation by almost 80%. In 1987, national health expenditures were
$0.5 trillion, 11.1% of the gross national product. Spending for federal
Medicare and Medicaid programs has grown from $70 billion in 1982
to $111 billion in 1987.
Many factors contribute to rising health care costs: inflation of
hospital and health care provider costs, the emergence of new diseases
and disorders, and the development of new diagnostic and therapeutic
modalities.
Edward E. Schneider, M.D. & Jack M. Guralnik, Ph.D., The Aging of Amerca:
Impact on Health Care Costs, 263 JAMA 2335, 2336 (1990).
Another factor is the "aging of the aged." "An unprecedented number of
individuals are entering the 9th and 10th decades of life." Id. This group of
the "oldest old" is the fastest-growing in the United States. Things will really
get tough when the "baby boomers" hit their eighties. In 2040, the average age
of a baby boomer will be 85 years, and the level of Medicare spending for the
population age 65 years and above could range from $147 billion to $212 billion,
in 1987 dollars. I& at 2337.
Other risks of abuse derive from prejudicial attitudes toward the elderly,
the diseased, and the disabled. No one can ignore the atrocities of recent his-
tory. During the autumn of 1939, Hitler instituted his "Euthanasia Program"
in which over 275,000 people were gassed in killing centers. Most who were
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Even a judicial proceeding would not save her life. By the
time the case reached the court's attention, the labels assessing
the degree of mental capacity would already have attached.
Rarely, if ever, does a judge leave the sanctuary of the court-
room to see whether the curled-up daughter in that bed is truly
silent. 1 Instead the judge must rely on the professional train-
ing and credibility of those experts who have made the assess-
ment. Sometimes a deposition of a doctor is a fait accompli.
By granting the members of the deathwatch standing to
terminate life-support systems, we turn their silence into ex-
pression. My fear is that their voices would drown out
whatever the patient might have left to say. After all, there is
no guarantee that the members of the deathwatch will be good
and true; they may have their own selfish reasons for wanting
killed were deemed incompetent: mentally retarded, mentally ill, epileptics,
senile elderly, sufferers of neurological disorders such as Parkinsonism or
multiple sclerosis, and other sick and handicapped people. Dubbed "useless
eaters," their sacrifice was justified by a perverse form of welfare utilitarian-
ism that sanctioned the killing of the weak so that others could flourish. Phil-
lippa Foot, Euthanasia, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85 (1977).
By focusing on the rights of members of the deathwatch, our analysis
shifts from the individual to the group. Any time this shift takes place, the
risk of harm to the defenseless and vulnerable members of society arises. The
risk is real; hidden biases against certain forms of illness, disability, indigency,
unattractiveness, or any other difference may be tacitly plugged into a utilita-
rian calculation that results in discrimination, or worse yet, extermination.
151. One notable exception was In re President & Directors of Georgetown
College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia's denied Georgetown Hospital's application for permission to ad-
minister blood transfusions to a 25-year-old woman who had lost two-thirds of
her blood supply due to a ruptured ulcer. She and her husband refused to con-
sent to the transfusions on religious grounds; they were Jehovah's Witnesses.
Id. at 1001-02. The attorneys for the hospital applied for an emergency writ at
4:00 p.m.
Judge Skelly Wright called the hospital to verify the attorney's represen-
tations, and
thereupon proceeded with counsel to the hospital, where I spoke to
... the husband of the patient. He advised me that, on religious
grounds, he would not approve a blood transfusion for his wife. I
asked permission of Mr. Jones to see his wife. This he readily
granted.. .. I then went inside the patient's room. Her appearance
confirmed the urgency which had been represented to me. I tried to
communicate with her, advising her as to what the doctors had said.
The only audible reply I could hear was, "Against my will." It was
obvious that the woman was not in a mental condition to make a
decision.
Id at 1006-07. Judge Wright signed an order to administer the blood transfu-
sions. Id- at 1007.
Compare this unusual trip to the patient's room to verify her incompe-
tency with Judge Muir's attitude in Quinlan I, described supra note 55.
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the deathwatch to come to an end. The incompetent person
might be killed as a consequence of some unarticulated utilita-
rian calculation. The court might end up sacrificing her in the
name of someone else's pain.
That would diminish us all. The loss of life and dignity is
not only felt by the lamb, but also by those who lead the lamb
to slaughter. It is true that the use of the legal fiction may en-
gender disrespect for a judicial system that cannot openly con-
front the reality of the situation. The members of the
deathwatch are the paintiffs, and not the silent curled up
daughter. Furthermore, the use of the legal fiction may keep
some deathwatches going interminably. But that may be the
way it has to be.152 Although the members of the deathwatch
may end up paying for our use of that legal fiction, and that is a
tragedy, the risk of abuse is a cost that I do not think we can
bear.
So, once again, the cost-benefit analysis had silenced me,
and I began a deathwatch on my own idea.
"So have you given up on them altogether?" she said one
day at the pool while we were doing desultory laps. 'Your
paintiffs, the members of the deathwatch?"
"I guess so," I admitted reluctantly. "At least when I think
of them legally."
It was several months later. I had become so disheartened
by my own conclusions about granting the members of the
deathwatch some form of legal recourse that I had lost faith in
my original insights about their pain.
This happens to me a lot. It reminds me of picking chicory.
You see something beautiful by the side of the road, a spray of
periwinkle blue in the grass, and you want to pick it, to take it
152. At the same time we make the decision of whom to burden, we
also are deciding whether we want to get accustomed, whether we
wish to become callous, or whether, instead, we think that as a society
we would be better off if we continued to view some things as shock-
ing, offensive, and even abominable.
GuiDo CALABRESI, IDEAiA BELmFS, ATrrUDEs, AND THE LAw 83 (1985).
In this instance, by clinging to the legal fiction, we have decided to burden
the members of the deathwatch, and at the same time, we have decided to get
accustomed to their pain. We do this because we are sufficiently worried that
granting the members of the deathwatch their own cause of action might re-
sult in sacrificing innocent victims, and that as a society, we would be better
off to remain deeply offended by the risks of abuse that I have described.
Hence, we are willing to be callous about the pain felt by the families of Karen
Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan.
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home. The wildflower book has warned you not to, that chic-
ory does not take kindly to picking, but you do it anyhow. A
few hours later, the chicory has collapsed. The crisp, jagged
edges are limp, and the brilliant blue has turned to a sullen
gray. The same thing happens to a lot of my ideas. When I
pick them and try to arrange them in a vase, they faint against
their glass prison; they wither and die. In fact, I had given up
on trying to squeeze the members of the deathwatch into any
kind of lawsuit. They had been relegated to that class of four-
in-the-morning things; things out of my control.
'Well, that's too bad." She hugged the kickboard and
pushed off from the edge of the pool, her legs flailing in a blur
of water and air.
'That do you mean that's too bad?" I grabbed a kickboard
and followed her in the water. I was annoyed. This was not
the only time that she had done this to me. I would have an
idea that could not withstand her scrutiny, and then she would
not let it die a dignified death. She would not let it quietly
slide down into the ravine of unworthy ideas, washed away by
the gentle rain of indifference and neglect. Oh no, she had to
torture it to death, submit it to a public execution.
"I just think it's too bad, that's all."
"But you were the first one to say that the members of the
deathwatch shouldn't have any substantive rights of their
own." I was kicking furiously to keep up with her, grasping
tightly on to my kickboard.
"That's right, I did." We had reached the other side of the
pool, and had stopped swimming. "Look, I can disdain the solu-
tion, but still admire the problem."
"The problem being?" At that moment, in that chlorinated
sea, I could not remember what there was about the members
of the deathwatch that had captured my imagination. The sea-
son had changed, and the chicory now lay under the ground. I
could not remember its blue beauty in the light, or its splendid
verticality.
"The problem being the law's failure to include the mem-
bers of the deathwatch in the frame." My friend had just taken
an introductory course in photography, and it seemed to radi-
cally alter the way that she looked at the world. Not only did
she now see everything through a lens of a camera, but she was
leaving words behind, consumed by an unexpected passion for
the visual. "Those termination of life support cases all focus on
the face of someone who no longer cries, on the face of the in-
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competent dying person. The lens is telephoto, and the field of
vision is so microscopic that the members of the deathwatch
aren't included. The ones who are really crying aren't even in
the picture."
"And what do you propose as an optic solution?" It was a
good thing that I had an earlier lifetime as a photographer and
could hold my own in technical banter.
"Maybe a twenty-eight-millimeter lens. Something that
still focuses on the face of the dying person, but captures every-
thing else around him. It's the lens of social context."
I wondered if that expression had been her own, but did
not want to offend her by questioning her authority. "How
sharply in focus would you have the members of the death-
watch be?"
"Not sharp at all. I'd want them in the picture, but as soft
presences. An aura of human warmth and concern around the
dying person, but without any formal recognition. You know,"
she grabbed her kickboard in preparation for departure, "if you
insist that the law face this problem head on, in the middle of
the frame, then you're stuck with the old picture. But if you
let the law do its work like an artist, in the shadows and on the
edges of things, you might still be able to do something about
their pain. Don't desert your paintiffs yet, your members of the
deathwatch." And she pushed off from the edge of the pool
and disappeared down the lane.
Suddenly I loved my friend, old and new. The aqua-green
water that enveloped her grew still, and I floated on my
kickboard without moving, finding solace in her wake. I tenta-
tively picked up another lens, the fifty-millimeter lens of our
reality, and dared to look at my problem again, through the
clear glass of her metaphor.
There they were. That splash of blue. I love the way the
wildflowers come back in the spring.
Left Hemisphere Interlude53
Over and over, I resisted the urge to ask the question.
153. The two halves of the human brain, called the "left hemisphere" and
the "right hemisphere," resemble a walnut when viewed from above. Our ner-
vous system connects to the brain in a cross-over fashion, so that the left hemi-
sphere controls the right side of the body, and vice versa. BETTY EDWARDS,
DRAWING ON THE RIGHT SInE OF THE BRAIN 26 (1979).
In most animal brains, the cerebral hemispheres are symmetrical in func-
tion; human cerebral hemispheres, however, are asymmetrical. In the 1960s,
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Over and over, I resisted the urge to outline an answer to it. I
was not going to do it. I was not going to order my thoughts in
a logical sequence. I was not going to make arguments, one,
two, three. I was going to be a poet, not a lawyer.
And over and over, the argument kept appearing on legal
pads and the backs of envelopes, written in a scrawl with a pen-
cil, as if the illegibility and erasability of the words made them
somehow less there. Worse yet, the argument kept falling into
place behind those ominous numbers, one, two, three. Before I
knew it, I was outlining an answer to a question, and could not
stop myself from asking it.
Question: What can the law do to alleviate indirectly the pain of
the members of the deathwatch?
Answer Three things (of course, three things).
1) The law can redefine death.
2) The law can lower evidentiary standards regarding conversa-
tions about the circumstances of one's own death in recognition that
the subject is a taboo in our culture.
3) The law can help create an environment in which a meaning-
ful deathwatch can take place.
It is a hard fact to face: I am a lawyer, not a poet.
researchers at the California Institute of Technology, in particular a psychobi-
ology professor, Dr. Roger Sperry, discovered that each hemisphere perceives
reality in its own way. Id at 26-28. The function of language and language-
related capabilities is located mainly in the left hemisphere of the majority of
individuals. (This is true in approximately 98% of right-handers and about
two-thirds of left-handers.) The left hemisphere operates "in a more logical,
analytic, computer-like fashion," and is used most of the time in individuals
with intact brains. John W. Levy, Differential Perceptual Capacities in Major
and Minor Hemispheres, 61 PRoc. NAT'L AcAn. Sci., 1151, 1151 (1968). The
left hemisphere plans step-by-step procedures and processes information in a
sequential, symbolic, and linear manner. The right "nonspeaking" hemisphere
is subjective, intuitive, and is not good at categorizing, naming or placing
things in sequential order. We use the right brain to imagine how things exist
in space, to understand metaphors, to dream, and to create new combinations
of ideas. EDWARDs, supra, at 34. "[O]ur educational system, as well as science
in general, tends to neglect the nonverbal form of intellect. What it comes
down to is that modern society discriminates against the right hemisphere."
Roger W. Sperry, Lateral Specialization of Cerebral Function in the Surgi-
cally Separated Hemispheres, in THE PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY OF THINKING 209, 209
(Frank J. McGuigan & R.A. Schoonover eds., 1973).
Even if the specialization of function in the cerebral hemispheres may not
be so cut and dry, it is still useful to keep in mind that each human being may
have multiple ways of processing information and apprehending reality, and
that how one approaches a problem will depend to a large part upon how one
perceives it. And if our understanding of the psychophysiology of cognition
has become more complex, the metaphor of left-brain and right-brain thinking
still makes sense to me. A lawyer will typically approach life from a left hem-
ispheric vantage point. A poet will not.
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III. MOVING UP THE BRAINSTEMim
WHAT CAN THE LAw Do TO ALLEVIATE INDIRECTLY THE PAIN
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DEATHWATCH?
This first suggestion is the most obvious, and has been
made by many others who have looked at the horrors of the
late-twentieth-century deathwatch: The law can redefine
death.
In the law, and in medicine, it has always been biological
death that has commanded our attention. The cessation of the
lungs and heart used to provide the definitionYlSS Once artifi-
cial ventilation became possible, however, the medical profes-
sion had to reconsider the definition of human death. The
focus shifted from heart and lung activity to activity of the
brain.
The prevailing test, formulated by an ad hoc committee of
the Harvard Medical School, specifies a set of clinical tests that
determines whether the entire brain of a comatose person is
dead.i 5 I dutifully put them in a footnote, because I must, but
154. In a lovely footnote that in my mind belonged in the first paragraph of
his article, Raymond J. Deverette pointed out that the word "brainstem" is a
metaphor borrowed from botany. The metaphor does not support a claim that
we have a living human brain when we say that the stem lives, but the rest of
the brain is dead "Now we do not say that we have a living rose when the
stem is alive but the blossom dead, nor do we say we have a living or edible
apple or grape when the stem lives but the fruit is dead." Raymond J.
Deverette, Neocortical Death and Human Death, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 96, 103 n.13 (1990). For another work discussing the significance of
metaphor in our discourse about illness, see SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS
METAPHOR (1977).
155. "The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a
total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and
vital functions consequent thereupon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 488 (3d ed. 1951).
156. In a 1968 report, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death specified a set of clinical
tests which it maintained were sufficient for determining whether the entire
brain is dead or the patient is in an irreversible coma. It recommended that,
excluding cases of hypothermia and the presence of central nervous system de-
pressants, death should be declared when a patient exhibits three traits: un-
receptivity and unresponsivity to external stimuli and inner need, no
movements or breathing, and no elicitable reflexes. Ad Hoc Committee of the
Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Defini-
tion of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 337, 337-38 (1968). A fourth condition, a
flat electroencephalogram (EEG) reading, should be used for its confirmatory
value only. Id. at 338. Once the patient meets all three tests, the results of
which must be consistent over a 24-hour period, the Committee recommended
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no one has ever claimed that they tell us much about the death
of a human being. They tell us when, in the words of the
Munchkin coroner, someone is "not merely dead," but "really
most sincerely dead."157 They do not apply, however, to those
patients who still have some residual nervous system function.
Those people, like Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan, are not
"dead" because they cannot meet the current definition. Their
cerebral function may be gone, but the lower brainstem func-
tion is still hanging on.
Other competing medical models provide definitions of
human death. Some prefer a definition that focuses on the loss
of organic function.3s Others focus on whether the patient has
regained consciousness.159 All the medical models require doc-
tors to prick limbs with needles, yell into deaf ears, shine lights
into eyes that do not see.160 All entail a medical judgment
based on an assessment of physical capacity; by and large, the
that death be declared and the respirator turned off. I& The application of
the report was carefully circumscribed to be concerned "only with those coma-
tose individuals who have no discernible central nervous system activity." I&
at 337 (italics omitted).
157. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). The Mayor of
Munchkin City called the Muncbkin coroner to ensure that the Witch of the
East, upon whom Dorothy's house had recently landed, was "morally, ethi-
cally, spiritually, physically, positively, absolutely, undeniably, and reliably
dead." Id. Without his averment as to her death, the Munchkins could not
launch into "traditional death behaviors." See ROBERT M. VEATCH, DEATH,
DYING AND THE BIoLoGIcAL REVOLUTION 27 (1989) (arguing that the timing of
traditional death behaviors should be the impetus that drives public debate
about the definition of death). In the case of the Munchkins, such behavior
involved singing '"ing, Dong, the Witch is Dead."
158. "[A] human organism is dead when, for whatever reason, the system
of those reciprocally dependent processes which assimilate oxygen, metabolize
food, eliminate wastes, and keep the organism in relative homeostasis are ar-
rested in a way which the organism itself cannot reverse." Lawrence C.
Becker, Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept, 4 PHIL & PUB. AFF.
344, 353 (1975).
159. See David Lamb, Diagnosing Death, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 144, 147
(1978).
160. Physicians have proposed several other major sets of criteria to diag-
nose irreversible loss of brain function. For example, in 1971, the University
of Minnesota Health Sciences Center published what have been called the
'"_innesota Criteria." They differed from the Harvard criteria in that they re-
quired neither a confirmatory EEG nor the absence of movement in response
to painful stimuli They specified a test for the presence of spontaneous respi-
ration for a period of four minutes at a time, and required only the absence of
brainstem reflexes. In addition, the tests needed to be repeated and remain
unchanged only within 12, not 24 hours. A. Mohandas & Shelly N. Chou,
Brain Death. A Clinical and Pathological Study, J. NEUROSURGERY, Aug.
1971, at 211, 212. The Minnesota Medical Association adopted another set of
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conclusion can be justified by pointing to a chart. The incredi-
ble comfort of numbers tells us that we have done the right
thing, the only thing, in considering this person to be a dead
one.
In contrast to the medical models, some have argued that
the task of how to define death is one that requires a moral, not
a medical, judgment.161 The central question then becomes:
When is it morally justifiable to treat a person as dead? This
criteria in 1976. See Ronald E. Cranford, Minnesota Medical Association Crite-
ria: Brain Death-Concept and Criteria, 61 MINN. MED. 561, 562 (1978).
In 1977, a study organized by the National Institute of Neurological Dis-
eases and Stroke (NINDS), headed by Earl Walker, published another set of
brain-based criteria. In addition to the deep coma with cerebral unresponsivity
and apnea, the Walker group required dilated pupils, absence of cephalic
reflexis, and electrocerebral silence on an EEG. A. Earl Walker, M.D. et al.,
An Appraisal of the Criteria of Cerebral Death-A Summary Statement, 237
JAMA 982, 982 (1977).
A President's Commission proposed a set of criteria that included deep
coma, absence of brainstem reflexes, and apnea. Clinical indicators for the
cessation of all brain functions had to be present for at least six hours. The
Commission recommended confirmation by EEG, and further testing for the
absence of cerebral brain flow could also aid in diagnosis. PRESmENT's COM-
MISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE, DEFINING DEATH
159-66 (1981). For an excellent history of the brain-based definition of death,
see VEATCH, supra note 157, at 15-58.
161. Some writers have analyzed the problem of defining death by examin-
ing the underlying notion of personhood. For example, H. Tristram Engel-
hardt has argued that there are at least two notions of person. The first is the
moral agent, the rational individual who bears rights and duties. The second is
a social concept or social role of person, individuals who may not be rational
moral agents, but who can still engage in "at least a minimum of social interac-
tion." H. Tristram Engelhardt, Medicine and the Concept of Person, in CON-
TEMPORARY IssuEs IN BIOETHIcS 94, 97 (Tom Beauchamp & LeRoy Waters
eds., 1982). Children, the senile, the mentally retarded and mentally ill would
all fall into this second category, and are therefore bearers of rights, who must
be treated with respect. Personal life and mere biological life can be distin-
guished, so that those who have deficient brain functions could be considered
dead. The brain-oriented concept of death for Engelhardt is thus more di-
rectly concerned with personal life. Id. at 98-99.
For another philosopher's discussion of what constitutes the significant
properties of a person, see Joseph Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1972, at 1. Some scholars also suggest that we not
focus on consciousness, but rather on the capacity for social interaction. Re-
becca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual ITlrrnities
and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARiz. L. REV. 373 (1986); Kevin P. Quinn,
The Best Interests of Incompetent Patients: The Capacity for Interpersonal Re-
lationships as a Standard for Decisionma-ing, 76 CATL. REV. 897 (1988);
Rhoden, supra note 74.
For a fascinating exploration of the impact of developments in artificial
intelligence on our sense of what is human, see Steven Goldberg, The Chang-
ing Face of Death: Computers, Consciousness, and Nancy Cruzan, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 659 (1991).
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question implies a deathwatch. Someone must ask that ques-
tion: someone who is treating the dying person; someone who
loves the dying person; someone who is responsible for the dy-
ing person; someone who must justify his decision to himself
and to others. Unlike the medical models that have objective
criteria, here we have value judgments to which we own up. It
is impossible to justify the conclusion by pointing to a chart.
There are no numbers in which to take comfort. Instead, this
question must be answered by an essay--an essay that recog-
nizes dying as a two-part relation, occurring within the context
of a moral community.162 Such an essay would defend the be-
162. Robert Veatch has been a leading proponents of a 'higher brain
death" definition. He relies upon the Judeo-Christian notion of what it means
to be a whole person, affirming that a human is of necessity an integrated unit
of body and mind. One is not interested in
the death of particular cells, organs, or organ systems, but in the
death of the person as a whole .... For purposes of simplicity I shall
use the phrase the capacity for bodily integration to refer to the total
list of integrating mechanisms possessed by the body. A case for these
mechanisms being the ones that are essential to humanness can in-
deed be made. Humans are more than the flowing of fluids. They are
complex, integrated organisms with capacities for internal regulation.
With and only with these integrating mechanisms is homo sapiens re-
ally human.
VEATCH, supmra note 157, at 24. The other higher functions of the brain, how-
ever, such as "consciousness [and] the ability to think and feel and relate to
others," are so essential that "their loss ought to be taken as the death of the
individual." 1d. at 29. Thus Veatch argues that death should be defined as the
"irreversible loss of the embodied capacity for social interaction." Id. at 30.
Even though Veatch has focused on the human body's capacity, he is still
squarely aligned with those who believe that the definition of death is a moral
decision, not a medical one. "[A]II that is at stake in the public policy debate
over the definition of death is determining when death behaviors are appropri-
ate." Id. at 27. Death behaviors are those that society initiates upon the death
of one of its members, such as mourning. In a sense, the deathwatch is just an
overture to subsequent death behaviors.
Two philosophers have criticized Veatch, arguing against basing the defi-
nition of death on moral judgments. They claim that personal identity should
be critical in determining when a person is dead. Michael B. Green & Daniel
Wilder, Brain Death and Personal Identity, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 passim
(1980). Thus "a given person ceases to exist with the destruction of whatever
processes there are which normally underlie that person's psychological con-
tinuity and connectedness." Id. at 127. They characterize their argument as
"ontological," not moral. Id. at 106.
Many excellent articles urge some form of upper brain criteria for death.
See, e.g., David R. Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CoRNELL
L. REV. 850, 879 (1986) ("the inevitability of scientific progress suggests that
the limits of present medical technology are no reason to avoid addressing the
appropriateness of a neocortical death standard"); Deverette, supra note 154,
at 96 (supporting an integrated approach in which upper brain death plays a
key role in defining death).
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havior of one human being toward another.
When faced with the patchwork of the proposed criteria,
the statutes and Uniform Acts,163 and the law reviews and com-
peting medical and philosophical opinions,164 I am at a loss to
make an intelligent proposal for a new definition of death. It is
work better left to those more qualified, and there are plenty of
talented people to thrash out a new definition of death that we
can all live with, or die with.165 And chances are that techno-
163. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 271 (Supp. 1992)
("An individual who has sustained either 1) irreversible cessation of circula-
tory and respiratory functions, or 2) irreversible cessation of all functions of
the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death
must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.").
164. The literature on the issue of defining death is extensive. For an ex-
cellent bibliography on the legal definition of death see, Richard E. Leahy,
Legal Death. A Pathfinder to the Current State of the Law and Its Implica-
tions, 9 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 73 (1989); see also HOWARD BRODY,
ETHICAL DECISIONS IN MEDICINE (2d ed. 1981) (including case studies in text-
book format); HANS JONAS, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: FROM ANCIENT CREED TO
TECHNOLOGICAL MAN 132-40 (1974) (explaining that for practical purposes
brain death defines death, but for higher moral reasons a brain-dead person
still enjoys sacred identity); PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON (1970)
(providing a practical, wide-ranging discussion of death by a Christian ethicist);
Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSO-
PHY & ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43 (William Blackstone ed., 1974) (ascribing
rights to brain-dead individuals); John C. Hoffman, C/art/ying the Debate on
Death, 62 SOUNDINGS 430 (1979) (proposing that the definition of death should
be a primary, rather than secondary, moral consideration).
There is an interesting debate between D. Alan Shewmon and Robert L.
Barry about whether neocortical death is consistent with the metaphysics of
the rationality of the soul in Aquinas. Compare D. Alan Shewmon, The Meta-
physics of Brain Death, Persistent Vegetative State, and Dementia, 49 THOMIST
24 (1985) and D. Alan Shewmon, Ethics and Brain Death." A Response, 61 NEW
SCHOLASTICISM 321 (1987) (asserting that the death of the brainstem provides
substantial changes in the metaphysics of life) with Robert L. Barry, Ethics
and Brain Death, 61 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 82 (1987) (arguing that, brain-dead
or not, human beings retain rational souls and moral rights).
For a thorough discussion of the redefinition debate, see KAREN G. GER-
VAIS, REDEFINING DEATH 159-82 (1986). For an international perspective, see
Christopher Pallis, Brain Stem Death-The Evolution of a Concept, 55
MEDICO-LEGAL J. 84 (1987).
165. Not everyone agrees that finding a definition of death is a worthwhile
endeavor. One commentator argues that the effort expended on a search for a
single definition of death is "wasted at best, counterproductive at worst."
Roger B. Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. L.J. 623, 628 (1973). The question
of whether a death has occurred arises in a number of different contexts:
When may an estate be probated? When does a life estate end? When is a vic-
tim of a crime dead? When can we stop medical treatment? Thus, "it would
be odd indeed if all these different situations were susceptible to resolution by
one definition of death." I&i at 631. 'The simplest solution lies in recognizing
that as there is no need to define death, so too there is no need for the law to
use the term at all.... What is important... are the consequences, not the
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logical advances will make whatever definition we settle on a
temporary solution.
What I do think will happen is this: the Harvard Ad Hoc
Committee criteria from the late 1960s will be discarded for a
definition that includes higher brain function. Just when that
will happen, I do not know, but it does not bother me that we
are moving slowly.16 Although I feel anguish for the members
of the deathwatch, it is a definition that should only be made
after deep reflection. After all, we are searching for the right
words to say: This person is alive. That one is not. The conse-
quences that flow from such a definition are profound: it tells
us what it means to be a human being. We need to be wary of
those words; they must say exactly what we mean them to say.
IV. DEATH THOUGHT, DEATH TALK, AND THE
EVIDENTIARY IMPLICATIONS OF TABOO
WHAT CAN THE LAw Do TO ALLEVIATE INDIRECTLY THE PAIN
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DEATHWATCH?
This second suggestion is not so obvious, although several
others who have looked at the horrors of the late-twentieth-
century deathwatch have hinted at it: The law can lower evi-
dentiary standards regarding conversations about the circum-
stances of one's own death in recognition that the subject is a
taboo in our culture.
Just as the members of the deathwatch hover over a dying
person, so I hover over the subject of death. Death is not a sub-
ject that we meet face to face. We may talk and write around
the subject of death, but we do not gather death into our arms.
conclusory determination." Id at 638. The law should only seek to describe
the circumstances under which given consequences are to flow. For criticism
of these views, see Alexander Capron, The Purpose of Death: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Dworkin, 48 IND. L.J. 640 (1973).
Another writer points out that even if we redefined death to include pa-
tients in a persistent vegatative state, "it will be of no use in addressing the
dilemmas of dying for patients in less fully debilitated conditions." Daniel
Wilder, Not Dead, Not Dying? Ethical Categories and Persistent Vegatative
State, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 41, 47.
166. It is not only probable, but highly desirable that society should
proceed with the greatest caution and deliberation in proposing proce-
dures that in any serious way threaten the traditional sanctity of the
individual life. As a consequence, society will certainly move very
slowly in developing formal arrangements for taking into account the
interests of others in life-and-death decisions.
Robert Morison, Death: Process or Event, 173 ScIENcE 694, 698 (1971).
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We do not feel its weight against our bodies; we do not look it
in the eye. Instead, like strangers moving in and out of build-
ings, we brush up against death as we go about our business.
Casual, unintentional encounters that do not implicate gravity.
Oblique, fleeting encounters on other thresholds; silent nods in
death's direction without the risk of intimacy.
We had the conversation many years before his death.
It was one of those close nights in August when the house
was too small to hold us. My father and I had escaped together
to the backyard. We were sitting on deck chairs in the dark,
listening to the melancholy chchchchchch of the locusts. Our
gray cat had appeared from nowhere to join us, sitting silently
on the edge of the ravine, his eyes flashing green and golden
from some unknown source of nocturnal light. There was no
breeze, but the evening air had an edge of coolness to it, a hint
on the back of the arms that summer was coming to an end.
The planet had started to tip backwards, away from the sun,
and we were together on that journey, my father and I, those
rasping locusts, and our cat. My mother was out singing
somewhere.
I do not remember what book I was lost in that summer,
but it was probably Jung. It does not really matter. I think
everyone has an August night in his life where some book gen-
erates questions about the soul.167
I asked my father if he believed in the human soul. His re-
sponse was, as usual, Aristotelian.
"Yes," he said. "I believe in some spirit that lives and ani-
mates my body."
167. Those who read books passionately, and survive, often have many
such August nights throughout their lives. The first few are the most memo-
rable, however, due to the tenderness of one's tissue and one's susceptability to
beauty and pain. One of my favorite accounts of growing up in the Midwest
during the 1950s, or of growing up anywhere, reading books and looking at
things intensely, is Annie Dillard's An American Childhood. Dillard describes
the subversive influence of books on the young, how what she
sought in books was a world whose surfaces, whose people and events
and days lived, actually matched the exaltation of the interior life.
There you could live.
Those of us who read carried around with us like martyrs a secret
knowledge, a secret joy, and a secret hope. There is a life worth living
where history is still taking place; there are ideas worth dying for,
and circumstances where courage is still prized. This life could be
found and joined, like the Resistance.
ANNIE Du-4RD, AN AMERicAN CHILDHOOD 183 (1987).
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"And what will happen to that spirit when you die?" I pur-
sued the subject, curious to hear his answer.
'What do you mean, 'What will happen'?" My father
leaned over and picked up his beer that was nestled in the grass
by his chair. "I don't think anything will happen. It will die
when my body dies."
"That's it? You go and it goes?" I was disappointed, since I
had recently come to a different conclusion and was seeking
ratification.
"Yes, that's it. I am just a biological creature who lives in a
body with a finite life span, and when it is over, I'll close my
eyes and die. Then I suppose, my body will be cremated, and
you can sprinkle me in the ravine. It'll be good for the tril-
lium." He laughed softly and took a swig of beer. "I'll finally
be useful."
"I think there's more to it." I was shy to reveal my new
beliefs, even to my father, particularly to my father.
"I expect you do, sweetie girl. That's because I am an Aris-
totelian, and you are not."
I was annoyed. My father had picked up several theories
from his undergraduate education, and one of them was that
there were two kinds of people in the world: those who be-
longed to the Aristotelian tradition and those who belonged to
the Platonic tradition. It may well have been a useful tool with
which to analyze his fellow man, but my father's theory had
worn thin on his family. He brought it out all the time, and
much to our annoyance, it seemed universally applicable.
My brother rebelled against the theory with a counterthe-
ory designed to drive my father to distraction. There are two
kinds of people in the world, my brother would say: those who
believe there are two kinds of people in the world, and those
who do not.
It has been a rough century for talk about the human soul.
In the early part of this century, the positivists carved meta-
physics out of philosophic discourse, and devoted themselves to
that which is knowable by our senses, one through five.168 Nor
168. The most famous articulation of philosophy's rejection of such meta-
physical subjects as the future and past of the human soul is found in Alfred J.
Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. He begins by criticizing the "metaphysical
thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the
world of science and common sense." ALFRED J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH
AND LOGIC 33 (1952). Metaphysicians produce sentences which are not verifia-
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does the law talk much about the human soul, except in the
context of one's constitutional freedom to maintain beliefs
about religion.169 And the medical profession is renowned for
its reticence on spiritual matters, for keeping its gaze focused
on the human body and not on what animates it.170
ble by empirical evidence. While many metaphysical passages may have aes-
thetic or moral value,
[w]hat is important to us is to realize that even the utterances of the
metaphysician who is attempting to expound a vision are literally
senseless; so that henceforth we may pursue our philosophical
researches with as little regard for them as for the more inglorious
kind of metaphysics which comes from a failure to understand the
workings of our language.
Id at 45.
For a more modern treatment of the subject of the human soul see
THoMAS NAGEI, Death, in MORTAL QUESTIONs 1 (1979). Nagel discusses the
observation of Lucretius that it is irrational to fear death, since death is just
the mirror image of our prenatal experience, and "no one finds it disturbing to
contemplate the eternity preceding his own birth." I&. at 7. Nagel argues that
"if death is an evil, it is the loss of life, rather than the state of being dead, or
nonexistent, or unconscious, that is objectionable. This asymmetry is impor-
tant." IM at 3.
I am not as certain as Nagel that prenatal and posthumous nonexistence
are not analogous. But then, Nagel expressly wants to "leave aside the ques-
tion whether we are, or might be, immortal in some form," id- at 1, and as-
sumes, for example, that "none of us existed before we were born (or
conceived), but few regard that as a misfortune." I&. at 3. He also rather cava-
lierly states that "almost everyone would be indifferent (other things being
equal) between immediate death and immediate coma followed by death
twenty years later without reawakening." I& at 2.
169. The Court first articulated the "action-belief" doctrine in Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In that case, George Reynolds, private secre-
tary to Brigham Young, appealed his conviction under the Morrill Act for
practicing polygamy in the Territories. Reynolds argued that it was his reli-
gious duty to practice polygamy, and "that the failing or refusing to practice
polygamy by such male members of said church, when circumstances would
admit, would be punished, and that the penalty for such failure and refusal
would be damnation in the life to come." I&. at 161. The Court upheld the
Morrill Act, announcing that the First Amendment makes freedom of belie
absolute, but not freedom to act based on that belief. Although laws may not
directly "interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices." Id at 166. Thus, the law purposefully does not discuss the sub-
stance of an individual's beliefs about such things as the immortality of the
soul, except perhaps to allude to them in the presentation of the facts.
170. This probably stems from the fact that medicine in this century is
viewed as a branch of science. Thus, like the positivists, the medical profession
is only interested in phenomena which are empirically verifiable.
Physicians-as-scientists view their functions (observation, identifica-
tion, description, investigation, and explanation of natural phenom-
ena) within the theoretical confines of their discipline. They usually
accept the notion of scientific law as a formulation of observed recur-
rences, order, relationships, or interactions of natural phenomena.
Even the theories to which they turn, while not, by definition, based
[Vol. 77:1
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Our collective reticence, however, does not mean that the
subject is a dead one, not of vital importance to understanding
the various attitudes towards the late-twentieth-century death-
watch. The pressures of intellectual fashion may push our
thoughts about the human soul below the water's surface, but
submersion does not necessarily mean drowning. Our theory of
ensoulment may still have enormous influence on our moral,
legal, and medical behavior, even if those thoughts do not
breathe the air.
Most of us believe in some theory of ensoulment, however
inchoate, and with apologies to my brother, my father was
probably right: We do each belong to either the Aristotelian or
Platonic tradition. I first read the Phaedo'71 when I was seven-
teen. It was my season for leaving home, for shedding old be-
liefs and acquiring new ones, for pulling up the window shades
to let the light flood in. In such a period of intellectual growth
I first met Plato's theory of ensoulment. It had a great impact
on me then, and although I do not embrace all of it now, his
theory still represents a rough version of spiritual truth for me.
Plato viewed man as having a dual nature; he is a compos-
ite being, consisting of a corporeal element, the body, and an in-
corporeal element, the soul. During our temporal existence,
the soul is seen as attached to or incorporated in the physical
matter of the human body.172 Plato always emphasized the ele-
ment of control of the soul over the body.173 The soul is viewed
directly on observable phenomena, must ultimately be validated by
reference to confirmed experimental law-to observably simple and
definitely true statements about the nature or behavior of natural
phenomena.
Joan M. Gibson & Robert L. Schwartz, Physicians and Lawyers: Science, Ar4
and Conflict, 6 AM. J.L. & MED. 173, 178 (1980).
171. Phaedo, supra note 31.
172. In the Phaedo, Socrates characterized the body as an "endless trouble
to us." Id at 120. Our souls are infected with the evils of the body, with its
lusts, appetites for foods and "fancies of all kinds," and susceptibility to dis-
ease. Id Worse yet, the body is "always breaking in upon us," causing turmoil
and confusion in our enquiries, so that we are prevented from knowing the
truth. Id- at 121. One can only achieve knowledge of Plato's essential forms
through a separation of the soul from the foolishness of the body-
It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure
knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body-the soul in her-
self must behold things in themselves: and then we shall attain the
wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers; not
while we live, but after death ....
Id-
173. In the Alcibiades, Socrates distinguished between the user and the
thing used. PLATo, ALCIBIADES, 7eprinted in BODY, MIND AND DEATH 34, 36
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as a navigator of a seagoing vessel. Upon death, the true essen-
tial person survives because of his identification with the im-
mortal substance of the soul. Death is seen as a liberation.
Once freed from the prison of its physical form, the incorporeal
soul is capable of existing on its own, in one form of immortal
life or another.' 74 For this reason, Socrates can show indiffer-
ence at the end of the Phaedo when Crito asks him how to bury
his body: "In any way you like; but you must get hold of me,
and take care that I do not run away from you."'175 Crito is not
to be sorrowful as he buries the body of Socrates, because the
soul of Socrates shall not remain, but go away and depart.176
Here is where Plato and I part company. He had an elabo-
rate theory of the transmigration of souls in which I have never
been able to believe.'7 But it really does not matter what
(Anthony Flew ed., 1964) Analogizing to a shoemaker or a harpist, he noted
the difference between the artisan or artist and the tools or instruments that
he uses. Similarly, the true essence of the artisan or artist differs from the
hands and eyes he uses to carry out his work. Because a man uses his body, he
must therefore be something different from his body. The user of the body,
Socrates concluded, must be the soul. I& at 36-37.
174. This is particularly true of the philosophic soul:
That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world-to
the divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she is secure
of bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears
and wild passions and all other human ills, and forever dwells, as they
say of the initiated, in company with the gods.
Phaedo, supra note 31, at 141. If I turn out not to have a philosophic soul, and
Plato's theory of the transmigration of souls turns out to' be right, I can only
hope that I will return to this earth as a cat in my own home. They really
have it good.
175. I& at 186.
176. Id
177. According to Socrates, what happens to the soul after death depends
upon the degree of its purity at the time of departure. The philosophical soul
who has striven during life to overcome the body in its quest for knowledge of
the forms will be delivered to a divine, rational and immortal world. Id. at
141. The impure, polluted soul who remained in love with the body has an-
other fate, however. After death, such a depressed soul may be dragged down
to the visible world and be left to wander among the graves and sepulchers,
still longing for the corporeal world. Eventually these doomed souls will be
imprisoned in another body. Their physical forms, Socrates warned, will be of
the same nature as in their former lives. Thus, men who were gluttonous
drunkards would pass into the bodies of asses and other lowly animals. The
unjust, tyrannical and violent would pass into the bodies of wolves, hawks, or
kites. I& at 143. The temperate and just souls would pass into the bodies of
social creatures, such as wasps or ants, or back again into the physical form of
man. From these happier souls would spring the just and moderate men of
the future. I&
Milton similarly described the fate of the depressed souls of impure, lust-
ful men:
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either Plato or I believe about the afterlife. What will happen
upon our deaths will happen. We will just have to wait and see.
What does matter, at least with respect to how we perceive our
own deaths, is that we believe something will happen when we
take our last breath. We can face our deaths with some degree
of equanimity and curiosity because of our belief in the soul's
immortality.
But for many people who live in the late twentieth cen-
tury, this is not the case.178 Like my father, they are Aristote-
lians. Aristotle was a biologist. He did not consider the soul to
be in any sense a separate substance or entity, but rather the
form of a particular living body.179 The soul-as-form stands in
[B]ut when lust,
By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk,
But most by lewd and lavish act of sin,
Lets in defilement to the inward parts,
The soul grows clotted by contagion,
Embodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose,
The divine property of her first being.
Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp
Oft seen in charnel, vaults, and sepulchers
Lingering, and sitting by new-made grave,
As loath to leave the body that it loved,
And linked itself by carnal sensuality
To a degenerate and degraded state.
JOHN MiLTON, "Comus," in THE POEMs OF JOHN MiLTON 168, 199-200 (John
Carey & Alastair Fowler eds., Longmans 1966) (1634).
Plato also provides a procedure for transmigration. After death, the soul
of each person would be led to a gathering place for the dead in order to be
judged on its former life. After judgment, the soul would be guided into the
world below to "receive their due and remain their time." Phaedo, supra note
31, at 177. Eventually, another guide would bring the soul back to the visible
world "after many revolutions of ages." I Each soul would then be assigned
to another physical form, a fitting habitation according to its degree of purity.
178. It is difficult to say whether this century's decline in formal religious
activities in many industrialized Western nations represents both a decline in
religious practice as well as a decline in beliefs. Writing about the Christian
tradition in England, one commentator suggested that the crisis in religious
belief belongs more to "religious intellectuals," while "[s]omething like half of
British people appear to believe in an after-life." Ninian Smart, Death and the
Decline of Religion in Western Society, in MAN'S CONCERN WITH DEATH,
supra note 25, at 138, 140.
Smart attributes the intellectual crisis to three main roots, the second be-
ing "the effect of certain aspects of scientific thinking upon traditional ways of
formulating Christian belief." Id. at 139. Scientific thinking had shaped my
father's views on immortality, and I would suspect has also shaped the views
of most members of the medical profession.
179. Aristotle started from the following principle, which ran through most
of earlier Greek thought. the soul makes living things alive. ARIsToTLE, DE
ANIMA 8-9 (John L. Ackrill ed. & David W. Hamlyn trans., 1968) [hereinafter
DE ANIMA]. He was concerned, as a "student of nature," with all general
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the same relationship to the physical body that the configura-
tion of a statue stands to the materials from which it is made.1s°
As such, the soul is inseparable from the body.' 8 ' Aristotle left
no room in his theory for the immortality of the soul. Once the
body had lost its vitality, it had also lost its soul. Body and soul
were so intimately entwined that they live and die together. 8 2
What I have presented is a rather crude dichotomy. I have
only touched upon two traditions, and at that, in a very cursory
fashion.1 s3 Furthermore, I have confined myself to the frame-
forms of life, not just with the human soul. According to Aristotle, the soul is
the form of a living body, or "the first actuality of a natural body which has
organs." Id. at 9. The first actuality seems to be some sort of potentiality.
Thus to speak of the soul is to speak of "the potentialities which a living thing
has for different forms of life." David W. Hamlyn, Introduction to DE ANIMA,
supra, at x. These potentialities include the various faculties of living things:
nutrition, reproduction, awareness, and rational thought. Aristotle believed
they formed a hierarchy, with the higher functions being dependent upon
those below. I at xi.
180. "Hence too we should not ask whether the soul and body are one, any
more than whether the wax and the impression are one, or in general whether
the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one." DE
ANImA, supra note 179, at 9.
181. "That, therefore, the soul or certain parts of it, if it is divisible, cannot
be separated from the body is quite clear;, for in some cases the actuality is of
the parts themselves." 1d. at 10.
182. This account of Aristotle's beliefs regarding the immortality of the
soul is unavoidably simplistic. True, Aristotle concluded "the soul does not ex-
ist without a body and yet is not itself a kind of body. For it is not a body, but
something which belongs to a body, and for this reason exists in a body ...."
Id at 14. Other passages in De Ani ma, however, suggest that personal immor-
tality exists in some fashion due to the "eternal" nature of the active intellect.
In discussing the active and passive intellect, Aristotle referred to the active
intellect as "immortal and eternal." Id. at 60. Hamlyn suggested that the text
of this passage may be corrupt. DE ANiKA, supra note 179, translator's notes
at 141. Taking the "least extravagant" interpretation, "Aristotle provides no
grounds here for any kind of belief in personal immortality." Id. at 142. Not
all scholars agree, however, and there have been many conflicting interpreta-
tions of this passage. Even with these multiple interpretations of Aristotle, "it
is illuminating to regard Aristotle as the archetypal protagonist of the alterna-
tive and opposite view of the nature of man, even though he was neither so
consistent nor so wholehearted a monist as Plato was dualist." Antony Flew,
Introduction to BODY, MIND AND DEATH, supra note 173, at 1, 9.
183. For example, I have not even alluded to Descartes, a more modern
philosopher who fits squarely within the Platonic tradition. Like Plato,
Descartes believed that "our soul is in its nature entirely independent of the
body, and in consequence it is not liable to die with it." RENE DESCARTES, DIs-
COURSE ON METHOD (Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., 1931) (1637),
quoted in BODY, MIND AND DEATH, supra note 173, at 129. As a student of
physiology, Descartes departed from the Platonic tradition with his interest in
science and mechanical principles. He equated living bodies with machines.
Man-made automatons and brutes were considered pure machines, while man
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work of Western culture, not even nodding above the line to
the competing belief systems that exist in large parts of the
world. L84 Thus even on the level of abstraction, what I have
said about theories of ensoulment is fragmentary, and only a
partial picture of how humans have come to regard the human
soul and its immortality.
But the deficiencies in my discussion go even deeper than
that, and they are beyond my control. I have only dealt with
the matter of the soul on the level of abstraction, and there is
much more to it than that. It is one thing to subscribe to meta-
physics on an intellectual level, and another to believe in it con-
was seen as a machine with a mind. What distinguished automatons and brute
animals from human beings was the faculty of reason possessed by the latter.
An automaton, for example, would be unable to make appropriate responses
to the wide range of life events confronting even "the lowest type of man." I&
at 127. Brute animals reacted only from the "disposition of their organs," not
from reason. I at 129. Furthermore, brute animals and automatons differed
from man in their inability to arrange words and form statements by which
they could make known their thoughts. This emphasis on consciousness and
the ability to use language as the criterion of thought was distinctly Cartesian.
"It is to Descartes and not to Plato that we owe the typically modern view...
of the problem of body and mind as the problem of the relations between con-
sciousness and the brain." Flew, supra note 182, at 24.
In this century, Gilbert Ryle challenged this traditional Cartesian dualism,
which he calls the dogma of the "ghost in the machine." GILBERT RYLE, THE
CONCEPT OF MIND 15-16 (1949). Mental and bodily activities are not separate
and independent. Rather, when a person performs bodily in an appropriate
way, we can regard this as a display of intelligence instead of the basis for an
inference that there is some internal, invisible ghost who is running the
machine. Id. at 22.
At least with respect to my thoughts about death, my interest in Plato's
theory of ensoulment, as well as in Descartes' theory, has more to do with the-
ology than with the philosophy of mind.
184. The Buddhist doctrine of rebirth, for example, differs dramatically
from traditional Western concepts of the afterlife:
[The individual is regarded as virtually everlasting, unless and until
he attains liberation (nirvana), when there will be no more rebirth.
The individual comes through a vast succession of previous existences,
and will continue thus so long as he remains in the grip of craving and
spiritual ignorane .... the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth ... does not
involve belief in a soul. There is no permanent self underlying physi-
cal and mental states.
Ninian Smart, Attitudes towards Death in Eastern Religions, in MAN'S CON-
CERN wrrH DEATH, supra note 25, at 95, 96. Nirvana means the replacement of
the imperfect states which make up the individual by a permanent state in
which there is no person. The death of the individual is "the most fearsome
sign of the impermanence and ill-fare of the world," and the prospect facing
the individual is seen "negatively as a succession of deaths." Id at 97. Thus
one should not hope to attain individual immortality, but to transcend it. Nir-
vana is sometimes described as the "deathless place," since it is "beyond the
realm of change and therefore of individual existence." Id.
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sistently. It is possible to subscribe to Plato's views about the
immortality of the soul in the daylight, and break out in an Ar-
istotelian sweat in the middle of the night.
In fact, most of us do all right when the death talk is on
the level of abstraction. We all know that death is a part of the
human condition and this fact does sometimes enter into our
conversations (although it is not a frequent intruder). No one
invites the subject to come in, but no one denies it admission
when it shows up at the back door, either.
But talk about a real death is another matter. That kind of
talk is different.l as And most of us never talk about our own
deaths at all, except to ourselves, in the dark, in the dampness
of that Aristotelian sweat. Even then, the subject of our own
death usually never makes a formal appearance. It does not be-
come incorporated in our nocturnal dialogue about undone
tasks, unpaid bills, the randomness of tornadoes coming our
way. Rather, the subject of our own death waits outside, and
looks longingly in through the window. It casts a shadow on all
our other talk, and the darkness it sheds magnifies our little
worries into grave concerns. It is not really talk about our own
death, but non-talk. By not letting it into our sentences, even
those muttered to the self at night, we try to deny that it is
there.1 8s We cannot find the words to say that we might die
185. Ghassan Kanafani, a modem Arabic writer, noted the difference be-
tween talking about death in the abstract and talking about an actual death:
What I want to talk to you about is death. Death that takes place in
front of you, not about that death of which one merely hears. The
difference between the two types of death is immeasurable and can-
not be appreciated by someone who has not been a witness to a
human being clutching at the coverlet of his bed with all the strength
of his trembling fingers in order to resist that terrible slipping into
extinction, as though the coverlet can pull him back from that colos-
sus who, little by little, wrests from his eyes this life about which we
know scarcely anything.
Ghassan Kanafani, The Death of Bed Number 12, reprinted in MODERN
ARABIC SHORT STORIES, 28, 29 (Denys Johnson-Davies ed. & trans., Heine-
mann 1976).
186. Due to our narcissism and inability to conceive of ourselves not ex-
isting, "[i]n the unconscious every one of us is convinced of his own immortal-
ity." 14 SIGMUND FREUD, Thoughts for the Times of War and Death (1915), in
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS 273, 298 (James
Strachey et al. eds. & trans., Hogarth Press 1957). 'Whenever we attempt to
[conceive of our nonexistance] we can perceive that we are, in fact, still pres-
ent as spectators." Id at 289.
For a study of Western attitudes toward death, see ERNEST BECKER, THE
DENIAL OF DEATH (1973). "[Tihe idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the
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today.
This denial of our own death, and the resulting silence that
surrounds the subject, came to be of more than academic inter-
est for me.
Richard worked in the law library at school, and while at
first I did not know him very well, he had helped me on several
research projects. He was a gifted reference librarian, curious
and intuitive. He was also very sick. He had started out with
the flu one winter, and his fever would not go away. It hung
around for weeks and weeks, and when the doctor finally ran
some blood tests, it turned out that Richard had lymphoma- He
was thirty-one years old.
For months, Richard was in and out of the hospital for
chemotherapy. During one dark period, his left lung suddenly
collapsed, and he ended up on a respirator in the ICU. He re-
covered, however, or so it seemed, and eventually came back to
work. One sticky afternoon in July, I was invited back to tech-
nical services to celebrate a staff member's birthday. It was the
usual fare: Carmella's cupcakes, Hawaiian punch, matching
cups and napkins from Woolworth, and a funny card signed by
everyone. Richard and I sat together, perched on a cool radia-
tor. I asked him how he was feeling.
"Fine, I guess. Tired. Okay, but really tired."
Then we talked about a movie I had just seen, and some-
thing else that I don't remember. It was crowded in the room,
and festive. People were milling around, laughing, talking, jug-
gling cupcakes on their knees. I was about to get off the radia-
tor and get some more Hawaiian punch when I heard Richard
say, "I'd like to get one of those documents you were doing re-
human animal like nothing else: it is a mainspring of human activity-activity
designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in
some way that it is the final destiny for man." Id at ix. Becker devotes much
of the book to showing that the fear of death is universal.
The fear of our own death is so great that we actually repress the idea:
Therefore in normal times we move about actually without ever be-
lieving in our own death, as if we fully believed in our own corporeal
immortality. We are intent on mastering death .... A man will say,
of course, that he knows he will die some day, but he does not really
care. He is having a good time with living, and he does not think
about death and does not care to bother about it-but this is a purely
intellectual, verbal admission. The affect of fear is repressed.
IcL at 17 (quoting Gregory Zilboorg, Fear of Death, 12 PSYCHOANALYTIc Q. at
468-71 (1943)).
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search on last year. You know, one of those living wills."'1 7
"Oh, sure." I tried to sound casual.
"You know, just in case. I don't know if you knew it or
not, but last spring my lung collapsed and they put me on a res-
pirator. I don't ever want to be on one of those things again.
Ever. I would rather just die."1s He said all of this rather
matter-of-factly, but did not look at me. I did not know what to
say, so I just rattled the ice cubes in my paper cup. "So any-
how," he said after an awkward silence, "I'd like to get one of
those."
"I'm sure we can find a living will form somewhere in the
collection. I don't have one, Richard, but they aren't hard to
find."
"Okay, I'll look." And that was all he said.
Richard and I had many subsequent conversations during
that summer, but he never again mentioned the living will. He
continued to work in the law library until the middle of
August, when his fever came back to haunt him. His recovery
had been an illusion. He went into the hospital for more tests,
and stayed for some experimental chemotherapy. One Monday
187. The living will is a written directive, executed while the patient is
competent, stating preferences about such things as termination of life-support
systems and withdrawal of food in the event the patient later became incompe-
tent. In some states, the requirements for valid living wills, including sample
forms, can be found in what are called "Natural Death Acts." California en-
acted the first such statute in 1976. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-
7194.5 (West Supp. 1992). The various state acts that followed California's lead
as of 1983 are listed in the PRESIDENT'S CoMMissIoN, supra note 74, app. D at
309-87.
The President's Commission suggested an alternative to natural death
acts, the durable power of attorney statute. See id. at 145-47. With a power of
attorney, the patient appoints an agent to act on his behalf. At common law,
the power terminated when the principal became incapacitated. To avoid this
result, many states enacted statutes allowing the agent's authority to continue
if the principal becomes incompetent. This allows the agent to make medical
decisions for the incompetent patient, including the decision to terminate life-
support systems. Over 40 states now have some form of '"iving will" legisla-
tion, "right to die" legislation, "natural death acts," or "durable power of attor-
ney" statutes. The statutes vary considerably. See Judith Areen, Advance
Directives Under State Law and Judicial Decisions, 19 LAw, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 91 (1991) (summarizing various statutes); see also UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE
TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L-A. 96 (Supp. 1989).
188. One study suggests that most patients and family members (70%) who
had experienced intensive care treatment were completely certain that they
would do so again to prolong life for any period, including only one month.
Marion Danis, M.D. et al., Patients' and Families' Preferences for Medical In-
tensive Care, 260 JAMA 797, 800 (1988). Thus Richard may have been in the
minority of patients who had spent time in an ICU.
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morning I came into the library to learn that Richard was again
in the ICU. On a respirator.
I called his mother to see how he was, and she said that
when Richard's lungs had failed him, the doctors had put him
back on the respirator. He was acutely agitated, and seemed to
want to tell her something. Richard had written my name on
the chalkboard that the nurses had given him to communicate.
She wondered if I knew why, and I told her of our conversation
of several months back, sitting on the radiator in technical serv-
ices at a staff member's birthday party. She was frantic. There
was nothing she could do for her son, and she wanted to do
something. Anything.
Could I bring one of those living wills to the hospital?
I went to the card catalog, and within a few minutes I
found a book with the living will form. I photocopied it, and
brought the form to the hospital, and his mother led me into
the ICU. Richard was lying all alone in a dark cubicle. From
the eyes down, the respirator had taken over his face, making
him look like some kind of exotic, elephantine creature.189
With each pseudobreath, it inflated him over and over again,
jerking him across the bed as if he were the marionette of some
mad puppeteer. What I saw was violence, and a total, complete
absence of control.
As far as I could tell, when I engaged his eyes, Richard
seemed happy to see me, and nodded when I showed him the
living will. I could get no one to witness its execution. The
nurses had been instructed not to participate in the signing of
any documents, and I was referred to the hospital's Legal De-
partment. It all seemed so pointless there in the corridor of the
ICU, staring at an empty form whose legal effect was dubious
to begin with,190 its purpose already defeated, and my friend
189. The fact that a respirator is attached to the human face through a
green plastic mask from which protrudes a long green elephantine tube is dif-
ficult to ignore. Masks transform the human body into something else. These
transformations often occur in fairy tales, where animals can change into
human beings, or human beings into animals. "The transformation of one
thing into another is the specialty of the so-called demons." SCHILDER, supra
note 57, at 205. Watching such a transformation of a familiar face can be a dis-
turbing experience.
190. At the time of Richard's illness, New York had no legislation recogniz-
ing advance directives for medical treatment. The New York Court of Ap-
peals, however, had given effect to prior oral statements where there was
uncontested evidence that the patient had indicated his views regarding the re-
moval of life-support systems before becoming incompetent. In re Storar, 420
N.E.2d 64,72 (N.Y.), cerL denied sub n Storar v. Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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Richard exactly where he did not want to be. But his mother
was looking at me with such expectation, as if by witnessing the
signing of the living will, we could somehow make Richard live.
And Richard had nodded.
So I got a pen, and we smoothed the document over the
chalk board, and Richard signed the damned thing. He slipped
into a coma that afternoon, and was dead before the sun went
down. He never got off the respirator.
With the fierce egocentricity of a survivor, I felt responsi-
ble. I should have pursued that conversation, and have often
asked myself why I did not. It would have taken just a few
minutes to go to the card catalog on that sticky day in July and
find Richard a living will form, the same few minutes it had
taken on the day that he died.
Perhaps it was the informality of the occasion: Carmella's
cupcakes and the Hawaiian Punch. Perhaps it was the tenuous-
ness of our relationship: a friend I knew from work. Perhaps
it was my own inability to deal with the request: denial of
Richard's death and of my own. Perhaps I just did the wrong
thing.
I have had to live with that failure for a long time. Richard
died over eight years ago. Eventually I gave up blaming myself
for those last few days he spent on a respirator in the ICU. If
he really had felt that strongly about life-support systems, I
told myself, he would have gotten the living will forms himself.
After all, he certainly had the research skills. Besides, there
were many times after that conversation on the radiator at
which Richard could have broached the subject, and did not. It
was up to him to instigate the conversation, not me. I was just
a co-worker, not his lawyer or best friend. Such were my
rationalizations.
I have often wondered why Richard chose me to reveal his
thoughts to about the respirator. Perhaps he knew the nature
of my research, and assumed that I would be able to find a liv-
ing will. That seemed like a logical explanation, but just be-
neath the layer of words that sought to make sense of things, it
The court authorized the removal of a respirator based on this uncontested ev-
idence and on the ground that the common law permitted a competent patient
the right to decline medical treatment. I& at 70, 72. Thus, at the time Richard
requested the living will, there was no statutory authority for its recognition,
although common law precedent gave effect to prior statements regarding in-
tent. Since that time, New York has passed a statute providing for the ap-
pointment of a health care agent and proxy. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980-
94 (McKinney Supp. 1992).
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made no sense at all. I might be able to follow a map in the law
library, but Richard was a cartographer. Perhaps he chose me
because there was no risk in his revelation. It was an opportu-
nity to speak the truth, without suffering the consequences.
Speaking the truth is never cheap. It always costs somebody
something.1 91
Why had he not told his mother how he felt about the res-
pirator? Under almost any scenario, his mother was the one
who would be there at the moment of decision; she was certain
to be a member of his deathwatch. She would have been in the
best position to carry out his intent.
But would she? I did not know Richard's mother well,
though well enough to know something of her despair. Richard
may well have calculated the cost of telling the truth to his
mother and decided that it was too high. Not only would the
conversation itself have been incredibly painful, with its im-
plicit acceptance of failure, but carrying out his intent might
also have been too much for her to bear. It was a heavy burden
to place on a mother, instructing her not to put her son on a
life-support system when she was clinging to his life. Also,
Richard's request might have interrupted the flow of her
prayers, and he might not have wanted to do that.
The fact was that Richard did not want to die. He found
the contemplation of his own death a terrifying thing. He
called me once, late at night, before his last hospitalization, and
wanted to know whether I believed in God. I think he was
under the misapprehension that I was a rational person, and
that if a rational person could believe in God, then maybe he
could too. I was not up to the task. My own beliefs were so idi-
osyncratic that I could not give Richard what he needed, a
transfusion of faith. During the course of that conversation,
however, I discovered how truly frightened he was. Here was
someone who had not come to terms with his own mortality.
That was probably not unusual for a man age thirty-one, but
his illness had taken Richard's rather commonplace fears and
elevated them into a spiritual crisis. He needed to talk to
someone.
191. I have always been leery of our enshrinement of the truth as the ulti-
mate ideal. One of my favorite quotes comes from Otto Rank "[Flor the time
being I gave up writing-there is already too much truth in the world--an
overproduction which apparently cannot be consumed!" JESSIE TAFT, OTro
RANK 175 (1958) (quoting a letter from Otto Rank to Jessie Taft (Feb. 8,
1933)).
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In our culture, the subject of death-in particular, one's
own death-is a taboo.192 Richard was in a panic, but custom-
ary patterns of conversation did not provide him with a grace-
ful way to initiate talk about that panic. He once made an
appointment with a priest in the hospital, but it was a man he
did not know, the priest was in a hurry, and Richard was very
shy.
Besides, talk about our own death rarely takes place in a
formal setting. It does not wear a tuxedo, the way we dress up
our words in drafting a will, when we commit to writing what
we want done with our property. Talk about what we want
done with our bodies in the event of terminal illness and in-
competency almost always wears blue jeans and a T-shirt, and
is spoken softly, in casual, even haphazard, circumstances. Too
much fear and superstition surround those words, and they
cannot bear much scrutiny. After all, to the speaker of those
words, there is a risk in saying them. F6r Richard, to articulate
his intent about life-support systems was to ensure the inevita-
bility of their use. To say those words was to make them come
true.
Is it any wonder, given the climatic conditions, that there
was no rain, that no words of intent showered down upon his
mother, his doctor, or his lawyer in written form, or public, oral
declarations? Is it any wonder that Richard chose to reveal
himself to someone he did not know very well, at a birthday
party at work, while sitting on a radiator?
Now here is the wonder: that Richard managed to crack
the hard, dry surface of his silence at all.
192. A taboo is
1) A prohibition excluding something from use, approach, or mention
because of its sacred and violable nature. 2) An object, word, or act
protected by such a prohibition. 3) A ban or inhibition attached to
something by social custom or emotional aversion. 4) Belief in or
conformity to religious or social prohibitions. 5) A proscription de-
vised and observed by any group for its own protection--azj., Ex-
cluded or forbidden by use, approach, or mention ....
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1236 (2d ed.
1975).
Radcliffe-Brown wrote that the English word taboo derives from the Poly-
nesian word, tabu, which means simply "to forbid" or "forbidden" and can ap-
ply to any sort of prohibition. Thus, the word may express a rule of etiquette,
a chief's order, or an injunction to children not to touch something. ALFun
R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, STRUCrURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY 133
(1952).
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There is a direct relationship between our theory of ensoul-
ment and our attitude toward death. If we subscribe to some
version of the Platonic tradition, and truly believe in spiritual
immortality, then we might welcome death, or at least face it
with stoic resignation. But if we believe in the Aristotelian no-
tion that our soul will be buried with the body, that could in-
deed create a dark, moist environment in which the wild
orchids of desperation might grow.
These are generalizations, of course, but I make them just
the same.193 I am aware there are exceptions. For example,
one could believe in an afterlife, and also in eternal damnation.
Then, depending upon one's propensity to sin, the contempla-
tion of death could inspire holy terror. Similarly, I have known
some peaceful and content Aristotelians. My father was an ex-
ample. It really did not seem to bother him that someday he
might end up fertilizing the trillium. Still, I think the general-
izations are more true than not. Beliefs about the soul's contin-
uation, or lack thereof, affect our attitude towards death. This
is not a very ambitious claim.
There is also a direct relationship between our attitude to-
ward death and its status as a taboo subject. A taboo is some-
thing forbidden, and taboos come in many different forms.
They may be proscriptions against certain behaviors,. 94 or
against eating certain foods, 195 or touching certain sacred or
193. One of my favorite essays by Joseph Epstein is about the virtues of
generalizations and their importance to "civilized discourse." Perhaps I am so
fond of the essay because he used as an example a variant of my father's gen-
eralization about people falling into two categories. "[Tihere is something ap-
pealing in the finitude of them. If there are only two types or categories or
kinds-or even if there are four or five-then the world suddenly seems so
much more intellectually manageable." JOSEPH EPSTEIN, But I Generalize, in
THE MIDDLE OF MY TETHER, FAmmaAR ESSAYS 189, 199 (1983).
194. Some of our behaviors, thought to be motivated by superstitions, are
in fact motivated by a taboo. For example, in contemporary England, a person
who spills salt is considered unlucky, but can avoid misfortune by throwing
salt over his shoulder. RADCI=FE-BROWN, supra note 192, at 135. "[Ie...
takes precautions and goes through a ritual in order that he may escape the
danger and be restored to his former ritual status." I-
195. The biblical rules found in Leviticus and Deuteronomy are perfect ex-
amples of dietary proscriptions.
Every animal that parts the hoof and has the hoof cloven in two, and
chews the cud, among the animals you may eat. Yet of those that
chew the cud or have the hoof cloven you shall not eat these: the
camel, the hare, and the rock badger, because they chew the cud but
do not part the hoof, are unclean for you. And the swine, because it
parts the hoof but does not chew the cud, is unclean for you. Their
flesh you shall not eat, and their carcasses you shall not touch.
Deuteronomy 14:6-8.
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profane objects or persons.196 But taboos can also be what Levi-
Strauss called "linguistic prohibitions."' 97 In a given culture,
certain words or subjects may be forbidden to be spoken of in
public discourse. Someone with Victorian sensibilities, for ex-
ample, may consider the mention of sexual activity or birth to
violate a taboo.198 Geoffrey Gorer has theorized that there has
been a shift in prudery during the last century, with the subject
196. Some cultures proscribe touching a corpse. According to Polynesian
belief, the person who touches or carries a corpse is considered at risk. "[The
misfortune of which he is considered to be in danger is illness." RADCLIFFE-
BRowN, supra note 192, at 135. Other cultures have a similar proscription
against touching a newborn baby. Id at 148; see also MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY
AND DANGER. AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO 140-58
(1966) (discussing primitive sexual rituals and their role in maintaining social
structures).
197. CLAUDE LEVI-STRAuss, THE SAVAGE MIND 176 (Julian Pitt-Rivers &
Ernest Gellner eds., Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1966) (1962). One example of
linguistic prohibitions, found in Australia as well as in America, involves
speaking the names of the dead. Id- at 176-77. For example, "the Wik Munkan
forbid any mention of a name or names for three years after the death of their
bearer, that is, until his mummified body has been burnt." Id. at 183. Simi-
larly, some names, such as those of a man's dead sister or his wife's dead
brother, may never be mentioned. Id. "An inquirer committing the blunder of
asking them is supplied with a substitute name which means literally 'no
name', 'without name' or 'the second born."' Id. Some cultures give the dead
a new proper name known as a "necronym" to avoid breaking the taboo. I& at
191-200. Necronyms sound to me a great deal like the euphemisms we use,
such as "passing on!' or "passed away," to say that someone died, presumably
to avoid a linguistic prohibition.
Freud had a lot to say about the prohibition against uttering the name of a
dead person and about the "taboo upon the dead" in general. SIGMUND FREUD,
TOTEM AND TABOO 51-74 (James Strachey trans., 1950) (1913). One explana-
tion for the taboo is a fear "of the presence of or of the return of the dead
person's ghost.., to utter his name is equivalent to invoking him and will be
quickly be followed by his presence." Id. at 57. Freud believed that the taboo
had developed from our ambivalent emotional attitudes toward the dead per-
son. Id. at 60. We may indeed feel an unconscious satisfaction from the death
of a loved one, and this "can explain the idea that the souls of those who have
just died are transformed into demons and the necessity felt by survivors to
protect themselves by taboos against their hostility." Id. at 60-61. Eventually
the ambivalence becomes apparent when, as time goes by, the demons of the
recently dead disappear and are replaced by ancestors who are to be vener-
ated. Id. at 65-66. Mourning performs a "psychical task ... its function is to
detach the survivor's memories and hopes from the dead" and eventually
transform those demons into friendlier spirits who can be revered and ap-
pealed to for assistance. I& For another discussion of "tabooed words," see
SIR JAMES GEORGE FRAZIER, THE NEW GOLDEN BOUGH 107-12 (Theodor H.
Gaster ed., Anchor Books 1961) (1959).
198. I have often noted that in social situations the subject of pregnancy
and birth are considered inappropriate topics of conversation in "mixed com-
pany." It is deemed "girl talk," something that the women may discuss freely
among themselves in the kitchen but not out in the living room where the
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of death replacing the subject of sex as the forbidden topic on
life's agenda.' His explanation for the linguistic prohibition
on the subject of death is the same as mine: People no longer
have a system of belief that includes spiritual immortality.
The reasoning goes something like this: If the predomi-
nant attitude toward death in a culture is one of fear, then
death becomes the subject of a linguistic prohibition-a ta-
boo.200 There are risks in violating a taboo. Much like a formal
legal system, our informal, traditional codes of conduct often
men most often reside. This has always struck me as odd, since for me, the
bringing into the world of a new human being has infinite fascination.
Some recent feminist writings have pointed out that the subject of birth
has seldom been held to be as profound as the subject of death. Death appers
on the male agenda, but "birth [is] not and will not become, a worthy subject
of male philosophy." MARY O'BRIEN, THE POLIcS OF REPRODUCTION 156
(1983). Symbolic representations of giving birth are rare: "Imaginative repre-
sentations of birth from the point of view of a woman contemplating it, or of a
woman experiencing a pregnancy... or of a woman giving birth, are unfamil-
iar cultural constructions." Virginia Held, Birth and Death, reprinted in FEMI-
NISM AND POLIrICAL THEORY 87, 95 (Cass . Sunstein ed., 1990).
199. GEOFFREY GORER, The Pornography of Death, (1955), reprinted in
GORER, supra note 44, app. 4 at 195. In the mid-Victorian decades, birth and
intercourse were the "unmentionables," and the subject of death was "no mys-
tery." Id Children were encouraged to think and talk about death, and to at-
tend the deaths of others, and it was a "rare individual who, in the 19th
century with its high mortality, had not witnessed at least one actual dying."
In the twentieth century, Gorer argues, prudery has shifted. Sexual inter-
course has become more mentionable, and "death has become more and more
'unmentionable' as a natural process." Id. Gorer sees a connection between
the shift of taboos and the shift in English religious beliefs where "belief in
the future life as taught in Christian doctrine is very uncommon today." Id at
196. He recommends that we "give back to death-natural death-its parade
and publicity, readmit grief and mourning" in order to do away with this
"modem pornography of death." Id at 199.
200. In The Magic Mountain, Thomas Mann alluded to the taboo nature of
death. A popular old man in the sanitorium, known as the "gentleman rider,"
died after weeks of critical illness. When a nurse "discreetly communicated
the sad event" to Hans Castorp, the protagonist, he rebelled against the "pre-
vailing system of secrecy" by insisting on viewing the gentleman rider's mortal
remains. THOMAS MANN, THE MAGIC MOUNTAwn 291-92 (H.T. Lowe-Porter
trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1951) (1924). At the dining hall, Castorp
tried to introduce the subject of death at table, but was met with such
a flat and callous rebuff on all sides as both to anger and embarrass
him. Frau Stroer had been downright gruff. What did he mean by in-
troducing such a subject-what kind of upbringing had he had? The
house regulations protected the patients from having such things
come to their knowledge; and now here was a young whippersnapper
bringing it up at table.
Id at 292.
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carry sanctions for the breaking of unwritten rules. 20 1 By re-
ferring to the subject of death, and in particular to one's own
death, one runs the risk of conjuring up death's appearance. 202
In breaking the taboo, the speaker endangers himself by mak-
ing himself vulnerable to the evil that prompted the taboo. If
that risk is of no threat to the speaker, then the subject can be
openly spoken of. In this instance, if the appearance of death
does not rattle our bones, then there is no reason for silence on
the subject. Simply put, the less fear we have about something,
the more likely we are to talk about it. The converse is true as
well: the more fear we have about something, the less likely
we are to talk about it. Once again, this is not a very ambitious
claim.
Anyone who does not believe me should spend some time
in Ireland.
201. Ironically, given his role in forming the tenets of liberal thought, em-
phasizing individual freedom to pursue one's interests without interference
from the state as long as no harm is caused to others, John Stuart Mill also
reminds us of the sanctions that society may impose on an individual who
strays too far from the accepted path. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty,
(1859) reprinted in UTLIARIANMM, supra note 146, at 126, 205-08 (Mary War-
nock ed., 1962). While the state may not have the authority to intervene and
stop certain socially unacceptable behavior, the citizens do have the power to
punish the offender. Id. at 205. Thus, society can ostracize a violator of social
norms. Id at 208.
For a discussion of the taboos existing in the practice of law, see WALTER
0. WEYRAUCH, THE PERSONALITY OF LAwYERS: A COMPARATIv= STUDY OF
SUBJECTIVE FAcTORs IN LAw, BASED ON INTERvIEws WITH GERMAN LAWYERS
140-43 (1964).
202. "Ritual avoidance" or "ritual prohibitions" are rules of behavior "asso-
ciated with a belief that an infraction will result in an undesirable change in
the ritual status" of the offender. RADCLIFF-BRowN, supra note 192, at 134-
35.
Many cultures have rites associated with two important occasions, birth
and death, and rules of avoidance almost always accompany these rites. A
baby or corpse, the object of the ritual avoidance, has "ritual value," and there
may be a taboo against touching that object. Id, at 133. Many things can have
ritual value, including "a person, a material thing, a place, a word or name, an
occasion or event," or even a period of time. Id. at 139. The members of a
given culture generally agree as to the ritual value of certain things. Id. at 141.
If a taboo is broken, the person who broke it must restrict his behavior. IH at
133. He "may not use his hands to feed himself," for he is "in a state of dan-
ger." Id. Nor can others touch him, because he can be dangerous to others.
Id. He himself becomes taboo by having broken the taboo. Id.
I am arguing here that the very subject of death, especially one's own
death, has ritual value; it is the object of ritual avoidance in that speaking of it
puts the speaker in danger. The danger is that the offender may now suffer
an undesirable change in her ritual status. That is to say, she may herself be-
come vulnerable to death and put others in danger of death by having become
taboo herself.
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My husband's family lives in county Wexford, and every
summer we take the children and rent a house for an extended
visit to the Irish grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. The
first time I went to Ireland I was struck by the frequency with
which death, and the dead, were mentioned unflinchingly in
casual conversation. On my first visit, I tried very hard to learn
all the branches of the family. It was not an easy task. My
mother-in-law came from a family of fourteen children, my fa-
ther-in-law from a family of nine. I found that I could keep the
relationships straight if I thoroughly understood the preceding
generation, so I started by learning the children's names and
the birth orders of both sets of my husband's grandparents. As
I met each aunt and uncle, and began to have a face to attach to
the name, I moved on to their spouses and children. To tell the
truth, after almost ten years, I am still working on the children
of their children. With over seventy first cousins to master, and
many repetitions of the same name, it is a miracle that I have
remained sane. A few rules have saved me. For example,
when in doubt, his name is Andrew.20 3
The real problem for me at first was to determine which of
the aunts and uncles were dead. My confusion sprang from the
freedom with which death, and the dead, were talked about
around the kitchen table. On that first visit, I was having
trouble identifying Father Ger. Father Ger was an older
brother of my mother-in-law, a Sinnott. He was obviously
much-loved, a practical joker and a confidant to many. The one
photograph I had seen of him showed a handsome young man
in a priest's collar, hands thrust rakishly into his pockets, legs
crossed, a greyhound at his feet, and an engaging smile that de-
manded one in return. I had heard many Father Ger stories
and was looking forward to meeting him. About two weeks
into the visit, I heard my mother-in-law refer to her brother
Ger, and then say quietly, "God have mercy on his soul." For
the first time, it dawned on me that I was not going to meet Fa-
ther Ger, on this trip or any other. He had died in 1957.
In my defense, I had not been tipped off about Father Ger's
203. There is a time-honored Irish custom of naming the eldest son after
his paternal grandfather and the second son after his maternal grandfather.
HANDBOOK ON IRmSH GENEALOGY 11 (1978). The eldest and second daughters
were similarly named after their paternal and maternal grandmothers. I-
Thus, on my husband's father's side, all the eldest boys were named Andrew,
after their paternal grandfather.
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death by any visits to his grave.204 Many of the other deceased
members of the family, including the grandparents, were bur-
ied in the village churchyard. They were visited at least once a
week, on the way to or from Mass. It was as if the dead were
still a part of the community. Dying marked a sort of transi-
tion, but not the kind that I had been accustomed to in my own
culture. Where I come from, once a person dies, he more or
less ceases to be the subject of conversation. Even in intimate
family settings, where a dead person might be talked about
openly, he has been relegated to the status of memory, a static
position. In Ireland, however, the dead do not disappear or be-
come frozen in the same way. Somehow they are still with us,
as active, silent participants, and no one seems to find anything
disturbing about their presence. On the contrary, having them
around is rather comforting.20 5
The same thing is true about the subject of death in Ire-
land. While it is not dwelled upon, when it does come up in
conversation, the speaker's tone of voice does not change. He
maintains eye contact, and there are no awkward silences or
clumsy efforts to move away from a subject that should never
have been mentioned. You can talk about death over a cup of
tea if you have to, need to or want to. Although I have often
heard sadness expressed at the mention of someone dying, I
have never heard an echo of fear or desperation.
The closest thing to trepidation that I ever heard about dy-
204. Father Ger was buried in the parish in which he served rather than in
his family's parish. This is not an uncommon practice in Ireland. Similarly,
nuns are usually buried with other members of their religious order.
205. The following passage from the work of Henry Scott Holand was re-
cently read at the funeral of one of our most beloved Irish aunts:
Death is nothing at all. It does not count. I have only slipped away
into the next room. Nothing has happened. Everything remains ex-
actly as it was. I am I, and you are you, and the old life that we lived
so fondly together is untouched, unchanged. Whatever we were to
each other, that we are still. Call me by the old familiar name. Speak
of me in the easy way which you always used. Put no difference into
your tone. Wear no forced air of solemnity or sorrow. Laugh as we
always laughed at the little jokes that we enjoyed together. Play,
smile, think of me, pray for me. Let my name be ever the household
word that it always was. Let it be spoken without an effort, without
the ghost of a shadow upon it. Life means all that it ever meant. It is
the same as it ever was. There is absolute and unbroken continuity.
What is this death but a negligible accident? Why should I be out of
mind because I am out of sight? I am but waiting for you, for an in-
terval, somewhere very near, just round the corner. All is well.
ROsAmuNDE PILOHER, SEPTEMBER 522-23 (1990) (quoting Henry Scott Holland
(1847-1918)). I am grateful for the assistance of Rosamunde Pilcher in identi-
fying the author of this beautiful passage.
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ing was from my mother-in-law. At a family gathering, we
were talking about irrational worries, and my mother-in-law
confessed that she was pathologically afraid of being buried
alive. As a child, she had once read about a man who had been
in a coma and appeared to be dead, but in fact was not. He had
been waked and buried, and later was discovered to have
regained consciousness while in a coffin, under six feet of dirt.
To this confession, her nephew, Father John, quipped, "Don't
worry, Aunt Nan. We'll know if you've stopped talking for
more than five minutes, you've got to be dead." The anecdote
has become a bit of family folklore; my daughters will hear the
story over and over again, long after their grandmother is gone.
What accounts for this attitude toward death in the corner
of Ireland that I have come to know? My intuition is that it
comes from a strong religious faith and a firm belief in the im-
mortality of the soul. The Catholic theory of ensoulment, when
embraced wholeheartedly, makes death a mundane topic, even
one that can generate a joke at a family gathering. Because
death has spiritual meaning and is theologically a joyous occa-
sion, there is no reason to avoid mentioning it in conversa-
tion.20 6 The subject is not taboo.
It is no quirk of fate that the Catholic religion has been at
the forefront of articulating when it should be permissible to
withhold extraordinary care from terminally ill patients.207
206. Catholics find their beliefs about the immortality of the soul in the
New Testament. "The principle of life is the spirit, the soul" and "death is the
giving up of the spirit." THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 154 (Robert C. Broder-
ick ed., 1976) (citing to Matthew 27:50 and Acts 7:59). Catholics are "consoled
by the many biblical assurances that we will rise with Christ to a new life in
God the Father who prepared our reward from all ages." Id (citing to Colos-
sians 2:20, 3:1-11).
Cf. John J. Paris, Terminating Treatment for Newborns: A Theological
Perspective, 10 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 120 (1982) (criticizing the wide-
spread belief that life and technology are the ultimate values, without regard
to medical prognosis or cost of medical treatment); J. Stuart Showalter, Deter-
mining Death: The Legal and Theological Aspects of Brain-Related Criteria,
27 CATH. LAw. 112, 114-16 (1982) (explaining the Catholic view that death is
not final, and therefore all possible means do not have to be used in keeping a
person alive).
207. Catholicism makes a distinction between "extraordinary" and "ordi-
nary" care when determining what care can be withheld from terminally ill
patients. This distinction has a long history in Catholicism, where it was used
prior to the discovery of antisepsis and anesthesia to decide whether a patient's
refusal of treatment should be classified as a suicide. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 126-27 (2d ed. 1983).
Ordinary means of preserving life are all medicines, treatments, and
operations, which offer a reasonable hope of benefit for the patient
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Nor is it surprising that the Catholic tradition allows the bur-
den on the family to be taken into account when determining
whether a particular treatment is ordinary or extraordinary.20 8
Where a belief system exists that takes away the fear of death,
it is possible to shift the focus from the dying person to the
members of the deathwatch. For the dying person, the journey
is almost over. Those who are left behind must be ministered
to. They are the ones who must contend with sorrow and pain,
not the soul who is about to take flight.
Ireland could teach us something about how to face our go-
ing out. If we could shatter the silence that surrounds the sub-
ject of death, we might be able to confront the taboo.
Confronting the taboo would make for better deaths, and mak-
ing for better deaths would help alleviate the horrors of the
late twentieth-century-deathwatch. It would be an improve-
ment in the human condition; a benefit for us all, and some-
thing to aspire to.
But for the people in power, confronting the taboo must be
more than just an aspiration. Those people who orchestrate the
deaths of others-who have jurisdiction over the human body,
and which can be obtained and used without excessive expense, pain,
or other inconvenience .... Extraordinary means of preserving life
... mean all medicines, treatments, and operations, which cannot be
obtained without excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience, or
which, if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit.
GERALD KELLY, MEDICO-MORAL PROBLEMS, quoted in RAMSEY, supra note
164, at 122.
208. Pope Pius XII has spoken directly to this subject:
The rights and duties of the family depend in general upon the pre-
sumed will of the unconscious patient if he is of age and sui juris.
Where the proper and independent duty of the family is concerned,
they are usually bound only to the use of ordinary means.
Consequently, if it appears that the attempt at resuscitation con-
stitutes in reality such a burden for the family that one cannot in all
conscience impose it upon them, they can lawfully insist that the doc-
tor should discontinue these attempts, and the doctor can lawfully
comply.
JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 111 (1984) (quoting The
Prolongation of Life, 4 THE POPE SPEAKS 393, 397 (1958)).
The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith endorsed this
stance with its May 5, 1980, '"Declaration on Euthanasia," approved by Pope
John Paul II. It asserts:
It is also permitted, with the patient's consent, to interrupt these
means (provided by the most advanced medical techniques), where
the results fall short of expectations. But for such a decision to be
made, account will have to be taken of the reasonable wishes of the
patient and the patient's family, and also of the doctors who are spe-
cially competent in the matter.
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who judge death talk, who design death spaces-have a duty to
confront the taboo. This duty runs not only to the dying per-
son, but also to those who gather around him.
Doctors more or less run the dying show. Because of their
medical monopoly on what takes place in hospitals and other
health-care facilities, their attitudes toward death shape the
contours of the late-twentieth-century deathwatch. Like other
kinds of death talk, their attitudes will rarely be spoken of or
written down, but they do not need to be. Like DNA, they en-
code the dying experience without expression, and obedient to
the genetic command, the medicalized deathwatch unravels it-
self in a designated way.
The taboo on the subject of death is even more pronounced
in the medical profession. There is often a conspiracy of silence
about death in a hospital, a reluctance to express in words the
fact that a patient is dying. In the early 1980s, there were some
chilling cases in which "Do Not Resuscitate" orders ("DNRs")
were conveyed by attaching purple adhesive dots @ to the pa-
tient's nursing records, or by circling the patient's in
red on the chart. Mistakes in applying dots and circles to the
wrong person's name, and disputes over who should have the
power to add color to those charts, resulted in much more strin-
gent requirements for the ordering of DNRs.2°9 It was as if the
209. E.g., Ronald Sullivan, State Says Hospital to Revive a Dying Patient,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1984, at B6. A grand jury, investigating cases in which
resuscitation was ordered withheld from two patients, criticized La Guardia
Hospital in Queens. The hospital staff there conveyed 'Do Not Resuscitate"
orders by attaching a purple decal to the patient's nursing record. In an at-
tempt to escape the legal risks of withholding CPR from dying patients, they
would then discard the purple decal along with the record when the patient
died.
New York Hospital identified patients whom it did not intend to resusci-
tate by circling their names in red on the chart. The hospital was charged in a
civil suit when an intern refused, against the protests of a family member, also
a physician, to resuscitate an 87-year-old patient for whom the family had not
authorized DNR orders. It must have been quite a horrible scene: a family
member and physician ordered a "crash cart," but was restrained by a hospital
intern who refused to resuscitate the woman, pointing "to her chart, which
had a red circle drawn around her name, signifying that she should not be
saved." Id.
There is considerable literature regarding DNRs. See, e.g., Mitchell T.
Rabkin et al., Orders Not to Resuscitate, 295 NEw ENG. J. MED. 364 (1976) (dis-
cussing the method by which a decision not to resuscitate is formulated, and
the need for stricter definitions of that process); Rabbi Levi Meier, Code and
No-Code: A Psychological Analysis and the Viewpoint of Jewish Laws, in
LEGAL & ETmcAL ASPECTS, supra note 102, at 90 (addressing a physician's de-
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doctors and nurses needed another form of symbolic represen-
tation, something besides words, to communicate their orders
about an impending death. I was reminded of those dots and
circles when reading about a practice in a large, urban hospital.
There was often a time-lag at this hospital between the death of
an indigent patient and the transportation of the body to the
morgue. To alert other hospital workers there was a corpse in-
side a room, the door would be closed, and often a slip of white
paper would be taped to the door, a silent, wordless announce-
ment that a death had just occurred.2 10
Another sign of the taboo nature of death, even in the
medical profession, is avoidance of the dying person. Not only
do health care workers not want to talk about a patient who is
dying, but often they do not want to talk to a patient who is dy-
ing. Of course, this kind of avoidance behavior is not confined
to health care workers; it is just a manifestation of what has
come to be called "death anxiety."2 11 - An early study of avoid-
ance behavior attempted to identify the relative degree to
which college students would distance themselves socially from
cision whether or not to write a DNR order in terms of psychology and Jewish
law); see also PREsIDENT's CoMMissION, supra note 74, app. I at 493-545 (com-
piling various policies of governmental bodies, institutions, and professional
societies).
210. SUDNOW, supra note 37, at 44.
211. Psychological literature defines, in various ways, an empirically mea-
surable theoretical construct known as "death anxiety." See, e.g., ROBERT KAS-
TENBAUM & RUTH AisENBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEATH 55-64 (1972).
Kastenbaum and Aisenberg defined the fear of death as the "fear of extinc-
tion, annihilation, obliteration, or 'ceasing to be."' Id. at 44. Choron isolated
three different types of death fears: fear of the event or process; fear of what
comes after death; and fear of ceasing to be. JACQUES CHORON, MODERN MAN
AND MORTALITY 70-83 (1964).
Various measurement techniques seek to quantify the amount of death
anxiety present in an individual. Ian S. Madfes, Death Anxiety and Related
Characteristics Among Hospice and Nonhospice Nurses 18 (1990) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology (Berke-
ley/Alameda)). The two most commonly employed direct measures are the
Templer Death Anxiety Scale and the Collett-Lester Fear of Death and Dying
Scales. Id at 20. The Templer Scale is a unidimensional measure which more
often correlates with fears of one's own death and dying than with the death
and dying of others. Id. "The Collett-Lester Scales attempt to independently
assess four defined death fears: fear of death of self; fear of death of others;
fear of self dying, and fear of others dying." Id Both scales require subjects to
rate statements about death and dying. I& For example, the Collett-Lester
Scales ask subjects to rate their degree of agreement or disagreement with a
statement like, "I would not mind dying young." The Templer Scales asks
subjects to respond True or False to similar statements. Id- at 21.
One of the major problems with these empirical techniques is their inabil-
ity to measure the largely unconscious quality of death anxiety.
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a dying person.21 2 The researcher found that white subjects
would avoid dying persons to the same extent that they would
avoid '"lacks or gamblers."2 13 Most would not want to have a
dying person as a friend. Similar studies in health care settings
show that doctors and nurses are also guilty of fleeing from dy-
ing patients, perhaps due to their own anxieties about death.214
They distance themselves; they express anger at the patient;
they limit conversations; they avoid contact altogether, intellec-
tualizing the patient's condition so they no longer have to deal
with him as a person.215 The effect on the dying person can be
devastating. The abject loneliness of the situation,2 1 6 the deper-
212. Richard A. Kalish, Social Distance and the Dying, 2 CoMLUNriY
MENTAL HEALTH J. 152, 152-55 (1966).
213. I& at 153.
214. Commentators have suggested that the practice of medicine itself gen-
erates a higher degree of death anxiety than is experienced in the general pop-
ulation. One study reported that a group of 81 physicians was more fearful of
death than groups consisting of medical students, healthy persons, and termi-
nally and seriously ill patients. Herman Feifel et al., Physicians Consider
Death, 2 AM. PYSCHOL. ASS'N PROC. 201, 201-202 (1967). The medical student
group was less fearful of death than the physician group, but more fearful
than the other groups studied. I& at 202. Data suggested that the "continued
experience in the medical profession did not facilitate the mastery of one's
fear of death, but rather appeared to enhance it." Joyce B. Cochrane, Death
Anxiety, Disclosure Behaviors, and Attitudes of Oncologists Towards Termi-
nal Care 19 (1987) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Temple University).
215. For a summary of the various studies done on avoidance behavior by
medical professionals about terminal care, see Harriet Goodman, Death Worc
Staff Perspectives on the Care of Terminally Ill Patients in an Acute Care
Hospital 15-19 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New
York).
A patient may even be treated as socially dead, even though he might not
yet be biologically dead. SUDNOW, supra note 37, at 74. Social death is
"marked by that point at which socially relevant attributes of the patient be-
gin permanently to cease to be operative as conditions for treating him, and
when he is, essentially, regarded as already dead." I& For example, a nurse
closed the eyelids of a dying woman before she was actually dead in prepara-
tion for her status as corpse, it being apparently more difficult to close the lids
after rigor mortis sets in. I- This practice allowed for a more efficient wrap-
ping of the body when the woman actually did die. Id.
216. In an article about group therapy with the terminally ill, researchers
reported that "the most basic anxiety of many group members was not so
much a fear of dying, of finiteness and nonbeing, but of the absolute utter
loneliness that accompanies death." Irvin D. Yalom, M.D. & Carlos Greaves,
M.D., Group Therapy with the Terminally 111, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 396, 398
(1977). While existential loneliness could not be allayed by therapy, "secon-
dary interpersonal loneliness that is a function both of the shunning of the dy-
ing person and his/her self-imposed isolation," could be handled capably in the
group. Id.
Nurses, doctors and other medical personnel would often subtly "cue the
patient" that her illness was terminal. I Dying patients experienced a
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sonalization,217 and the denial of any kind of significant social
role,218 are forms of social death which seem far more abhor-
rent than the biological death which the health care workers
are avoiding.
There are reasons, obvious ones I suppose, why medical
professionals might not deal well with death and dying. After
all, most of them consider themselves in the business of saving
lives,219 and it is easy to see how they might perceive the death
"hushed shrinking away, a tendency to be less intimate, a slightly greater dis-
tance." Id- One patient initially realized the gravity of her illness when her
doctor began ending his meetings with her by solemnly shaking her hand in-
stead of "giving her a gentle pat on the fanny." Id- (a remarkable observation
on several different levels).
217. Just becoming a patient in a hospital, regardless of one's terminal sta-
tus, can lead to the psychological phenomenon known as "depersonalization."
This phenomenon, a feeling of loss of ego, has more specifically come to mean
"a state in which the individual regards himself, and particularly his body, as a
foreign object. He is estranged from his own body and does not experience it
as belonging to himself. There are associated feelings of being without will
and being like a machine." FISHER, supra note 60, at 114.
Depersonalization can occur chronically in severely disturbed people, but
also occasionally in normal people, often as a response to stressful situations or
those in which an individual must identify with a degraded role. Edith Jacob-
son, Depersonalization, 1959 J. Am. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 581, 583. One psy-
chologist researched political prisoners in Nazi Germany who had once been
substantial citizens, but were being treated as criminals. I& at 581. They fre-
quently reacted with depersonalization symptoms, such as feeling that their
face or limbs did not belong to them. Id. at 581-82. The denial of part or all of
the body was a symbolic denial of the criminal role assigned to them. I. at
606-07. The same psychological phenomenon can happen to anyone who leaves
his social role behind him to become a patient in a hospital. This is particu-
larly true if one is dying, and the hospital workers exhibit avoidance behavior.
218. The denial of a social role for the dying person cannot be discussed in
an historical vacuum. Erik H. Erikson argues that it is all too easy to discuss
intellectual history as if it has no influence on the development of our psycho-
logical profiles, and urges us to analyze the "individual's ego identity in rela-
tion to the historical changes which dominated his childhood milieu." Erik H.
Erikson, Ego Development and Historical Change, in IDENTITY AND THE LIFE
CYCLE 18, 49 (1 Pysch. Issues 1959). While a child has a number of "opportuni-
ties to identify himself, with real or fictitious people of either sex, with habits,
traits, occupations, and ideas... the historical era in which he lives offers only
a limited number of socially meaningful models for workable combinations of
identification fragments." Id at 26.
The increased medicalization of death, and the shunning of the dying per-
son by both medical professionals and laymen, has provided no socially mean-
ingful role for the dying person. This has caused a psychological crisis for the
dying person which must be understood in its historical context.
219. In Brian Clark's play, Whose Life is It Anyway, Dr. Emerson treats a
young sculptor who was paralyzed from the neck down in an accident and has
chosen not to continue his life. When another doctor suggests that someone in
his patient's situation could wish to die, Dr. Emerson categorically states:
No, Clare, a doctor cannot accept the choice for death; he's committed
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of a patient to be a failure-a public, professional failure.220 A
recent article about heart surgeons in New York State pub-
lished mortality rates as evidence of a doctor's skill.2 1 It was a
telling comment on our culture that survival rates would stand
out as the sole criterion by which we would judge a doctor.
There was no corresponding chart for sensitivity, tact, or a will-
ingness to respond to not only the medical needs of the patient,
but to his emotional, spiritual and social needs as well.
That should come as no surprise, however. We are all ob-
sessed with beating death, and our own attitudes promote and
perpetuate the attitudes of our healers. It is a symbiotic rela-
tionship, one in which miracles are demanded22 and often de-
livered. When the miracle does not happen, the failure must be
felt acutely by the miracle worker. There is a lot at stake in
that failure, most of it having to do with the death of a patient
and not the death of a human being.
It is understandable, therefore, that medical professionals
would be even more vulnerable to the taboo of death talk-un-
to life. When a patient is brought into my unit, he's in a bad way. I
don't stand about thinking whether or not it's worth saving his life, I
haven't time for doubts. I get in there, do whatever I can to save life.
I'm a doctor, not a judge.
BRiAN CLARK, WHOSE LiE Is IT ANYWAY 91 (1978).
220. Being human, the doctor can be hurt when forced to acknowledge
that his patient is going to die. Perhaps as his medical experience
lengthens he is less aware of the hurt he first felt earlier in his career
when his patients died; but although the situation becomes bearable it
can still perturb. He must admit to the person most concerned that
he is now impotent to do what is desired so much, to save his patient's
life. The doctor's ability to cure and bring relief usually sustain him
in his work-and in his own self-esteem. He can feel very threatened
at having to admit failure to a person who is depending on him.
John Hinton, The Dying and the Doctor, in MAN'S CONCERN wITH DEATH,
supra note 25, at 30, 37.
221. David Zinman, Heart Surgeons Rated, NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk
ed.), Dec. 18, 1991, at 3. This was the first time that the New York Health De-
partment had ever released, by name, adjusted mortality rates for each of the
140 New York heart surgeons. The Health Department made the disclosure
under court order, ending a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit initiated by
Newsday. The figures covered cardiac artery bypass operations performed in
1989 and 1990. IMi
222. Symptomatic of a "demanding" era, groups have even formed that are
devoted to the goal of beating death altogether. KRANT, supra note 40, at 13.
For example, a publication originated in California (where else?) called The
Immortality Newsletter, whose motto was "Death is an imposition on the
human race and no longer acceptable." Id. This philosophy generated the cry-
onics movement of the 1970s in which bodies of recently dead people were fro-
zen in liquid nitrogen capsules so that the individuals could be revived in the
future, when medicine will have found a cure for the fatal illness. Id.
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derstandable, but not forgivable. The facts are that people die,
and they do so while being cared for by doctors and nurses. Be-
cause the power to determine the circumstances of death re-
sides almost entirely with the medical profession, there is a
duty to chart carefully the course for a patient riding through
those narrow straits, a duty not to let that patient crash into
sheer cliffs, hurdle over wild waters alone, or languish in the
doldrums of artificial life support. That duty runs to the family
and friends of the dying person, to the members of the death-
watch. The death belongs to them as well.223
Ultimately, the medical profession must confront the ta-
boo. Words must be found to communicate the fact of the
death so that a proper deathwatch can take place. Words of dis-
closure to the patient and his family. Words about life-sup-
port systems that allow the patient to manifest his intent
223. My indictment against the medical profession is, of course, general.
Many nurses, doctors, and other health care professionals have spoken and
written about the importance of attending to the members of the deathwatch
as well as to the patient. For example, some hospitals and hospices offer what
is sometimes referred to as "Bereavement Service," which includes counseling
for family members both before and after the death. At St. Christopher's Hos-
pice in London, the Bereavement Service maintains contact with the family
for an average of 18 months after the death. Families and close friends are
"assisted in working out their bereavement through reality assistance, emo-
tional support, and simple talking-out." Leonard Liegner, M.D., St. Christo-
pher's Hospice, 1974. Care of the Dying Patient, 234 JAMA 1048, 1048 (1975).
224. A trend has developed toward more open disclosure to patients, in-
cluding disclosure of a bad prognosis. See, eg., PRESIDENT'S COMMSSION,
supra note 74, at 52-54. A 1961 study found that almost 90% of doctors had a
"strong and general tendency" not to tell their patients of a cancer diagnosis.
Donald Oken, M.D., What to Tell Cancer Patients: A Study of Medical Atti-
tudes, 175 JAMA 1120, 1122 (1960). Sixteen years later, more than 97% of doc-
tors said they routinely disclosed a cancer diagnosis to patients. Dennis H.
Novak, M.D. et al., Changes in Physicians'Attitudes Towards Telling the Can-
cer Patient, 241 JAMA 897, 898 (1979). But see Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth,
Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent A Review and Critique
of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1983) (criticizing the reliance
placed on these studies).
A one-sided disclosure from doctor to patient may not actually do much to
confront the taboo on the subject of death. Jay Katz argued eloquently for
doctors and patients to move beyond the narrow confines of the doctrine of in-
formed consent, which only requires the doctor to recite a litany of medical
risks to the patient. JAY KATz, THaE SILENT WORLD OF DocroR AND PATIENT
85-103 (1984). Instead, the doctor and patient must have a dialogue in order to
arrive at appropriate medical decisions, a dialogue which admits the inequali-
ties of the parties. Id. at 101-102. The doctor knows more about the disease,
and the patient knows more about his needs. Id. at 102. The conversation
must be built on trust. Id. 'This trust cannot be earned through deeds alone.
It requires words as well. It relies not only on physicians' technical compe-
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before losing competency.225 Words that help to turn the fear
inside out, just by virtue of their having been spoken. Words of
consultation, 226 and of sympathy.227
tence but also on their willingness to share the burden of decision making
with patients and on their verbal competence to do so." Id.
For another plea for a conversation between doctor and patient, and in
particular for the patient to take the initiative, see Michael I Flick, The Due
Proces of Dying, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1162-63 (1991).
225. It always made me angry that my friend Richard's doctor did not initi-
ate any conversations with him about any sort of living will or other advance
directive regarding life-support systems, considering his gloomy prognosis.
Apparently, it is not uncommon for doctors to fail to take the initiative in this
way.
In 1976, California enacted the first natural death legislation. Diane L.
Redleaf et al., Note, The California Natural Death Act- An Empirical Study of
Phyvsicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913, 917 (1979); see also supra note 187
and accompanying text (discussing living wills, natural death acts, and durable
power of attorney legislation). A study of the effects of the Act on physician
practices found that while most physicians were aware of the Act, only 22% of
the respondents knew the circumstances under which directives were binding.
Redleaf, supra, at 930. 'ost physicians either did not answer or said they did
not know whether the Act permits withholding or withdrawal of life-sus-
taining procedures only if the patient would die regardless of such proce-
dures." Id. Most who did respond were incorrect. I& The majority of the
physicians also "did not know how long a patient must wait after being diag-
nosed as terminally ill before executing a binding directive." Id. A significant
number of doctors (16%) expressed fears that the Act had increased their mal-
practice liability for stopping treatment, and 27% felt that the Act had made
them uncertain regarding their criminal and civil liability if they did so. Id. at
939.
This study was done in 1979 when the Natural Death Act movement was
in its youth, and doctors were probably much less sophisticated about the med-
ical, legal, and ethical issues surrounding the termination of treatment than
they are now. I know that in nursing homes, the forms for DNR orders are
often pushed under the patient's nose before the suitcases are unpacked.
When I put my elderly aunt into a nursing home a year ago, she was presented
with a DNR form before getting to choose whether she would have jello or a
Twinkie for dessert.
Doctors have also complained, probably justifiably, that the legal profes-
sion has not done a very good job in communicating the law to the medical
profession. See, eg., Flick, supra note 224, at 1166 n.165 ("Both what the law is
and how it is applied are largely mysteries to doctors, who get their informa-
tion about law from newspapers and medical journals. In the retelling of the
law, commentators inevitably simplify and put a gloss on it .... )
226. Words of consultation are particularly critical to family members who
may be bearing a large part of the burden of caring for the dying patient. See,
e.g., Wallace I. Sampson, M.D., Dying at Home, 238 JAMA 2405 (1977) (dis-
cussing the needs to talk to family members about a patient's desire to die at
home). Dr. Sampson has some excellent medical advice regarding the
problems a family might run into if the family decides to bring the patient
home to die. Among the subjects covered are pain control, ways to deal with
bowel and bladder dysfunction, and the patient's need (or lack thereof) for
food and water. Id. at 2406. Sampson also has some advice to doctors on how
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Lawyers too must confront the taboo, but in a different
way.
It seems as if we are going to have to live with the pretense
that the decision to terminate life-support systems belongs to
Karen Quinlan or Nancy Cruzan. Dispensing with that pre-
tense appears to be too costly; too much is at stake. To make
the pretense palatable, however, courts have imposed certain
standards of proof on the manifestations of the patient's former
intent. In applying those standards, the taboo nature of death
talk must be taken into account.
Consider the evidentiary standards New York and Missouri
imposed on the members of the deathwatch. To prove that the
patient, if competent, would have refused life-sustaining treat-
ment, these states have adopted a "clear and convincing" stan-
dard of proof.
Mary O'Connor was a 77-year-old woman who suffered sev-
eral strokes that left her incompetent. 229 She was a widow,
best to support and assist the patient and family: 'People seem to want to
regain control of their lives and of their deaths. Except in smaller towns,
medicine has not been geared to home care, so we need to reorient ourselves
to the desires of people who want to die at home." I& at 2405. In a sense,
Sampson's is a "how to" article on the logistics of bringing back the nine-
teenth-century deathwatch. See also On Dying At Home, EMERGENCY MED.,
Feb. 1977, at 136 (discussing the virtues of allowing a terminally ill patient to
die at home amidst family and friends).
Anyone who can get through an article about home care for the termi-
nally ill child or infant without crying is made of sterner stuff than I am. For
a discussion of home care for terminally ill children, see Ida. M. Martinson,
ILN., Why Don't We Let Them Die at Home?, RN, Jan. 1976, at 58.
227. Occasionally a doctor will directly address the emotional needs of the
members of the deathwatch. See, eg., G.E. Burch, M.D., Of the Family of the
Sick, 92 AM. HEART J. 405, 405 (1976). While Dr. Burch focused on the welfare
of the patient, he also wrote about the fears and anxieties of family members
and discussed the need for physicians to meet regularly with the family and to
allow frequent and lengthy visits to the bedside of the dying person. I&L He
suggested that doctors often appear to family members as "primarily con-
cerned with the use and operation of complex, frightening, awful apparatus
with stern, serious, and grim automatons in attendance." I& Dr. Burch admit-
ted that the additional burden of responding to concerns of the family of the
sick "can annoy the doctors at times, but this is part of caring for the sick, part
of the practice of medicine." Id. Dr. Burch may attend my deathwatch
anytime.
228. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); In re
Westchester County Medical Ctr. ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
229. Mary O'Connor suffered from dementia as a result of strokes.
Although the condition "substantially impaired her cognitive ability," she was
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with two adult daughters, Helen and Joan, both of whom were
practical nurses. After her first stroke, she went to live with
Helen, but, when she suffered a second stroke, she lost her gag
reflex and had to be put into a nursing home. Because she
could not eat, O'Connor became so ill that she had to be trans-
ferred to a hospital where her doctors wanted to insert a naso-
gastric feeding tube to keep her from dying of thirst and
starvation. Her daughters opposed the insertion of the tube,
stating that this was against their mother's expressed wishes
that "she did not want her life prolonged by artificial means if
she was unable to care for herself."=
At trial, James Lampasso, a former co-worker and long-
time friend of Mary O'Connor, testified that he first discussed
artificial means of prolonging life with her in 1969. At that
time, Lampasso's father was dying of cancer and had informed
him that he would not want to continue life by any artificial
means if he had lost his dignity and could no longer control his
bodily functions. O'Connor had wholeheartedly agreed, saying,
"'I would never want to be a burden on anyone and I would
never want to lose my dignity before I passed away.' ,,23
Lampasso also noted that O'Connor was a "'very religious wo-
man' who 'felt that nature should take its course and not use
further artificial means.' "23 During two or three subsequent
conversations, O'Connor stated that it was "'monstrous' to
keep someone alive by using 'machinery, things like that' when
not in a coma or a persistent vegetative state. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 609.
"She was conscious, and capable of responding to simple questions or requests
sometimes by squeezing the questioner's hand and sometimes verbally." Id.
She could not understand complex questions, however, such as those dealing
with her medical treatment. Id. at 610. Her doctor "doubted that she would
ever regain significant mental capacity because the brain damage was substan-
tial and irreparable." Id.
In defending his court's decision in O'Connor, Chief Judge Wachtler dis-
tinguished the case from the later United States Supreme Court decision,
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, on the basis that Nancy
Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state, and Mary O'Connor was not. Sol
Wachtler, A Judge's Perspective: The New York Rulings, 19 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 60, 62 (1991). The O'Connor decision was not, he protested, an
earlier version of Cruzan because 'ary O'Connor was not a Nancy Cruzan."
Id. Thus, according to Wachtler, the Court of Appeals of New York has not
yet confronted how or whether to terminate life-support systems from some-
one in a persistent vegetative state who had not left clear and convincing evi-
dence of his intent. Id.
230. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 609.
231. Id. at 611 (quoting Lampasso's testimony about a conversation with
O'Connor).
232. Id. (quoting Lampasso's testimony).
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they are 'not going to get better'; that she would never want to
be in the same situation as her husband and Lampasso's father,
and that people who are 'suffering very badly' should be al-
lowed to die."233
Mary O'Connor had been a member of two deathwatches:
her husband's and her stepmother's. One daughter, Helen, tes-
tified that after her father was hospitalized with cancer, her
mother said that she never wanted to be in a similar situation;
"she would not want to go on living if she could not 'take care
of herself and make her own decisions.' " Helen testified
that later, after O'Connor had been hospitalized for a heart at-
tack and had finally been discharged, her mother said "that she
was very glad to be out of the hospital and hope[d] she would
never have to be back in one again and would never want any
sort of intervention, any sort of life support systems to main-
tain or prolong her life."' Mary O'Connor's other daughter,
Joan, gave similar testimony, describing her mother's state-
ments on this subject as "less solemn pronouncements: 'It was
brought up when we were together, at times when in conversa-
tions you start something, you know, maybe the news was on
and maybe that was the topic that was brought up and that's
how it came about.' "
The New York Court of Appeals held the members of the
deathwatch, in this case the daughters, to the very high eviden-
tiary standard of "clear and convincing" evidence with regard
to their mother's intent.27 The usual standard of proof in a
civil case is a "preponderance of the evidence"; in a criminal
case, the burden is "beyond a reasonable doubt." In the mist,
between the two standards of proof, floats this standard called
"clear and convincing" evidence. In this context, the New York
Court of Appeals described it as "proof sufficient to persuade
the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and settled commit-
ment to the termination of life supports under the circum-
stances like those presented."
When the New York Court of Appeals applied the eviden-
tiary standard of "clear and convincing," the daughters' testi-
mony in O'Connor could not meet the burden of proof.239 The
233. IMi
234. Id. (quoting Helen's testimony about a conversation with her mother).
235. Id. (quoting Helen's testimony).
236. I& (quoting Joan's testimony).
237. Id. at 612.
238. Id at 613.
239. Id. at 615.
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court noted that Mary O'Connor had never discussed the with-
holding of food and nutrition;240 nor had she indicated whether
she would feel the same way if the refusal of medical treatment
would have produced a painful death.241 Both daughters admit-
ted that their mother had never discussed what she would have
done under those precise circumstances.2-
Nancy Cruzan's parents ran into the same high evidentiary
hurdle in Missouri when they sought to withdraw her nasogas-
tric feeding tube. Nancy's statements, made at age twenty-five
in a "somewhat serious conversation with a housemate friend
that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life
unless she could live at least halfway normally," also did not
meet Missouri's standard of "clear and convincing" evidence.2 43
Like the daughters in O'Connor, the members of Nancy
Cruzan's deathwatch faced a familiar problem, harking back to
Quinlan. Her statements about life support were too general,
too hypothetical, too lacking in specificity.2,"
240. I&
241. l at 608.
242. Id. at 615.
243. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 433 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
244. Actually, I do not find Mary O'Connor's statements, in particular, to
be too general, too hypothetical, or too lacking in specificity. Judge Simons,
who dissented from the majority opinion in O'Connor, agreed with me. While
he was willing to adopt the standard of "clear and convincing," he was also
willing to accept the trial court's finding that O'Connor's family had met that
burden of proof, that "Mrs. O'Connor did not wish any artificial means used to
prolong her life under these circumstances." O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 622
(Simons, J., dissenting). He also noted that she had participated in several
deathwatches of close family members, that she had consistently expressed
her view that artificial means should not be used to sustain life, and that some
of those statements had been made after a hospitalization for a serious illness.
Id.
Similarly, the conversations that Nancy Cruzan had with a roommate, and
the conversations that Karen Quinlan had on several occasions with family
members and friends, do not strike me as too general, too hypothetical, or too
lacking in specificity. To its credit, the Supreme Court of New Jersey later
stated that Karen Quinlan's statements were "certainly relevant to shed light
on whether the patient would have consented to the treatment if competent to
make the decision." In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985).
A very disturbing article has convinced me that there is a lot of hidden
sexism in these appellate cases regarding the termination of life-support sys-
tems; that the moral agency of women, and thus their statements of intent, are
taken less seriously than those of men. See Steven H. Miles & Allison August,
Courts, Gender and "The Right to Die," 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 85, 85
(1990). Much of the article is based on the theoretical work of Carol Gilligan.
She argues that women have a different approach to moral decision making
than men. The male model tends to view the moral agent as an autonomous
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The writers of those state appellate opinions, however,
treated the subject of death just like any other subject about
which a court might have to infer intent. They did not indicate
that what was being talked about was any different from what
kind of chickens a restaurant might want to buy, or what kind
of windows an owner might want to put in his house.m Chick-
ens, windows, death-the subject matter is all the same, in tex-
ture, in color, in density.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Cruzan, however, is where the
taboo nature of death is dealt with honestly. Justice Brennan's
dissent is also where the members of the deathwatch are ac-
knowledged, and their pain openly recognized. After describing
the physical deformation and dependency of a patient in a per-
sistent vegetative state, he wrote, "Such conditions are, for
many, humiliating to contemplate, as is visiting a prolonged and
anguished vigil on one's parents, spouse, and children. A long,
drawn-out death can have a debilitating effect on family mem-
bers."2 " He opposed the standard of "clear and convincing" ev-
idence on several different grounds, one of those being the
exclusion of any testimony from family members and close
friends regarding what Nancy would have done.247 In fact, Jus-
tice Brennan argued that intimate conversations with those
family members and close friends may be "the best evidence
available of what the patient's choice would be. It is they with
whom the patient most likely will have discussed such ques-
tions and they who know the patient best."2"
Finally, Justice Brennan urged us all to look at the nature
of death talk. While the majority suggested that only living
wills or equivalently formal directives could meet the high
standard of proof, Justice Brennan pointed out that most peo-
individuated bearer of "rights," whereas the female model views the moral
agent as a member of a complex, interdependent community in which deci-
sions have an impact not only on the individual, but also on relationships
among other members of the intimate group. I&L at 92. See generally CAROL
GILIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoicE (1982) (analyzing theories of human develop-
ment and their shortcomings as applied to both sexes); Robin West, Jurispru-
dence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv 1 (1988) (examining the harms of gender-
patterned jurisprudence).
245. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116,
121 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y.
1921).
246. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2869 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
247. 1& at 2876.
248. 1&
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ple do not behave that way about their own deaths.24 9 Igno-
rance about the legal requirements, denial of the possibility
that such a thing could happen, and denial of their own mortal-
ity all contribute to an absence of formality about their intent
regarding life-support systems.25 No inference of lack of in-
tent, Justice Brennan argued, should be drawn from the failure
to write it down:
Too few people execute living wills or equivalently formal directives
for such an evidentiary rule to ensure adequately that the wishes of
incompetent persons will be honored. While it might be a wise social
policy to encourage people to furnish such instructions, no general
conclusion about a patient's choice can be drawn from the absence of
formalities. The probability of becoming irreversibly vegetative is so
low that many people may not feel an urgency to marshal formal evi-
dence of their preferences. Some may not wish to dwell on their own
physical deterioration and mortality.251
Justice Brennan ended his dissent by disparaging the legal
fiction that the Supreme Courts of Missouri and the United
States were trying to effectuate Nancy Cruzan's intent. In-
stead, "[t]hey have discarded evidence of her will, ignored her
values, and deprived her of the right to a decision as closely ap-
proximating her own choice as humanly possible. They have
done so disingenuously in her name, and openly in Missouri's
own.IP252
Justice Brennan's remarkable dissent is followed by an-
other, by Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens also brought the
members of the deathwatch into the circle of constitutional
consideration. His contribution, in my mind, is to tie their pres-
ence to the spiritual component of death. Borrowing an elegant
turn of phrase from Justice Harlan, Justice Stevens made a
beautiful analogy: "[J]ust as the constitutional protection for
the 'physical curtilage of the home.., is surely.., a result of
solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within,"' so too
"the constitutional protection for the human body is surely in-
separable from concern for the mind and spirit that dwell
249. Id
250. Several studies have demonstrated that the number of adults who
have actually executed a living will remains small. The numbers range from
as low as 4%, to 15% (a telephone survey of a random sample of adults con-
ducted by the AMA) and 17.5% (a sample of older adult research volunteers).
Nancy R. Zweibel & Christine I_ Cassel, Treatment Choices at the End of Life:
A Comparison of Decisions by Older Patients and Their Physician-Selected
Proi, 29 GERONToLoGIsT 615, 615 (1989).
251. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2875 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
252. IrM at 2878.
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therein."' 5 While admitting that the constitutional signifi-
cance of death is difficult to describe, he explained that
not much may be said with confidence about death unless it is said
from faith, and that alone is reason enough to protect the freedom to
conform choices about death to individual conscience. We may also,
however, justly assume that death is not life's simple opposite, or its
necessary terminus, but rather its completion. Our ethical tradition
has long regarded an appreciation of morality as essential to under-
standing life's significance.
Justice Stevens then cast his eye on the members of the
deathwatch. Nancy Cruzan's interest in life included "an inter-
est in how she will be thought of after her death by those
whose opinions mattered to her. There can be no doubt that
her life made her dear to her family, and to others. How she
dies will affect how that life is remembered."2'  He argued that
the state of Missouri should have deferred to the members of
the deathwatch, not directly as I had originally planned, but in-
directly, working in the shadows and on the edges of things as
my friend had suggested-
The trial court's order authorizing Nancy's parents to cease their
daughter's treatment would have permitted the family that cares for
Nancy to bring to a close her tragedy and her death. Missouri's objec-
tion to that order subordinates Nancy's body, her family, and the last-
ing significance of her life to the State's own interests. The decision
we review thereby interferes with constitutional interests of the high-
est order.25
As I said, those are remarkable dissents.
Do others sometimes feel, as I do, that they were born at
the wrong time? That their feelings and thoughts are so out of
sync with the majority opinion, whatever the issue may be, it is
almost guaranteed to be alien to them? That they may as well
skip the front part of the decision and go directly to the dis-
sent? That the dissent will be the place where the truth will
emerge, where wisdom will be found, where there will be
resonance with what is in their hearts?
I am grateful for those dissents. It is so important for me
to see Supreme Court justices acknowledge the difficult and
risky nature of death talk; to address the members of the
deathwatch and their pain; to dare to put the spiritual meaning
of death in the same sentence with the Constitution. It is so
253. Id. at 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
254. Id.
255. Id- at 2885-86.
256. I& at 2886.
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important for me to hear the argument that the standard of
"clear and convincing evidence" is too high, considering that
talk about one's own death is a taboo subject in our culture. It
makes me feel a part of the human family, and not alone. It is
like the wonder of literature, when a writer captures something
that you have said to yourself in the dark silence of the night,
certain that you alone felt and thought that way. A flood of re-
lief comes from the revelation that you are not unique, that the
same words have formed in other minds, that when you cannot
sleep because of what happened to Karen Quinlan, Nancy
Cruzan, Mary O'Connor, and their families, your insomnia is
shared--and justified.
I am grateful for those dissents, and worried about my lon-
gevity. The women in my family live forever. Justice Brennan
has retired, and Justice Stevens is an old man. If I stay out of
sync and live long enough, what will happen to those dissents?
I can bear the alienation from the majority opinion, but I will
not be able to bear a silence at the end.
And so, that is how lawyers should confront the taboo of
death talk. We should implicitly recognize the taboo in our ap-
plication of evidentiary standards to former conversations of in-
competent patients. It is not the time for rigor and heightened
scrutiny. It is a time to let Richard express his concerns about
life-support systems to a co-worker, sitting on a radiator, drink-
ing Hawaiian punch. It is a time to let Mary O'Connor tell her
daughters and her friends about the horrors of the
deathwatches she has seen. It is a time to let Karen Quinlan
tell her sisters about the nightmare of watching family friends
die terrible, lingering, painful deaths. It is a time to let Nancy
Cruzan tell her roommate that she does not ever want to die
that way. It is a time to defer to the members of the death-
watch and to give credence to their words about words whis-
pered to them in the night.
V. LAW AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF RITUAL SPACE
WHAT CAN THE LAw Do TO ALLEVIATE INDiRECTLY THE PAIN
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DEATHWATCH?
This third suggestion is not like the other two. While lan-
guage is always the law's contribution, this suggestion has less
to do with the manipulation of written symbols and more to do
with how human beings inhabit space.2 7 It also has to do with
257. '"e distinctions of language cut the world into bits ... into catego-
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the function of behavior known as ritual:2 1 how does the
deathwatch serve to send a member of the community on his
way; how does it fortify the survivors against the threat of
change; how does it conquer the anarchy of death and restore
order to the universe and to the community? The third suges-
tion is this: The law can help create an environment in which a
meaningful deathwatch can take place.
The deathwatches of the nineteenth century, as portrayed
by Munch's painting, took place in the bedroom of the dying
person. What had once been the private domain of the individ-
ual was turned into a place for community259 and consecration.
ries, classes, oppositions, and contrasts. It is in the nature of language to
search out all differences and to turn them into distinctions which then pro-
vide bases for boundaries and barriers." Roy RAPPAPORT, ECOLOGY, MEANING
AND RELIGION 206 (1979). Rappaport contrasts conceptual language with the
function of ritual "to unite, or reunite, the psychic, social, natural, and cosmic
orders which language and the exigencies of life pull apart." Id.
258. "Ritual" has been defined in a number of different ways. Sir Edmund
Leach, a cultural anthropologist, suggested an expansive definition, applying it
to all stereotypical, symbolic behavior that serves to communicate information
about a culture's cherished values. Edmund R. Leach, Ritual, in 13 INTERNA-
rIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOcIAL SENCFs 520, 524 (David L. Sills ed.,
1968). Another commonly encountered definition of ritual, one favored by
psychoanalytic theory, refers to all nonrational or formalized symbolic behav-
ior as "ritual," as distinct from pragmatic behavior that is rationally related to
the achievement of some end. Evan M. Zuesse, Ritual, in 12 THE ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF REUGION 405, 405 (Mircea Eliade ed., 1989). These very broad defini-
tions eliminate the religious component of ritual.
Other anthropologists are interested in the religious meaning of ritual
symbolism. Victor Turner defines ritual as "prescribed formal behavior for oc-
casions not given over to technological routine, having reference to beliefs in
invisible beings or powers regarded as the first and final causes of all effects."
VICrOR W. TURNER, FROM RITUAL TO THEATRE 79 (1982). Evan M. Zuesse de-
fines ritual as "those conscious and voluntary, repetitious and stylized sym-
bolic bodily actions that are centered on cosmic structures and/or sacred
presences." Zuesse, supra, at 405. Does it matter which definition of "ritual"
we adopt for purposes of the deathwatch? I do not think so. The behavior ex-
hibited in a deathwatch qualifies for the more expansive definitions. It is for-
malized behavior that has social meaning, in that it transmits the culture's
values and unifies individual participants into a genuine community. But the
behavior exhibited in the deathwatch qualifies for the more narrow definitions
as well. There is no getting around the fact that a member of the community
is dying, that a life force is waning, or transmuting, or moving on. In recogni-
tion of that fact, certain rituals are performed during a deathwatch that refer
to invisible beings, cosmic structures, or powers that are regarded as the first
and final causes; someone or something in the transcendental realm is invoked
or addressed.
259. I use the term "community" here rather loosely:
Secular ceremony certainly often takes place outside of community in
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The bed would be moved to a central location, and chairs would
be placed around the bed to permit visitation. The curtains
would be closedm ° and candles would be lit. The sick-room
was transformed.
Dying is a rite of passage. In his seminal work, The Rites of
Passage, Arnold van Gennep distinguished among three phases
in a rite of passage.26' The first phase, known as "separation,"
clearly demarcates sacred time and space from profane or secu-
lar time and space.262 With formal institutions, separation is ac-
complished by the construction of a special building, such as a
church or a temple, and by the holding of religious services that
are beyond or outside the time that measures our everyday
lives. Since the timing of death in the nineteenth century could
not be controlled, the decline of the human body dictated when
the deathwatch began.283 Similarly, since dying took place in
the sense of "corporate group" and outside of community in the sense
of "common culture." There are secular ceremonies invented and
produced for persons who have come together just for one particular
occasion. The participants even may be of different cultures.
Sally Falk Moore & Barbara G. Myerhoff, Introduction to SECULAR RrruAL 3,
9 (Sally Falk Moore & Barbara G. Myerhoff eds., 1977). The members of the
deathwatch may in fact, and more than likely will, be part of a larger, more
permanent community. They may also form one of these more ephemeral
communities, however, that Falk Moore and Myerhoff refer to here.
260. Closing the curtains creates an enclosure, a demarcation between pro-
fane and sacred space. Mircea Eliade writes that all sacred spaces are en-
closed, one reason being to preserve the "profane man from the danger to
which he would expose himself by entering it without due care. The sacred is
always dangerous to anyone who comes into contact with it unprepared, with-
out having gone through the 'gestures of approach' that every religious act de-
mands." MmtCEA ELIADE, PATTERNS IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION 370-71
(Rosemary Sheed trans., Sheed & Ward 1958) (1948). The sacred enclosure is
also analogous to city walls, originally used as a "magic defence, for they
marked out from the midst of a 'chaotic' space, peopled with demons and
phantoms... a place that was organized, made cosmic, in other words, pro-
vided with a 'centre."' Id. at 371.
261. ARNOLD vAN GENNEP, THE RrrEs OF PASSAGE (Monika B. Vizedom, &
Gabrielle L. Caffee trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1960) (1908). Van Gennep
noted that different people, engaged in different ceremonial patterns, place va-
rying degrees of importance in each of these phases. I&i at 11.
262. Id-
263. Although the timing of death cannot be controlled in the way a peri-
odic, religious occasion can be scheduled, Eliade would still argue that sacred
time, as well as sacred space, is implicated in a deathwatch. Death is an event,
and as such, "every event (every occurrence with any meaning), simply by be-
ing effected in time, represents a break in profane time and an irruption of the
Great Time." ELIADE, supm note 260, at 396. Profane time is "the time in
which meaningless actions come and go." I& Not all sacred, religious time is
reproduced periodically, since "any time may become a sacred time." Id. at
397. Just as any space can become sacred, "so too sacred time, generally estab-
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impromptu, informal settings, there were no special buildings
devoted to the deathwatch. However, the rituals of moving the
bed and chairs, the closing of the windows, and lighting of the
candles accomplished the same thing-the creation of sacred
space.264
This sacred space was created in preparation for the next
stage of a rite of passage, known as "transition." During this
intervening phase, which van Gennep referred to as a "mar-
gin," or limen, meaning "threshold" in Latin, the ritual subject,
the dying person, passes through a period of ambiguity in which
normal social relations are discontinued, rights and obligations
are suspended, and cosmological concerns become of central im-
portance.266 During this phase, in the nineteenth-century
lished by communal feasts set by the calendar, may be attained at any time
and by anyone, simply by repeating an archetypal, mythical gesture." I. at
397-98.
264. A sacred space can be described as "a defined place, a space distin-
guished from other spaces. The rituals that a people either practice at a place
or direct toward it mark its sacredness and differentiate it from other defined
spaces." Joel Brereton, Sacred Space, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, supra
note 258, at 526, 526. The functions of sacred space are dual: first, to provide
places of communication with divinity, i.e., places where people can go to meet
the gods; and second, to be a locus of divine power. Id. at 528-29. See generally
ELiADE, supra note 260, at 367-87; MICEA EUADE, THE SACRED AND THE PRO-
FANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION 20-67 (Willard & Trask trans., Harcourt,
Brace 1959) (setting the agenda for recent scholarship on sacred spaces).
Since so many rituals in the deathwatch go beyond just communication
with divinity, I will use the term "ritual space" from here on, except when di-
rectly referring to van Gennep's theory.
265. VAN GENNEP, supra note 261, at 11.
266. Id. at 147-48 (discussing mourning as a "transitional" period for bath
the deceased and the survivors). Victor Turner built upon van Gennep's the-
ory of liminality, extending it far beyond its original sense of an intermediate
stage in a rite of passage. For Turner, liminal personae could become an en-
during category of people who inhabit the edges of social boundaries: poets,
clowns, shamans, and monks.
The attributes of liminality or of liminal personae ("threshold peo-
ple") are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these per-
sons elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally
locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are
neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions as-
signed and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremon[y] ....
Thus, liminality is frequently likened to death, to being in the womb,
to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an
eclipse of the sun or moon.
VICTOR W. TURNER, THE RrrUAL PROCESS 95 (1969).
Some people live their lives in these liminal positions. (In the legal pro-
fession, the academic plays the court jester, "betwixt and between.") During a
rite of passage, however, all participants are in a sense liminal; by engaging in
ritual activity, they separate themselves from their everyday roles and
statuses.
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deathwatch, dying words would be said, old grievances forgiven,
property distributed, promises extracted, and confessions made.
It was a time for extraordinary utterances, words said outside
the normal boundaries of social intercourse, a time of change
and of confusion. By its very nature, the liminal stage of a rite
of passage is threatening to the community; certainly this was
true for the members of the nineteenth-century deathwatch.
The constituency of the group was about to change: A member
was on the verge of departure, and in the vacuum he left be-
hind, there was chaos, a lack of order and definition.26 7
The third and final phase of a rite of passage, "reaggrega-
tion" or "incorporation," also involves symbolic behavior; in
this circumstance, the dosing of the eyelids, the covering of the
face, the recitation of prayers that send the soul on its way.M
This third phase places the ritual subject in a new, well-defined
position in the total society. In the nineteenth-century death-
watch, the new position was that of ancestor;269 his body be-
came a corpse and was subject to a new set of rules for its
handling and final disposition.270
The rituals of the nineteenth-century deathwatch, the sym-
267. Any change in membership in a small group, whether that change is
the birth of a child, marriage, or the death of a member, strains its internal
cohesion. A change such as a death "inevitably affects the group as a whole
and the relationships among the participants. Every relationship within the
group must be readjusted, and the newly formed group as a result is not iden-
tical to the original conjugal group." Weyrauch, supr note 103, at 166.
268. VAN GENNEP, supra note 261, at 164-65.
269. When I refer to the dying person's new status as "ancestor," I have of
course picked a term that has familial connotations. I do not mean to limit my
remarks to familial deathwatches. The new status might just as easily be de-
scribed as that of "deceased friend or loved one."
In many cultures, however, ancestor worship plays a significant role.
Death rituals "which revolve about the departed are designed to remove pollu-
tion and other evil consequences and to propitiate the deity and thus obtain
the favor of the spirit of the deceased." JOAcHIM WACH, SOCIOLOGY OF RELI-
GION 66 (1944). "Either the departed is considered to have gone and is there-
fore prevented by a series of rites from returning and upsetting the newly
achieved equilibrium of the surviving group, or he continues even after death
to be regarded as a highly revered, howbeit invisible, member of the group."
I. at 67. It is possible that the high regard in which his family holds Father
Ger is just another version of ancestor worship. See suprm notes 203-08 and
accompanying text.
270. Under Jewish law, a person moving from life to death actually has an
interim status. Goses is the name given to a dying person, and in the Talmud,
different rules apply to a goses than to a living person. For example, the goses
should not be touched in the event that his departure might be inadvertently
hastened. Furthermore, a goses should not be left alone, and it is a great mitz-
vah to be present at the departure of the soul. Candles are usually lit in the
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bolic behavior engaged in by the entire community, provided a
framework in which this change of status could take place.
Those prescribed, regular formalities performed around the dy.
ing person represented some sort of constancy to a community
that was threatened by change.-7 The deathwatch gave the
members of the community an excuse to gather, and once in
each other's presence, it gave them something to say and do, a
way to express grief and a way to deal with the burden of one's
own body at an awkward time.272 Each participant knew his
presence of a goses to symbolize the flickering out of the human soul. 5 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1426 (1972).
Once the goses achieves the status of corpse, a different set of rules apply.
For example, someone, preferably the firstborn son, should close the eyes of
the dead. For the laws and customs regarding the treatment of the sick, dying,
and the dead, see CODE OF JEWISH LAW §§ 192-94 (Rabbi Solomon Ganzfried,
ed. & Hyman E. Goldin trans., Hebrew Publishing Co. 1991); see also supra
note 24.
For a general discussion of the Talmudic sources and various codes of
Jewish law on the treatment of the goses and related ethical issues, see FRED
ROSNER, MODERN MEDICINE AND JEWISH ETHICs 197-203 (1986); see also JEW-
ISH BIOETHICS 266-316 (Fred Rosner & J. David Bleich eds., 1979) (confronting
ethical issues surrounding death and the dying); JEWISH MEDICAL LAW 148-54
(Avraham Steinberg, M.D., ed. & David B. Simons, M.D., trans., 1989) (outlin-
ing Jewish ethical codes and principles concerning medical care, the treatment
of the dying, and procedures after a patient's death).
I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Jeffrey I. Roth, for his assistance
in the research on Jewish law.
271. Rituals, rigid procedures, regular formalities, symbolic represen-
tations of all kinds, as well as explicit laws, principles, rules, symbols,
and categories are cultural representations of fixed social reality, of
continuity. They represent stability and continuity acted out and re-
enacted. visible continuity. By dint of repetition they deny the pas-
sage of time, the nature of change, and the implicit extent of potential
indeterminacy in social relations. Whether rituals, laws, rules, cus-
toms, symbols, ideological models, and so on, are old and legitimated
by tradition, or newly forged and legitimated by a revolutionary social
source, they constitute the explicit cultural framework through which
the attempt is made to fix social life, to keep it from slipping into the
sea of indeterminacy.
SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 40-
41(1978).
272. One function of a deathwatch is to prepare the survivors psychologi-
cally for the death and attendant grief. One nursing study investigated the re-
lationship between the expectancy of death and adaptive behavior after death.
Families who were psychologically prepared for the death of a member made
earlier arrangements for removal of the body, manifested less overt emotional
behavior, and verbalized fewer expressions of guilt. Rosemary J. McKeighen,
A Study of Expectancy and Family Grief Reactions 21 (1967) (unpublished
M.S. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles). Also investigated was the
function of a hospital "quiet room," located on the same ward but apart from
the deceased patient's room, to which the family could go to be alone after the
death. The room provided "an appropriate place and the needed time for per-
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role before entering the dark, candlelit room, and that cer-
tainty of script was more than just a consolation. The death-
watch represented to its members a promise of order and a
restoration of normal social relations. It became a polar star to
focus upon, a steady, unblinking point of light in the swirling,
dark maelstrom of impending death.
Except for the rules about testamentary dispositions, the
law did not have much to do with the substance of these rituals.
As we have seen, however, the law does help define the tempo-
ral limits of the deathwatch. In this century, and in the past,
we have tacitly agreed to gather together for this rite of pas-
sage, to stop looking at the clock. But no ritual can go on for-
ever; we must eventually return to ordinary time. By
redefining death and by recognizing that death talk is the sub-
ject of taboo, the law can help bring the attenuated deathwatch
of the late twentieth century to an end.
The law can, however, do something more to alleviate the
pain of the members of the deathwatch. It can help create an
environment in which a meaningful deathwatch can take place.
This the law cannot do alone. Lawyers have to talk to mem-
bers of the medical profession and to the architects of ritual
space. There is a logistical problem to such a conversation,
however. It is difficult to talk to people who are not there.
Every semester, after several weeks have gone by and I
have begun to recognize the faces that look out at me, I give a
speech about the importance of coming to class. It is not a very
inspired speech, but it is heartfelt. I always feel a bit silly at its
end,273 since the speech was given for the benefit of those stu-
sonal reflection, reaction, further clarification, and emotional expression." Id.
at 22. Families who had engaged in a deathwatch and had a high expectancy
of death used the room less. Those families who had not engaged in a death-
watch, or for whom the death was a surprise, displayed extreme emotional be-
havior, such as "vomiting, screaming and fainting," and often refused to accept
the reality of the death pronouncement. id. at 21. Families psychologically
unprepared for the death used the quiet room more frequently. id at 22.
In part, the study concluded that family visits should be encouraged since
they build "expectancy via exposure to the situation and increased opportunity
for acquisition of information." Id at 75. The author also recommended the
hospital hire a "grief therapist," a nurse or family counselor who would help
the "family to enter into or continue through the grief process." Id- at 77.
Such a "grief therapist" would arguably serve the same function as a spiritual
leader in a nineteenth-century deathwatch.
273. On days when I am feeling formidable, I admit to my students that I
feel a bit silly, and on days when I am feeling fragile, I do not. Feeling fragile
is a virus that attacks women law teachers in particular. See generally
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dents who are not there. The students who share my views
about the importance of coming to class are already sitting
before me. I suppose an analogue is the spiritual leader who
admonishes his flock about the wages of sin, knowing full well
that those sheep inside the gate are already convinced. The
real sinners are out of earshot, wandering the fields unat-
tended, bleating their way straight to ovine hell.
It is all a problem of audience. How do you convince others
to take a certain course of action if they are not there to hear
your words? In this instance, their absence is not due to tru-
ancy or sin, but to intellectual isolation. I propose that lawyers
and doctors and architects get together to help alleviate the
pain of the members of the deathwatch, but only one-third of
my audience is present. Although I often wonder who reads
law reviews, I am almost certain that most of the readers are
lawyers. I know there are a few curious souls who read outside
of their discipline. After all, I am one myself. But my partici-
pation is that of an eavesdropper. I like to perch on the edge of
other professions because I am nosy and lonely. I like to know
what they are thinking about, mostly to see if they are thinking
about what I am thinking about, since so often when I stay at
home I have to think alone.
But eavesdropping is solitary and passive, and does nothing
to bridge the gaps between the professions. Even with the occa-
sional exchange of footnotes, the fact remains that doctors talk
and listen to doctors; lawyers talk and listen to lawyers; archi-
tects talk and listen to architects. And no one talks or listens
to poets. We are very insulated from one another. Indeed, one
of the goals of professional education is to provide its students
with a vocabulary that ensures that what they have to say will
be understood only by other members of the guild.
The problem goes deeper than that, however. We learn a
way of looking at the world that makes it difficult to see things
through any other prism. We also begin to believe that our pro-
Deborah Waire Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity and Morality, 6 BERKE-
LEY WoMEN's L.J. 136, 150 (1990-91) (discussing the challenges and biases wo-
men law professors face). While Deborah has given me many insights, and we
do swim together, she is emphatically not the woman in the pool. Actually,
the woman in the pool is a composite of several friends with whom I share
ideas, including the more lawyerly portions of myself. This confession is dedi-
cated to my husband, Daniel P. Jordan Jr., who has a historian's respect for
the truth. He would also like me to confess that I have never taught Civil Pro-
cedure, but I refuse to on the grounds that it is never advisable to do every-
thing your spouse wants.
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fession has a monopoly on solutions. No matter what the prob-
lem is, most doctors believe that the solution lies hidden in the
secrets of nature, in attaining a perfect understanding of the
human body. Most lawyers believe that the solution lies hidden
in the secrets of language, in finding the perfect words to ad-
dress the situation. Most architects believe that the solution
lies hidden in the secrets of design, in conceiving of the perfect
space. All poets know that the solution, if there is one, lies hid-
den in the secrets of the human heart, where perfection is un-
heard of.
We were expecting as visitors for the weekend an old
friend from Columbus, Colin Fink, his wife Nancy, and their
two children. Colin is an architect in upstate New York. Here
was an opportunity to talk to someone who was not a lawyer, to
someone who designs spaces for a living. Maybe we could dis-
cuss what our respective professions could do about the horrors
of the late-twentieth-century deathwatch; what lawyers and ar-
chitects might do together to alleviate the pain of its members.
With four small children under one roof, it was not easy to
find an island of silence upon which to embark on an adult con-
versation. When such an island finally appeared on the hori-
zon, I found Colin sitting on a lawn chair in our living room,
reading. He put his book down and asked me what I had been
working on, and I tentatively started in on the deathwatch.
Colin was interested. The firm with which he had once
been associated, the Research and Design Institute (REDE),
had been hired in the late 1960s as a consultant for the design
of a thirty-bed extended care unit to a county hospital.2 4 The
premise that bed rest is essential to post-operative care had
been replaced by a theory of early ambulation and "self-ther-
apy."275 The hypothesis was that patients would heal better
274. The Research and Design Institute (REDE) was located in Providence,
Rhode Island. It consisted of a group of architects, designers, and social scien-
tists who sought to create "superior configurations for institutional facilities."
Ronald Beckman, The Therapeutic Corridor, 45 HOsPITALs 1, 2 (photo. re-
print) (1971). Because funding dried up, the firm is now defunct. Colin W.
Fink is presently a partner with the firm, North Country Team, Inc. of Essex,
New York. The hospital was South County Hospital in Wakefield, Rhode
Island.
275. Ruth M. Fitzgibbons, Open-plan CommunitY Clinic, INTERIoRS, Dec.
1974, at 72, 74. The medical jargon of the early 1970s referred to this as pro-
gressive patient care ('?PC"). Id
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and faster if they were actively involved not only in their own
recovery but also in the recovery of others.
This hypothesis proved to have a profound effect on the de-
sign of the Borda Wing, as it came to be called. The REDE
team was concerned that conventional hospital corridors would
not support the practice of early ambulation; there just was not
enough room in the narrow hallways for people to move
around. The team recommended that the corridors be used not
only for getting from one room to another, but also as commu-
nal areas, capacious enough to accommodate any combination
of recuperating patients, some of them in wheelchairs or stain-
less steel exoskeletons. The architects went to work, and in-
stead of designing the hallways for solitary nurses, they made
them wide enough so that patients could congregate in groups,
share experiences, and give support to one another while bodies
were on the mend.276
The communal spaces in the Borda Wing included two
nourishment centers available for staff and patients, and pa-
tients could eat whenever and with whomever they pleased.
There were game tables, reading and writing stations, alcoves
for private telephone conversations, and sunny dayrooms at
either end of the corridors to provide a "destination point,"
otherwise known as someplace to go.2 77 Privacy was respected,
but the therapeutic emphasis was on collaboration. Everyone
was encouraged to live out in the open as active members of a
healing community.
It was an interesting conversation, but too short. Colin's
presence was required in the backyard, and I never really got to
ask him how he would design for the deathwatch. It was too
short, but long enough to give me a flash of insight: architects
approach problems differently from doctors and lawyers.
First, architects are obsessed with function: What is it this
building is supposed to do?278 Usually the answers are quite
simple. For example, this building is supposed to provide shel-
ter for a family; or this building is supposed to provide a place
276. Id. The standard hospital corridor is six to eight feet wide. In the
Borda Wing, they were 18 feet wide. Id-
277. I&
278. One scholar has argued that this obsession with function ("What is it
this building is supposed to do?" e.g., provide shelter, comfort, or safekeeping),
has confused architects about the status of architecture. "Some have regarded
architecture as chiefly utilitarian; others have treated it as an 'applied art.'"
Others, such as Louis H. Sullivan, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, and Frank Lloyd
Wright, have "tried to meet the prosaic demands of utility by making function
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to learn; or this building is supposed to provide a place to care
for the sick and restore them to health.
Armed with a concept of what the building is supposed to
do, architects start out with some expectations about how the
human beings who will use the building are going to behave.
This requires them to focus not so much on the behavior of any
given individual, but on the behavior of a group of individuals.
While it is true that the basic unit is still the human body, most
buildings are designed with the idea that more than one human
body will use the space, and that the patterns of use are pre-
dictable. In homes, for example, at least in our culture, people
usually sleep in bedrooms that are located towards the back of
the house, and gather together in larger rooms towards the
front. In schools, teachers usually stand up and talk in the
front of the room, and pupils sit down and listen.279 In hospi-
tals, sick people usually lie down in beds, more or less grouped
paramount, believing that genuinely appropriate forms are always beautiful."
SUZANNE Y. LANGER, FEELING AND FoRm 92-93 (1953).
Architecture does more than just provide shelter. It creates an "ethnic
domain," an image of a culture and a
physically present human environment that expresses the characteris-
tic rhythmic functional patterns which constitute a culture. Such pat-
terns are the alternations of sleep and waking, venture and safety,
emotion and calm, austerity and abandon; the tempo, and the smooth-
ness or abruptness of life; the simple forms of childhood and the com-
plexities of full moral stature, the sacramental and the capricious
moods that mark a social order, and that are repeated, though with
characteristic selection, by every personal life springing from that
order.
I& at 96.
Colin Fink has quarreled with my use of the word "obsessed" in the noted
sentence. "In defense of architects, a good architect should not be obsessed
with anything. The beauty of good architecture is the beauty of poetry-the
ambiguity, multiplicity, and flexibility of a design." Letter from Colin Fink,
partner, North Country Team, Inc., to Louise Harmon, Associate Professor,
Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro College (May 9,1992) (on file with the
Minnesota Law Review).
279. It has always bothered me that the architecture of law schools seems
to demand that classrooms be designed like large, fixed-focus cameras, with
the teacher occupying the focal point at the bottom of the pit, and the students
placed on ascending tiers in seats invariably screwed to the floor to assure the
maintenance of this unpleasant status quo. When I first started teaching at
Touro, we had just moved into an old junior high school building, and my first
classes were held in a large, level room which had been the cafeteria. The stu-
dents sat in folding chairs, and we moved them around a lot. The balance of
power was always changing, as was the way in which we saw the world and
each other. As we remodeled the building and struggled toward accreditation
and acceptance in the academy, the ABA required us to screw the chairs to the
floor. Now we eat bad hot dogs in that room, and I find myself teaching at the
bottom of a pit.
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together by disease, and their family and friends sit down to
visit them. Most of these expectations are culturally
determined.
At a deeper level, there are hypotheses about how best to
achieve the maximum function of a building that embrace a
certain view of human psychology. All of these hypotheses de-
part from the premise that people are affected by their environ-
ment; that the dimensions, floor plan, orientation, light, colors,
and textures, all of the attributes of any given building, will
have an impact on how people think and feel and interact in
that environment.280
How people think and feel and interact in a hospital or
other health care facility became relevant when Norman Cous-
ins, among others, convinced us that healing is dependent on
the patient's state of mind.28' Cousins further insisted that a
patient's environment has a "large part to do with getting the
best out of health care."282 These ideas had an impact on hospi-
tal design. It became a shibboleth in the architectural litera-
280. Consider the following statement regarding the design of environ-
ments for special groups of people such as the elderly, disabled children, or
homeless people: "Architects of such facilities agree that the most important
aspect in designing for any special population is the creation of an environ-
ment that is sensitive to the needs, feelings, and dignity of the people who will
use the space." Lynn Nesmith, Designing for 'pecial Populations," ARCHI-
TECTURE, Jan. 1987, at 62, 62. While such a statement seems almost trite in an
architectural journal, it is difficult to imagine articulating the goal of either a
legal or medical task in this way.
281. Interest in the relationship between a patient's mental state and the
healing process, with its implications for the design of hospitals, hardly started
with Norman Cousins. For example, the Austrian visionary, Rudolph Steiner
(obit. 1925), developed something called "Anthroposophy," the "science of the
spirit." Karin Tetlow, Healthy Color, INTEmORS, Dec. 1989, at 94, 94. Danish-
born Eric Asmussen has concentrated on anthroposophical architecture in hos-
pital design since 1960. Asmussen designed the hospital that is part of the Ru-
dolf Steiner Seminary at Jarna, near Stockholm. He strove to create "a
stimulating environment which inspires the healing activity for which the
building was intended. Windows, for example, are shaped as keyholes sug-
gesting connections with the 'spiritual in the universe.' The resulting har-
mony brings equilibrium to the patient, who by being sick, is out of balance."
Id The architecture itself serves as therapy, on the theory that the environ-
ment can have a positive impact on healing.
282. Carleton Knight I, Designing for the Health Care Process and Mar-
ketplace, ARcHITEcrURE, Jan. 1987, at 49, 49 (quoting Norman Cousins).
283. Cousins's book, Anatomy of an filness, was one of the most popular
expressions of a holistic approach to incurable illness. After its publication,
"several hospitals developed special facilities within their cancer treatment
centers based on his ideas." The first was St. Joseph's Hospital in Houston,
which created a living room for patients, an "airy open space with comfortable
furniture, a television with video cassettes of old comedies ... a place to paint
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ture that the design had to promote the healing process, as the
architect struggled to come to terms with his obsession: What
is it this building is supposed to do?
Architects started asking questions like these: Does it mat-
ter how many doors a patient must open in order to be out in
the world?284 Does it matter if a patient has another human
being to make eye contact with when he enters a health care
facility? a  Does it matter if there is room on the maternity
ward for the father to sleep?2 w Does it matter whether the
or play the piano." Id Cousins reported that at least "a dozen hospitals...
have taken similar steps to reduce the institutionality of a medical environ-
ment and make it more homelike for patients and families alike in recent
years." I&
284. A relationship exists between a patient's vulnerability to death and
changes in physical environment. Studies of transfers of the frail elderly from
one setting to another show that such a move may threaten their health; they
need stability. JOsEPH A. KONCELIK, DESIGNING THE OPEN NURSING HOME 14
(1976).
One of the most reliable predictors of death among the elderly who
have been transferred is the loss of desire to penetrate the social and
physical environment. The number of times a person needs to go be-
yond his or her boundaries-or have someone penetrate theirs-in or-
der to remain alive can be fixed. These numbers of penetrations
become the most accurate predictor of death among the aging who
have been transferred from one setting to another.
I& (citing Leon A. Pastalan, Privacy Preferences Among Relocated Institution-
alized Elderly, in EDRA5 (Environmental Research Ass'n, Inc. ed., 1974)).
285. One problem with the architecture of spaces designed to house new
medical machines is the tendency of architects to want to "celebrate the tech-
nology" by exposing the hardware. For example, the architects of the Center
for Non-Invasive Diagnosis at the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque
had to fight the urge to "express the building as a giant machine (which it ac-
tually is)." Michael Crosbie, Reassuring Setting for High-Tech Medicine,
ARcHTECTuRE, Jan. 1987, at 43, 43. Instead, the Center is "quite domestic in
scale," reflecting the architecture of the American Southwest. The architect,
Glade Sperry Jr., felt it was "important to have human contact on entering the
center, and the receptionist's desk is positioned so that one immediately makes
eye contact." I& While the exterior reflects "the palette of the desert, the in-
teriors are cool and restful-rose, gray, mauve, and tan." The goal is to mini-
mize the "frightening experience" of "being pushed through a magnet and
emitting radio signals." Id
286. Until recently, maternity units in hospitals were judged on clinical ef-
ficiency. In Wythenshawe Hospital, an older hospital in Manchester, England,
there was "no attempt to provide a domestic atmosphere or to make unobtru-
sive the clinical equipment such as gas outlets, cot, scrub-up trough." Wythen-
shawe Hospital Maternity Unit, ARCHITECTS' J., March 30, 1966, reprinted in
BRITISH HOsPTrAL AND HEALTH-CARE BUiLDINGs at 192, 199 (Peter Stone ed.,
1980). There was space for about five witnesses, such as pupil midwives, the
husband, and, later, medical students. While the husband could witness the
birth, his extended stay was not anticipated. I&
Compare this to a maternity unit in the Stirling Royal Infirmary, which
seeks to provide "every amenity for the patient." Paisley and Stirling Mater-
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lighting is diffuse in the ICU? Does it matter whether the pul-
sating life-support systems hang naked from the walls? 2s 7 Does
it matter if a bed-bound patient can see a tree?m
Even questions of power are raised in projects like the hos-
pital wing that Colin's firm helped design. The hypothesis
there shifted part of the responsibility for the healing process
nity Units, ARCTrEcrs' J., Nov. 4, 1970, reprinted in BRITISH HOSPITAL AND
HEALTH-CARE BUILDINGS, supra, at 205, 212. The labor suite has a lounge
where the patient may remain during the early phases of labor. Later on, in
the first stage delivery rooms, the husband is not only welcome, but an over-
night room is provided for him. I&
In another new design for a birthing room, a Chicago-based architecture
and interior design firm created suites at West Suburban Hospital in Oak Park
that serve as labor/delivery and recovery/postpartum care rooms (LDRP) for
normal and high risk births. The suite also serves as a "homey liv-
ing/dining/bedroom for visiting, and even family sleep-overs in a reclining
lounge chair." Judith Davidsen, Birthing Center, INTmoR DESIGN, Nov. 1990,
at 190, 192. The medical equipment needed for the birth, such as oxygen, air,
and suction vacuum, for use in case of emergency, and an examining light, all
disappear after the baby is born. The bed converts into a labor table, then a
delivery table and then back to a bed. The family is invited to participate in
the birthing event, and the room's design helps to "bridge the gap between
pregnancy and parenthood." Id.; see also Margaret F. Gaskie, Making Special
Care Special, ARcHrrEcTuRAL REC., June 1990, at 98, 98-101 (describing an-
other birthing center design in Miami).
287. 'The Intensive Care Unit Initiative was presented to the Third Sym-
posium on Health Care Interior Design at San Francisco's Contract Design
Center" in the fall of 1990. The designer, Orlando Diaz-Azcuy, was aware that
there were four essential elements to consider: "the medical staff; the patient;
the family; and the technology." Karin Tetlow, Design Heals, INTERIORs, Dec.
1990, at 61, 61. Diaz-Azcuy hid most of the ICU equipment in "office style
cabinets" in the wall when it was not in use. He also provided for a private
toilet and sink that were hidden from sight, and calculated where the window
should begin so that the patient could see the outside world from his bed.
There was something called the nurses' "Observation Wall," which was "built
from Varilite panels that change from clear to water-white at the patient's dis-
cretion to ensure privacy." Id. at 64. Instead of having lighting installed in the
headwall, Diaz-Azcuy provided for soft, ambient lighting, with several addi-
tional lighting sources that could be operated by dimmer according to either
the patient's or medical staff's needs. The curtains were a yellow stripe, and
the wood paneling was made of white oak. His overall goal was to create "hu-
manistic and sensitive designs." Id at 62, 64.
288. A geographer at the University of Delaware has suggested that trees
can actually reduce costs in hospital care. He examined the post-operative
care records of two groups of patients who were virtually identical except that
some looked out onto a brown brick wall, and some looked out onto a small
stand of deciduous trees. On average, patients who could see the trees spent
nearly 24 hours less in the hospital, needed less attention from nurses, and
took fewer doses of expensive drugs. Ulrich argues that hospital design and
siting should take into account the quality of the patients' views from the win-
dows. Roger S. Ulrich, View Through a Window May Influence Recovery
from Surgery, 224 SCIENCE 420, 420 (1989).
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from the medical professionals to the patient himself. By shift-
ing that responsibility, there was a corresponding shift in
power; how the therapy and course of treatment was going to
proceed became more a joint enterprise than a dictatorship. In
the Planetree Model Hospital Project in San Francisco, to give
another example, a designer challenged the traditional nursing
station with its high counters and lack of accessibility, claiming
that such bastions emphasize "territoriality and convey a strong
'us versus them' mentality."289 The nursing work areas were
therefore located informally along the perimeter walls, and in
the middle of this area, tables were provided for patients to
look over their charts and discuss them with nurses, doctors, or
family members. A patient library in the twenty-five-bed unit
"symbolically convey[ed] the importance of openly exchanging
medical information." 9  As the space was redesigned, the
power relationships were redefined. 91
As I said before, architects approach things differently
from doctors and lawyers.2 92 Unlike architects, most doctors do
289. Michael Wagner, Healing Revolution, INTERIORS, Dec. 1990, at 96, 97.
The interior designers of the Planetree Model Hospital Project were Victoria
Fay & Associates and architects Kaplan, McLaughlin, and Diaz. The Plane-
tree Project opened in 1985 in the Pacific Presbyterian Medical Center in San
Francisco. Id- at 96-97.
290. Id at 97.
291. To me, the most radical innovation in the Planetree unit did not have
to do with design, but with time. The power to set the schedule for waking
and visiting was returned to the patient. Every evening the nursing staff
asked the patient when he would like to be awakened, instead of rudely wak-
ing him at 6:00 a-m. to take his temperature. Similarly, the patient was the
one to determine who would visit him and when. I. These seem like such
little things, but anyone who has spent time in a hospital knows that these lit-
tle things are what get you down. They are what diminish you as a human
being.
292. I realize that I may be speaking of only a handful of progressive archi-
tects. Probably just as many are designing hospitals in the more traditional
style. Furthermore, some new movements in design strike me as a step back-
wards. I felt a chill run down my spine when I read about the new phenome-
non of "medical malls." One such mall is in Tucker, Georgia, a suburb of
Atlanta. The mall has 120 licensed beds, with "an inpatient care area con-
nected to the administrative and business office by an open atrium." The mall
is very cost effective, since the offices did not have to meet the stringent hospi-
tal codes. Margaret Sanders, Hospitals. The Prognosis, CoNsTRuCoN SPECI-
FMER, Aug. 1991, at 46, 52.
Dr. Roger Panther, president of Quorum Health Resources, Inc., has been
instrumental in developing several medical malls. "'The core of the mall has
an outpatient entrance leading to a central reception area,' Panther says.
'More than simply an open area for traffic, the reception area doubles as func-
tional space for waiting, reception, admitting, information, and dining. The
multi-purpose atrium design stresses natural lighting and an airy atmosphere
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not deal with patients as members of a community. There is
one human being, and only one, at the end of the stethoscope.
Even then, in light of the specialization within medicine, it is
sometimes difficult to get a doctor to see that one human being
instead of just the body part in which he is interested. 29s Law-
yers deal with humanity in the same way; the tenets of liber-
alism have forced upon us the unit of the individual, and our
procedural apparatus has reinforced that limitation by making
it difficult to listen to more than one voice at a time.
Because architects do not look at human beings in isola-
tion, they have given a lot more thought to the deathwatch and
how to alleviate the pain of its members. We have a lot to
learn from them.
What does it mean to be at home? I looked up the word in
the dictionary, and to me the first six competing definitions
looked like a piece of poetry:
HOME (hom) n. 1) A place where one lives; residence; habita-
tion. 2) The physical structure or portion thereof within which one
lives, as a house or apartment. 3) One's close family and one's self; a
person's most personal relationships and possessions: house and
with interior landscaping, skylights, and on-the-mall eating areas for visitors
and staff."' Id
Unfortunately, I have had a recurrent nuclear holocaust dream in which I
always find myself living out the last few days of my life, with my small chil-
dren, in the Walt Whitman Mall in Huntington, New York. I was not happy to
see that medical malls are on the horizon. Maybe I will someday die in a room
next to an escalator, with indoor trees, a phony roaring fountain, and the ma-
levolent hum of muzak in my ears.
293. A monologue in My Dinner With Andre comments on the narrow fo-
cus that a medical specialist can have with respect to the part of the patient's
body he is interested in. Andre's mother had been dying in the hospital, and a
specialist who had been consulted about a minor problem with her arm failed
to see the rest of the patient:
You know, we had gone to the hospital to see my mother, and I'd
been in to see her, and I saw this woman that looked as bad as any
survivor in Auschwitz or Dachau, and I was out in the hall sort of
comforting my father, and this doctor who was a specialist in a prob-
lem she had with her arm went into her room and came out just
beaming and said to us, "Boy, don't we have a lot of reason to feel
great? Isn't that wonderful how she's coming along?" Well, all he
saw was her arm. That's all he saw. And I mean, here's another per-
son who's existing in a dream. Who on top of that is a kind of butcher
who's committing a kind of familial murder, because he comes out of
that room, and he psychically kills us by taking us into a dream
world, you see, where we become confused and frightened, because
the moment before, we saw somebody who looked already dead, and
now here comes the specialist who tells us that everything is great.
WALLAcE SHAWN & ANDRE GREGORY, MY DINNER WITH ANDRE 61-62 (1981).
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home. 4) An environment or haven of shelter, of happiness and love.
5) Any valued place, original habitation, or emotional attachment re-
garded as a refuge or place of origin. 6) The place where one was
born or spent his early childhood, as a town, state, or country. 4
Such a lot of work for one small word, and each definition
is beautiful in its own way. With so many meanings, it explains
how I can feel at home in my little blue house, or at home with
my family, or at home at work, or at home in Columbus, Ohio,
or even at home in my own mind.
But at the moment, I am thinking more about a home
space, an actual place in which to live, and ultimately to die. A
book by Gaston Bachelard got me thinking about home space;
what it means to have one and what it means not to have one.
In The Poetics of Space, Bachelard writes, "All really inhabited
space bears the essence of the notion of home."' ' 95 The phe-
nomenologist of the home has his task set out for him: He
must
say how we inhabit our vital space, in accord with all the dialectics of
life, how we take root, day after day, in a 'corner of the world.' For
our house is our corner of the world. As has often been said, it is our
first universe, a real cosmos in every sense of the word. If we look at
it intimately, the humblest dwelling has beauty." 9
What does it mean to take root, day after day, in a corner
of the world? For me, it means waking up in my own bed by
the dim light of the dawn, making the solitary journey to the
kitchen to put the kettle on, the cats at my feet, music from the
radio humming in the background, knowing that the people I
love the most in the world will soon join me in the kitchen,
with their clatter and clutter and morning demands. For a
brief, precious moment of time, we will inhabit our home space
together before we all go out the door.
That door. We all go out of it in the morning, and come
back through it at the end of the day. That door means every-
thing to the definition of my home space. It creates a boundary
between my family and the outside community. It keeps in our
family secrets, our rituals, our words of love, and our words of
294. THE AMEuCAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 629
(William Morris ed., 1973).
295. GASTON BACHELARD, THE PoETIcs OF SPACE 5 (Maria Jolas trans.,
Orion Press 1964) (1958). I would also like to thank Peter Bentell of the archi-
tecture firm of Bentell and Bentell, in Locust Valley, New York, for his inval-
uable assistance in steering me toward some of the more thoughtful literature
about architecture and its relationship to the human body and to society as a
whole.
296. IL at 4.
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frustration. It houses both our dreams, and sometimes our
fears. That door defines the outer edges of our intimacy.297
That door. We all go out of it in the morning, and come
back through it at the end of the day. Not only does it keep
things in, it also keeps things out. Each of us who inhabits the
home space within has control over the use of that door; it pro-
vides the power to exclude. Even though it is only a piece of
wood, hanging tenuously at times from two hinges, it is a sym-
bol to all who stand before it that permission must be granted
before entering.298 And when we open that door to a friend, we
do so knowingly and willingly, because of our decision that, for
a time, we do not mind redefining the boundary of our private
domain.
Without that corner of the world, that vital space to take
root in day after day, the world would be, and is for many, a
cold and heartless place.
The only good place to be sick is at home.
Once I was trapped on my back in a hospital for four
297. Examining the significance of the human body in architecture, two
scholars have discussed the symbolic meaning of "the house." KENT C.
BLOOMER & CHARLES W. MOORE, BODY, MEMORY AND ARcHTETaruRE 45-49
(1977). At the "edges of the house," where the house dweller leaves and en-
ters, a reorientation from a place of one or a few people to a place of many
people is necessary-
Even as the primary body boundary exists between the world of the
individual and the community, the house boundary exists between the
family and the community. The entryway, therefore, becomes an ex-
traordinarily sensitive region of the house boundary, a landmark
which must respect and reinforce the feelings and identity of both the
inside and outside communities.
Id. at 46. Society needs articulate and dynamic boundaries. 'The architectural
boundary exists to encourage and ritualize activities which are sacred to the
family, and its destruction or exaggeration can sap the vitality of both the fam-
ily and the public domain in which it resides." Id. at 47.
298. Let us only say a few words about the 'essence' of the house. To
find a common denominator for all houses (buildings) may seem fu-
tile. If it makes any sense to talk about the 'level of houses,' however,
it ought to be possible. In fact, all treatises on architecture from Al-
berti to Venturi in some way or other have attempted to solve the
problem. It was pointed out above that essentially the house brings us
'inside.' The essence of the house as architecture, therefore, is inte-
rior space. In the city we are still 'outside,' although we have left the
open landscape. In the house we are alone with ourselves, we have
withdrawn. When we open our doors to others, it is our free decision:
we let the world come to us, rather than looking at it outside. 'Do-
mestic peace' has been a basic right since remote times.
CHRISTIAN NoRBE G-ScmuLTz, ExIsTENcE, SPACE & ARcHTEaCruRE 86, 88
(1971).
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months, and I can still remember my incessant yearning to re-
turn to my home space. Day after endless day, I would say to
myself and to others, "All I want to do is go home." I wanted
my own bed, my own window looking out on my own tree, my
own sheets, my own cats, my own tea cup, my own bathroom,
my own door. That door.
I hated having no door to close in the hospital, being sub-
jected to the unannounced entrances and exits of strangers.
I hated the nurses coming in and out, those constant bodily in-
vasions, perpetrated against me according to someone else's
schedule. I hated visiting hours, when sometimes people I did
not choose to see chose to come see me. I hated having other
very sick human beings in beds eight feet away, with their own
parade of visitors, their own medical traffic, and their very dif-
ferent universe on the television. I hated having always to be
pleasant, since I knew too well the price for petulance: a de-
cline in the quality of nursing care. For anyone with a chronic
illness, the mentality must be that of a survivor; in a conscious
act of will, the prickly parts of one's personality must be
wrapped in the velvet of submission." Day after day, night af-
ter night, all I wanted to do was to go home, and unlike many
times when wishes come true, when I finally did go home,
there was no sense of disappointment. All I had yearned for
were little things, and the little things were all still there, wait-
ing patiently for me: my bed, my cats, my tea cup, my tree,
now leafless from the winter winds.
Sickness brings with it a vulnerability of spirit, a fragility
that makes us want to turn away from the world and crawl into
our own beds. It is a great irony to me that our need to be at
299. A room in an institutional setting like a hospital will always be subject
to intrusions by others since it is one small unit in a much larger public space.
Not only does the occupant of a hospital room lack the power to exclude
others, but he also lacks the power to inhabit the public space beyond the few
square feet allotted for his body. A hospital room therefore probably qualifies
as a "cell." The distinction between a house and a cell is fundamental. With a
house, a family expects to be able to occupy all its parts. A cell denies the oc-
cupant "access to the whole of the place which contains the cell. The front
door of a prison, for example, is not accessible to the occupants of its cells, nor
are the attics, cellars, and grand interior meeting places available to the ten-
ants of most modern apartment 'complexes." BLooMER & MooRE, supra note
297, at 47.
300. See A. Strauss et al., The Hospital and its Negotiated Order, reprinted
in MODERN SOCIOLOGY 394, 400-02 (Peter Worsley ed., 2d ed. 1978) (discussing
the hospital as a "locale where personnel, mostly but not exclusively profes-
sionals, are enmeshed in a complex negotiative process," and how the chroni-
cally ill patient gets what he wants in the "negotiated order").
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home is greatest when we are sickest, yet that is the time in
our culture when we are bodily removed from our homes. Just
consider what it means to crawl into your own bed.s0' My Irish
mother-in-law, for example, when she goes to bed at night, goes
to the bed that she was born in, to the bed that her brothers
and sisters were born in, to the bed that her mother died in, to
the bed that her great-grandmother died in. My babies, her
grandchildren, have many times crawled into that dark wooden
bed to read books with her, to be near her soft, sweet skin that
always smells of roses. Someday, she herself will die in that
dark wooden bed.
Does it matter where we conceive our children? Where we
give birth to our children? Where we lie down to sleep?
Where we lie down to die?
Just consider what it means to crawl into a hospital bed.
The mattress is enclosed in thick, brittle plastic that resists the
weight of a human being.3O2 It is a hot, sweating thing, made
bearable only by the intervention of rough, white cotton that
only stays in place if the envelope is not opened. Its frame is
301. The history of where we lay ourselves down to sleep, or to die, is in-
teresting. In Europe, until the late Middle Ages, most people slept on loose
bedding or on the ground. Beds were a luxury, often serving as a symbol of
wealth and rank. For example, the ranking individual in a household slept in
a bed with elaborate accouterments, in particular a canopy. This "Bed of Es-
tate," much like the Chair of Estate, would be used only when official visitors
were received. A simpler bed would be used for less momentous sleeping.
CHARLES BOYCE, DIcIoNARY OF FuRNITURE 26 (1985).
In the eighteenth century, beds became smaller, less elaborate, and more
accessible to the average man. In England, the general type of bed was a sim-
ple four-poster bearing draw curtains. A smaller canopy known as the "field
bed" became more popular in America. Beds of the Empire periods tended to
be low, chunky blocks, usually undraped. The "sleigh bed" was of this type.
Modern springs and mattresses have removed the need for heavy wood fram-
ing, and most contemporary bed designs use only enough framing to raise the
bed from the floor. Canopies, if they are used at all, have become merely dec-
orative. JOSEPH ARONSON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FURNrrE 37-43 (3d ed.
1965).
302. Those horrible mattresses are intentional, and supposedly serve lauda-
ble goals of sanitation and patient hygiene.
One guidebook to the design of long-term care facilities states as its "main
thrust" the "creation of an environment which promotes a feeling of well-be-
ing, of independence, of individual worth, and an atmosphere which engenders
the continued growth of the resident." LASZLO ARANYi & LARRY L.
GOLDMAN, DESIGN OF LONG-TERM CARE FACxrrIES 24 (1980). On a previous
page under "Odor Control," the book states: '"roper selection of furnishings
will also go a long way toward eliminating this disagreeable problem. Mat-
tresses should always have waterproof ticking. Seating used by residents
should also be covered in materials that shed or repel liquids." Id. at 20. The
authors even suggest, "Some mattresses are also available with a germicide im-
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metal, and it is not committed to any certain place, but mi-
grates on wheels at the whim of someone other than its occu-
pant. It has that terrible potential of becoming a prison, with
shiny parallel bars that wait poised below the mattress line.
They brush against your calves when you get up to roam
around, a chilling reminder of their function, to capture and re-
tain. The crime committed. illness. The theory of punishment:
isolation.
Although few of us crawl into the bed that bore us, those
of us who are lucky enough to live in a home space have a place
to lie down at night to call our own. I want to die in that place,
if I can. But if I must die in a bed that belongs to another, I do
not want it to be in one of those hospital beds. I do not want
my body lifted from a plastic platform to a plastic bag. I do not
want to be rendered untouchable by a barrier of chrome.
To me, the answer to those questions is obvious: It matters
where we crawl into bed, whether we are sleeping, making new
life, healing, giving birth, dying, or just having a nap. It mat-
ters a lot.3
°3
And the only good place to be sick is at home.
pregnated in the ticking, the value of which may be subject to question." Id at
24.
All this may be well and good for patients who are incontinent or highly
contagious. However, for the dying patient who is neither, it seems a shame to
force him to live out his last few days afloat a rubber mattress. Are comforta-
ble, disposable mattresses that more closely resemble a normal bed an impossi-
bility? During my own lengthy hospital stays, I would gladly have paid for my
own mattress, if the hospital would have permitted it. As it was, I had to fight
for the privilege of keeping my own pillow. If the goal of long-term care de-
sign is truly to promote the resident's feeling of well-being and individual
worth, some attention ought to be paid to treating a reclining human body as
something other than a generator of odor causing fluids and germs.
303. Norberg-Schultz explored the "lowest level of existential space, that
of furniture and objects-for-use." NORBERG-ScuLTz, supra note 298, at 31-32.
The fireplace, which has since ancient times been the very center of the dwell-
ing, and the table, the place 'vhere the family joined to form a 'ring,"' are
extremely important. However,
[Tihe bed represents the centre even more convincingly, being the
place from where man starts his day, and to which he returns in the
evening. In bed, the circle of the day, and of life, is closed. The bed,•
therefore, par e=ellence, is the place where man 'comes to rest,'
where his movements find their goal. Bolnow also points out that
man's active relationship to the world is characterized by his vertical
position; he takes a 'stand'. To sleep means to give up this position
and return to the very 'point of departure'. When the Chateau de
Versailles was centralized on the bed of Louis XIV, it symbolized
more than a mere demonstration of power.
I&. at 32.
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What is the relationship between a home space and the rit-
ual space that is needed for a meaningful deathwatch?
We cannot create the ritual space needed for a meaningful
deathwatch without a home space. Ritual requires the demar-
cation of ritual space from secular space, and there can be no
demarcation without the power to transform. Ritual also re-
quires a community, and there can be no community without
the power to include and exclude. Those powers can only be
exercised in a home space. If there is no home space, there can
be no ritual space, and if there is no ritual space, then the
deathwatch lacks meaning.
Having a home space means, among other things, that
those who inhabit it have control over what transpires within.
This includes the power to transform the environment. If for
whatever reason the inhabitants of the home space wish to
make a room which is normally light, dark, they can do so. If
they wish to change the configuration of the furniture, they can
do so. If they wish to unplug the telephone and turn off the
television, they can do so. If they wish to fill the room with
music or prayer, they can do so. In a home space, there are no
institutional impediments to the creation of ritual space. There
is a door, and behind that door the members of the deathwatch
can gather. There is freedom behind that door.
That door. Having a home space also means that its in-
habitants can shut that door, or they can choose to open that
door selectively, to invite in friends and family. That door de-
fines the community; it draws the circle around the members of
the deathwatch, not some arbitrary legal category. Control
over that door, and who goes in and out, allows the inhabitants
of the home space to create their own circle of intimacy, with-
out which ritual cannot take place. There is a relationship be-
tween a home space and the ritual space needed for a
meaningful deathwatch, all having to do with that door.
Recognition of that relationship is something that the law
could do to alleviate indirectly the pain of the members of the
deathwatch. There is this obvious suggestion: If possible, we
should help those people who want to die at home, or who want
to care for their dying family members or friends at home, to
do so.
The idea is not new; no wheels need be invented. There is
already an institution in place to facilitate such a home death.
It is known as a hospice. Although the words "hospice" and
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"hospital" share the same etymology, 04 and the institutions
share the same history, they have come to mean very different
things. In the ancient civilizations of India and Egypt, as well
as in early Greece and Rome, the public facilities for the care of
the sick were located in temples.305 Bodily and spiritual health
were regarded as the same thing.
In Western Europe, during the medieval period, religion
was again the dominant influence in the establishment of heal-
ing institutions. During the Crusades, "hospices" or "hospitals"
sprang up all over Europe alongside monasteries to provide
food, temporary shelter and medical care for travelers and pil-
grims. A number of military facilities provided for the care of
sick and exhausted crusaders.306 In the early medieval period,
monks and clerics performed the role of healers, because they
were the only ones with a semblance of education and were
bound by vows of charity. In 1163, a Church edict forbade
clergy from performing any operation that necessitated the
shedding of blood. The result was a sharp curtailment in the
304. The word hospital ultimately comes from the Latin hospes, meaning
"a guest." The French hospice developed from the Latin hospitium, which
meant the location where a guest was received, and the English words hospi-
tal, hostel, and hotel come from the old French hospitaZe. Thus, the words hos-
pital, hostel, hotel, and hospice were all originally used in the same sense, but
now have very different meanings. KENNETH P. COHEN, HospIcE: PRESCRip-
TION FOR TERMINAL CARE 13 (1979).
305. Both ancient India and Egypt had crude facilities that we might char-
acterize as hospitals. In "the sixth century B.C., Buddha appointed a physician
for every ten villages and built hospitals for the crippled and the poor." Id- at
14. His son also built shelters for the pregnant and the ill. In early Egypt,
medical treatment was usually dispensed in the home, but some therapy was
also available in the temples. Often the Egyptian doctor was a priest, since sci-
ence and magic were often viewed as the same thing. Id.
In ancient Greece, sanctuaries were dedicated to Aesculapius, the Greek
god of medicine. In these sanctuaries the sick were ministered to for both
their physical and spiritual woes. These Aesculapia had large spas, gymnasia,
for "gymnasiotherapy," amphitheaters for entertainment, libraries, and rooms
for patients, visitors, attendants, priests, and doctors. Aesculapia spread
throughout Greece and into the Roman empire. Id at 14-15.
306. Pestilence and disease were particular problems during the Crusades,
and there were a number of monastic and military hospitals and hospices for
the care of sick and exhausted pilgrims and crusaders. The first reference to
beds being provided for patients was in the foundation charter of the Knights
Hospitallers, dated 1113, which set up seven resthouses for sick or wounded
pilgrims on their way to the Holy Land. Id at 17-18.
Leprosy was another motivating factor in the establishment of hospitals in
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. "Lazar houses" were developed to treat
those afflicted with leprosy. These were generally crude structures, located on
the outskirts of town, which served to segregate lepers and to check the spread
of the disease by isolation and proper hygiene. Id. at 19.
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medical activities of religious leaders, and the barbers took over
surgery.307 Centuries later, even though the hospitals are still
dominated by the successors of the barbers, religious leaders
have returned to the hospice, to treat the spiritual ills of the
weary travelers within.
The "modern concept of hospice care dates back to the late
19th century, when an associate of Florence Nightingale opened
a home for the terminally ill in Dublin."scs It is not easy to de-
fine a 'hospice," because it is often not a place, but an out-pa-
tient program for the terminally ill and their families. In 1978,
the National Hospice Organization adopted the following defini-
tion of hospice, which is as good as any:
Hospice is a medically directed, nurse coordinated program providing
a continuum of home and inpatient care for the terminally ill patient
and family. It employs an interdisciplinary team acting under the di-
rection of an autonomous hospice administration. The program pro-
vides palliative and supportive care to meet the special needs arising
out of the physical, emotional, spiritual, social and economic stresses
which are experienced during the final stages of illness and during dy-
ing and bereavement. 3° 9
One of the greatest virtues of hospice care is that it takes
care of the terminally ill person in his home space.310 In fact,
the hospice takes care of everyone who inhabits the home
307. I& at 20.
308. Paul M. Sachner, Heroes in Our Own Backyard, ARECLECTURA
REC., Nov. 1988, at 82, 104.
309. The National Hospice Organization ("NHO"), formed in 1977, consists
of various institutional and individual members. NHO provides for the ex-
change of information between hospice groups, informs the public about hos-
pice care, and establishes and maintains standards for hospice care. JACK M.
ZIMMERMAN, HOSPICE: COmpi= CARE FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL 17 (2d ed.
1988).
The NHO and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care As-
sociations ("JCAHCA") are fighting a jurisdictional battle over the setting of
standards and the accreditation of hospices. Both are voluntary, nongovern-
mental bodies. Id at 26. Government involvement began in 1982, when Medi-
care began to provide hospice benefits to certified institutions. See the Health
Care Financial Administration regulations governing hospice care under the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982, section 122 of Pub-
lic Law 97-248, which set forth elaborate requirements for an organization to
meet in order to be certified for the purposes of participating in the Medicare
hospice benefit program. 96 Stat. 324, 356-63 (1982). In addition to federal leg-
islation, state legislative and regulatory requirements began to affect hospices
in the mid 1980s. ZIMMERMAN, supra, at 27.
310. Most hospice care in this country is delivered in the person's home.
Jacqueline Shaheen, New Jersey Q & A.- Making the Decision for Hospice
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1991, § 12, at 3. There are 1,700 hospices in the
United States. Frank Spencer-Molloy, Hospice Brings Dignity, HARTFORD
CouRANT, Aug. 21, 1991, at cl. Formal in-patient facilities, however, are rare.
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space.3 " This is one instance where the architect's approach of
looking at human problems in social context prevails. The pa-
tient is not seen as an isolated, autonomous individual, but as a
member of a family and a community. The pain of the mem-
bers of the deathwatch is not only expressly recognized, but ad-
dressed. Most hospices provide counseling for friends and
family members before and after the death of the patient,
sometimes for longer than a year,312 and there is evidence that
bereaved survivors of hospice patients experience much less
painful and protracted periods of mourning31 3 The patient too
does not suffer the isolation and loneliness that often comes
with a hospital death. He is restored to the center of the circle,
in his own home space, and his dying and his deathwatch once
again have social meaning. He does not die alone.
Sometimes hospice care takes place outside the home, for a
variety of reasons,3 14 and it is in the design of in-patient care
Amy Dunkin, Tender Care for Terminal Patients, Bus. WEEK, Mar 25, 1991, at
107.
311. The National Hospice Organization's Standards of a Hospice Program
of Care lists the "unit of care" as the "patient/family." ANNE MUNLEY, THE
HOSPICE ALTERNATIVE app. A at 320 (1983).
312. Most states have licensing requirements that include the provision of
year-long bereavement counseling for family members following the death of
the hospice patient. Danni Sabota, Hospice Becomes a Business as Well as an
Approach, HOUSTON Bus. J., Aug. 6, 1990, § 1, at 17.
313. In a recent study of bereaved survivors whose family members had re-
ceived hospice care from a hospital based hospice program, survivors reported
that "routine, pre-death, work of the hospice team had a noticeable and posi-
tive impact on their subsequent well-being in bereavement." Ruth Huber &
John W. Gibson, New Evidence for Anticipatory G 6 HOSPICE J. 49, 65
(1990). The study included a new clinical tool called the "10-Mile Mourning
Bridge," which represents the grief process. Conceptually, bereaved individu-
als successfully crosses the bridge when "they are able to reinvest their emo-
tional energy into new interests or relationships." Id at 55; see also Linda L.
Steele, The Death Surround: Factors Influencing the Grief Experience of Sur-
vivors, 17 ONCOLOGY NuRSING F. 235 (1990) (finding that survivors of termi-
nally ill people who had participated in a hospice program prior to the death
showed "decreased feelings of guilt, dependency, loss of control, despair,
numbness, shock, and disbelief").
314. While home care may be an ideal way to care for a dying family mem-
ber, one doctor noted that the ideal may not be possible for many patients.
Many patients do not have the financial means to afford home care. Many pa-
tients do not have family, and for those patients who do have a family, "work
or other obligations may restrict the time a family can spend on the patient."
Morris D. Kerstein, M.D., Caring for the Terminally Il" A Hospice, 129 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 237, 237 (1972) (letter to the editor). Dr. Kerstein urged more
hospice care, recommending that hospices be affiliated with major universities
so they could be used to teach and provide research data in sociology, nursing,
and theology, as well as undergraduate and graduate medicine. This "combi-
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hospices that architects have shown themselves to be light-
years ahead of doctors and lawyers in their concern for mem-
bers of the deathwatch.3 15 St. Christopher's Hospice in London
was the model. Consider the following description of St.
Christopher's:
There are mainly wards, with few private rooms. Each bed has a col-
orful curtain around it, and there are some transparent partial panels.
Personal touches, such as flowers, paintings, comfortable lounge
chairs, and wood, give a feeling of warmth. In addition to the wards,
there are family rooms for visits and a large room for group activities
.... Each patient brings his own personal belongings. Hospital gowns
are not used. Bedside cabinets are of wood. The beds are simple and
low enough for easy egress and ingress. Five huge, down pillows are
supplied each patient .... Children of all ages, including infants, are
permitted to come and go freely in all wards, hallways, and dayrooms
.... The actual event of death is managed with dignity. The dying
patient is not isolated behind curtains. All patients in the ward area
are aware of what is transpiring. The lack of suffering, in fact the ab-
solute absence of patient distress, is the unique factor permitting the
staff and other patients to overcome their fear of death.
316
nation of disciplines would allow this supportive group to be more realistically
aware of the patient and of his family life-style." Id at 238.
315. Despite the hospice movement, it is not clear that the medical profes-
sion has truly changed its attitudes and practices toward the dying patient.
One study reviewed medical charts to study the terminal care practices at a
hospital and two in-patient hospices. While the hospital patients had more di-
agnostic tests and laboratory charges, the physician' notes about the patients'
families or nonmedical aspects of the illness were infrequent at all three insti-
tutions. Henry S. Perkins, M.D. & Albert R. Jonsen, M.D., Dying Right in
Theory and Practice.- What Do We Really Know of Terminal Care?, 145
ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 1460, 1460-63 (1985).
The study distinguished between "curative" therapy and "palliative care."
I& at 1462. "Palliative care" has become a euphemism for "hospice" in Ameri-
can hospitals. When my great-aunt was dying of cancer last year in St. Luke's
hospital in New York City, she told me that she had received a call from a
nurse in the "palliative care" unit. She then asked me where in the body the
"palliative" was located.
316. Liegner, supra note 223, at 1047-48. But see David K. Reynolds, Ph.D.
& Richard A. Kalish, Ph.D., The Social Ecology of Dying: Observations of
Wards for the Terminally Ill, 25 Hosp. & CoMiMUNiY PSYCHIATRY 147 (1974)
(describing how dying occurs in three extended care wards in a Veterans' Ad-
ministration Hospital).
Reynolds and Kalish found almost no social interaction among the pa-
tients: "Many patients lie mute in bed; others, sitting in wheel chairs by their
beds all day, say little or nothing to their roommates." Id In the solarium,
the researchers found "seven wheel chairs facing in seven directions, no one
facing anyone else, no one talking or even watching the jumping and unclear
images on the TV screen." Id. at 148. Many patients had no visitors, even at
the time of their death, and many others had guardians or socially distant rela-
tives who only showed up when they died. There were no chairs at the pa-
tients' bedsides, and ambulatory patients sometimes used wheel chairs to
assure themselves of a place to sit down. The staff controlled the temperature
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The first freestanding hospice in the United States was a
project of Hospice, Inc., a New Haven, Connecticut, nonprofit
group.317 Lo-Yi Chan was the architect, and he was particularly
challenged by the maintenance of a proper balance between iso-
lation and privacy. Experience in English hospices had shown
that the dying patient actually needed other people around him
more than privacy, since privacy came to signify isolation and
abandonment.318 Chan found that the space requirements for
hospices differed from those of an acute care facility or a nurs-
ing home because of the importance of "interdisciplinary care
and family participation."3 19 Thus, Chan designed the rooms in
the New Haven Hospice to have approximately twenty feet
around each bed to accommodate visitors and family mem-
bers.3 20 Here was an architect who recognized the importance
of the deathwatch, and offered its members a legitimate space
to stand in. Perhaps I make too much of twenty feet of floor
space, but on a symbolic level, those twenty feet represent for
me a glimmer of hope that the horrors of dying alone in the
late twentieth century might come to an end.321
and lighting. Lights were turned on at 2:15 a.m. to change incontinent pa-
tients, and all patients were awakened at 4:00 am., even though breakfast did
not arrive until 8:00 am. The smell of the ward was "objectionable at first,
although one becomes adjusted to it in a few minutes." Id.
317. Lo-Yi Chan, Hospice A New Building Type to Comfort the Dying,
AM. INST. ARcHrrEcrs J., Dec. 1976, at 42, 42.
318. Id. at 44.
319. Id. at 43.
320. Judith Kohn, Hospice Building Speaks on Many Emotional Levels to
Patients, Family, MOD. HEALTHCARE (SHORT-TERM CARE), Oct. 1976, at 56, 57.
321. Lo-Yi Chan is one of many architects who have turned to the
problems of hospice design. William Bregner, the architect of an addition to
St. Mary's Hospital in Bayside, Queens, a palliative care unit or hospice for dy-
ing children, has also been sensitive to the needs of the members of the death-
watch. The unit accommodates ten terminally ill patients aged 2 to 16 with
life expectancies of up to one year. At a washer/dryer area, families could
"meet and share their thoughts." Monica Geran, Hospice for Children, INTE-
RIOR DEsIGN, Feb. 1986, at 192, 194. There was ample space for visitation, and
relatives could place convertible chairs next to the beds so they could "stay
overnight and maintain hand-to-hand contact with the child." Id Grieving
parents could retreat to a lounge on another floor so their behavior would not
upset the patients. In hindsight, Breger would have expanded these facilities.
Id.
When the University of Michigan overhauled its health-care facilities in
1980, it studied the use of the hospital by the "forgotten users," the patients
and their families. Not only did the researchers look into the nonmedical
needs of the patients, but they were also concerned about visiting friends and
family:
While the inpatient is whisked from admitting to the cocoon of his
room, his illness, and his treatment, it is his companions or visitors
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How could the legal profession help people who want to die
at home, or who want to care for their dying family members
or friends, to do so? First, they could get involved in projects
that would create more hospices. Despite the desirability of
hospice care, and even its cost effectiveness,m there simply are
not enough hospices to go around. For many, if not most, ter-
minally ill patients in this country, hospice care is not available;
in particular, there is a scarcity of in-patient hospice beds.S23
Lawyers are often involved in the development of health care
facilities, and recognition by the legal profession that a hospice
is an option for the care of the terminally ill could go far in
promoting the hospice movement.3 2
who brave the confusions and complexities of the establishment to
find the patient's room, the nearest telephone, restroom, or cup of cof-
fee, or a place to await medical verdicts.
ARCHITECTURAL REC., June 1986, at 116 (reviewing JANEr M. CARPMAN Er AL.,
DESIGN THAT CAREs: PLANNING HEALTH FACILxIS FOR PATIENTS AND VIsI.
TOES (1986)).
Many in-patient hospices have open visiting hours and permit overnight
guests. Space for extra beds in the patient's room is provided, and extra chairs
can be brought in when the deathwatch finally takes place. MUNLEY, supra
note 311, at 63, 66.
322. Hospice care is gradually being recognized as more cost-effective in
cases of terminal illness than hospital care. Rob Mosbacher, chairman of the
Texas Board of Human Services, estimated, "It's costing roughly half as much
for hospice care as it is for institutional care or hospitalization. In fact, it's
probably the low end, conservative. We think it is probably upwards in many
cases, of perhaps four to one." Sabota, supra note 312, § 1, at 17. For example,
the average daily hospital stay in 1988 cost $950. Inpatient hospice care aver-
aged a daily charge of $346, and home care hospice costs ran about $80 per day.
Since many patients are covered by Medicare/Medicaid, insurance companies
are now providing the hospice package established by Medicare. Under that
program, the daily cost of $361.35 for inpatient care and $81.63 for home care
covers all services, medication, and equipment. Id.
323. The scarcity of hospice beds is a serious problem in this country. Most
formal inpatient hospice services are geared for patients with a prognosis of
less than six months' survival, and who consider themselves in a "palliative
treatment mode, with no desire for cardiopulmonary resuscitation." J. Cain,
M.D. et al., The Quality of Dying: Financial, Psychological, and Ethical Di-
lemmas, 76 OBSTRmcs & GYNECOLOGY, 149, 151 (1990). In one large metro-
politan county with a population of 1.5 million, there were only 12 beds; they
were available at a cost in excess of $300 a day. Insurance coverage was based
on skilled care needs; patients who needed extensive custodial and comfort
care, but not skilled care, had to pay more than $9000 per month. Neverthe-
less, there was long waiting list for these 12 beds. Id-
In a nursing home, the average costs are $2500 per month, and again in-
surance does not cover costs unless skilled care is needed. Beds in nursing
homes are also scarce, since many homes do not have the skilled staff or the
psychological support necessary to provide terminal care. I& at 151-52.
324. Lawyers could be more aggressive in recommending hospice care to
clients for whom it would be appropriate. Close to three-fifths of the families
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Second, the legal profession could be instrumental in devel-
oping a national system to make hospice care available to those
who cannot afford to pay. As it now stands, there are gaps in
Medicare coverage for hospice care; dying younger adults and
children are not eligibleaas Thus, even if there were a hospice
available, many of the patients who might benefit from its serv-
ices are too poor to bear the cost alone. Perhaps amending the
existing federal scheme is not the answer. After all, the hos-
pice movement was in many ways a reaction against the dehu-
manizing experience of a hospital death. The tradition in
England was a free-standing hospice facility unaffiliated with a
hospital. That tradition did not survive the journey across the
Atlantic, however. Most hospice care in this country is affili-
ated with a hospital,32 and there have been instances in which
the existing funding system and criteria established by third
party payers have forced the hospice to fit the hospital mold.32
interviewed in one study received no information about hospice care after ter-
minal cancer had been discovered. David S. Gochman & Gordon S. Bonham,
The Social Structure of the Hospice Decision, 6 HOSPICE J. 15, 30 (1990). Data
from physicians confirmed that they were not communicating information
about hospice care to terminally ill patients and their families. The study did
not even mention lawyers, presumably because they were not identified by
families as a source of information. As a group, "friends" most often commu-
nicated information about hospices. I& at 32.
325. One gap in the insurance coverage for hospice care involves younger
people who are dying and not eligible for Medicare. Although some private
insurance companies provide hospice benefits, and hospice programs fre-
quently try to provide services on a sliding fee scale, the expense can still be
prohibitive. Shaheen, supra note 310, § 12, at 3.
Until recently, children have had very little in the way of hospice care,
despite the fact that approximately 100,000 children die annually in the United
States. Most hospice programs in the early 1980s could not accept children as
patients. Ann Armstrong-Dailey, Children's Hospice Care, 16 PEDIATRIc
NuRSING 337, 339 (1990). Children's Hospice International ("CHI") was
formed in 1983 to improve the availability and quality of hospice care for chil-
dren. CHI serves as a training and conference center, publishes training
manuals, and supports efforts to expand awareness of the benefits of chil-
dren's hospice care. A children's hospice in Alexandria, Virginia was sched-
uled to open in 1991. The facility was "designed to feel like home, complete
with playrooms and toys. It will have 14 beds for children and space for visit-
ing parents." IA
326. Janet Plant, Finding a Home for Hospice Care in the United States,
HOSPITALS, July 1, 1977, at 54, 57.
327. For example, St. Luke's Hospital Center, a teaching facility in New
York City, was one of the first to establish a hospital-based team that provided
a combination of home care and in-patient services. St. Luke's did not group
the hospice inpatients together in a special unit. Instead, it assigned them to
various floors in the hospital, fearing that the hospital might otherwise lose its
standing with third-party payers as an acute-care facility. I& at 58, 61.
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Hospicizing the hospital may end up hospitalizing the hospice.
Instead of building upon the structure that generated the prob-
lem in the first place, we may need to get out a shovel and
break new ground32s
Third, the legal profession could help develop licensing
standards for the various professionals who work in hospices to
ensure quality care and to avoid the risk of abuse by greedy and
exploitative individuals who might want to get rich quick from
the death racket.3 -9
Fourth, lawyers could help fashion creative solutions that
combine some form of hospice care with already existing health
care facilities. The Mayo Clinic, for example, has recently
purchased a hotel across the street from its surgical facility, and
discharges patients to spend a few days there. The family can
then come and stay with the patient, administer medication,
and care for him, but if complications arise, immediate medical
attention is available across the street sm Such a move across
the street to an environment that is more like a home space
might be a possible solution for families who cannot care for
the dying person in the home. It would allow a meaningful
328. See Sandra S. Ikuta, Dying at the Right Time: A Critical Legal Theory
Approach to Timing-of-Death Issues, 5 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 65 (1989).
329. Most states have licensing requirements for hospices. See supra note
309 and accompanying text. However, there are not always licensing require-
ments for the professionals who work in hospices. Nurses are a perfect exam-
ple.
The nursing profession has seen proposals to educate and certify nurses in
hospice care. These nurses would receive special training in such things as
pain management, home pain management, instruction of family members in
home care, crisis management, and bereavement counseling. One article pro-
posed two levels of hospice education. The first level would certify the nurse
as a "hospice nurse certified" who would deliver patient/family hospice care;
the second level would certify him as a "hospice nurse advanced" who would
educate and administer hospice care programs. Marjorie C. Dobratz, Hospice
Nursing: Present Perspectives and Future Directives, 13 CANCER NURSING 116,
116 (1990).
330. See Sanders, supra note 292, at 48. The University of Texas M.D. An-
derson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas, is currently building a new patient-
family facility, the Jesse H. Jones Rotary House International. Unlike the
Mayo Clinic arrangement, patients will not be discharged to Rotary House;
rather, it will operate as a hotel. The facility has been specially designed to
provide a comfortable, home-like atmosphere for patients and their families
while also taking into account the patients' physical needs. Guest rooms will
be larger than industry standards to accommodate wheelchairs and medical
appliances. Furthermore, a resource center will offer education programs for
patients and family members on how to care for themselves and cope with
their disease. Office of Public Affairs, M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, Univer-
sity of Texas, Press Release 1, 1-2 (Oct. 12, 1990).
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deathwatch to take place, yet the medical services of a hospital
would be only a few steps away. In New York State, to cite an-
other example, there has been a move recently for hospices to
enter into contracts with individual nursing homes to provide
care for terminally ill nursing home residents. 331 These kinds
of creative solutions require complicated negotiations, ex-
changes of promises and expectations; in short, they require the
skill and imagination of legal minds.
So lawyers do have something to contribute: setting up the
legal relations that create a space in which a meaningful death-
watch can take place. We are professional wordsmiths, and our
words are instrumental. We can make things happen with our
words: words of contract, words of legislation, words of persua-
sion and legitimation. Our law words can help carve out of the
universe a warm space in which our fellow human beings can
gather upon the death of one of their own.
That warm space is called home.
There was one other thing Colin said that keeps ringing in
my ears. It is a high pitched sound, and unpleasant, like
tinnitus.
He said this:
In a way, the inability to have a meaningful deathwatch in a hospital
is your own fault. I don't mean you personally, but the fault of law-
yers. Most doctors I know are panicked about being sued. If the doc-
tor opens the door and lets a lot of people into the room to watch the
patient die, somebody's cousin is going to be a lawyer, and before you
know it, the doctor will end up in court. I wouldn't want to open that
331. This move results from a 1989 federal law permitting Medicaid reim-
bursement for hospice patients living in nursing homes. Medicare Cata-
strophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, § 101(b)(2), 103
Stat. 1979, 1980 (1989). In May 1991, the New York Department of Social Serv-
ices implemented an interim system whereby hospices could be reimbursed for
care inside nursing homes in New York. Before this, nursing home residents
in New York were not eligible for hospice care. Mary Baker, Hospice Con-
tracts Seen Cutting Health Spending, CAP. DisT. Bus. REv., May 27, 1991, § 1,
at 1.
One local health-care industry analyst estimated that the new law could
more than double New York hospice business in the state's 80 hospices. The
state would reimburse hospices with patients in nursing homes at 95% of the
nursing home rate. At that point, the contract between the hospice and the
nursing home would determine how the nursing home would be reimbursed
for its care of the patient. If the patient were eligible for Medicare coverage,
the federal government would pay the cost of hospice care in the nursing
home. This would prevent the transfer of terminally-ill nursing home resi-
dents to hospitals where "they are likely to be subjected to aggressive and
costly life-extending medical procedures." Id
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door either. It's like inviting an audience in to witness your failure,
your inability to keep out the ultimate uninvited guest, the specter of
human death.
Those words are still humming in my head, disturbing my
equilibrium. There is some truth to them. Although I like to
think the law could alleviate indirectly the pain of the mem-
bers of the deathwatch, the lawyer might just bring the death-
watch to an end. After all, his relationship with human failure
is parasitic; he needs someone to stumble in order to survive.
And as long as the doctor perceives death to be such a failure,
he is never going to let the lawyer into the room.
Perhaps as lawyers we could make a small gift to the mem-
bers of the deathwatch-a small gift, but one from the heart.
Just as judges should be generous to those who engage in death
talk, so should we be generous to those who take care of them.
When we ourselves become members of a deathwatch, when we
enter that ritual space to attend, we should leave our law words
behind.
There are times in life, and in death, when no one needs
our dutiful prose. Only our prayers and our poetry.
Right Hemisphere Coda
Mourning Shore
For some reason
I come into the day
a little sad.
I always have.
At night we drift
in black waters of
some foreign sea.
Elemental simplicity,
no structural demands,
no boundaries,
wetness binds the gases
and molecular integrity
is easy to maintain.
The moon is our pilot
on that journey
dark and deep
and of such beauty
rough earth words
could never tell
of our collective sleep.
On sand hot white
I crack
and suck the air
in crude exchange.
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The ends of hands,
of tongue, of feet,
begin the definition,
the solitude
of finite form,
the sickness of gravity.
For some reason
I come into the day
a little sad.
I always have.
Solidity
From salty water,
wordless we come in,
wrapped in white cotton
by the hands of others.
Horizontal, heavy headed,
all mouth and tongue,
unaware that we begin
or that we end,
searching with eyes that look
but do not see
for interpreters
of our infancy,
to give meaning where
there is no meaning
beyond pain and need,
and dependency.
Slowly we come into our words,
words that yield boundaries:
The carapace of self,
the mystery of other,
the tyranny of corners,
and edges of things.
Vertical, head erect,
we shed white cotton and
the hands of others,
and construct a world of words,
words that make water
turn into ice.
And though we think
that what we name
stands still,
it does not.
Solidity is a cheap
word trick.
What is named is really
just slow water.
Wordless, we go out,
wrapped in white cotton,
by the hands of others.
This time, there is a text,
the text of memory,
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to yield an interpretation
of our senility.
Old words, our old words,
lying around in random patterns,
on the sand,
words of laughter,
thrown out at the sea,
on some nameless day
of sun and dogs and levity.
Or whispers dropped softly
in the dark
at the bottom of sea pools,
left along the beach,
when the tide ran out,
and the moon
cast its cool light
on our discovery.
The transiency of sun,
of surf,
and our solidity.
Those who wrap white cotton,
be wise about those words.
The detritus of expression.
Solid waste.
The meaning they bear belongs
to those who do the interpretation,
not to the author of the text
who floats out to sea,
silent, free
in saline liquidity.
Mistakes About Water
That dark night
I was pulled out to sea,
it was just a mistake
about water.
They called it the East River
which led me to believe
I could dance on its shores
with impunity.
But when I lost my footing,
I tasted salt,
and felt the power
of the moon,
and quickly apprehended-
They were wrong.
It was a tidal estuary
and no place to dance
at all.
It was just a mistake
about water.
Beckoned by those
who saw me fall,
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and rescued my identity
when they could not
rescue me,
you arrived.
The members of my deathwatch.
One by one,
in solemn procession,
you descended
that dangerous
brown bank
to witness my departure,
to attend,
to stay with me.
I would not
be alone in my
going out to sea.
Your presence
so startled me,
those sad eyes,
and outstretched hands,
those words of sorrow
and supplication,
my body found
the will to swim
toward beauty,
and love,
and terror
on the shore.
Even though
the decision
was unilateral,
made without consultation,
I do not begrudge
my body's domination.
It cannot help itself;
it is just a poor
living thing.
But someday,
I will make another mistake
about water.
And when you arrive,
one by one,
in solemn procession,
the members of my deathwatch.
Do not make a mistake
about water.
Let me go,
for I have seen
the green glory
of the sea,
and known the freedom
of not being me.
DEATHWATCH

